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ABSTRACT
Approaches and Techniques for Fingerprinting and Attributing Probing
Activities by Observing Network Telescopes
Elias Bou-Harb, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2015
The explosive growth, complexity, adoption and dynamism of cyberspace over the
last decade has radically altered the globe. A plethora of nations have been at the very
forefront of this change, fully embracing the opportunities provided by the advancements
in science and technology in order to fortify the economy and to increase the productivity
of everyday’s life. However, the significant dependence on cyberspace has indeed brought
new risks that often compromise, exploit and damage invaluable data and systems. Thus,
the capability to proactively infer malicious activities is of paramount importance. In
this context, generating cyber threat intelligence related to probing or scanning activities
render an effective tactic to achieve the latter.
In this thesis, we investigate such malicious activities, which are typically the precursors
of various amplified, debilitating and disrupting cyber attacks. To achieve this task, we
analyze real Internet-scale traffic targeting network telescopes or darknets, which are de-
fined by routable, allocated yet unused Internet Protocol addresses.
First, we present a comprehensive survey of the entire probing topic. Specifically, we cat-
egorize this topic by elaborating on the nature, strategies and approaches of such probing
activities. Additionally, we provide the reader with a classification and an exhaustive re-
view of various techniques that could be employed in such malicious activities. Finally, we
iii
depict a taxonomy of the current literature by focusing on distributed probing detection
methods.
Second, we focus on the problem of fingerprinting probing activities. To this end, we
design, develop and validate approaches that can identify such activities targeting enter-
prise networks as well as those targeting the Internet-space. On one hand, the corporate
probing detection approach uniquely exploits the information that could be leaked to the
scanner, inferred from the internal network topology, to perform the detection. On the
other hand, the more darknet tailored probing fingerprinting approach adopts a statistical
approach to not only detect the probing activities but also identify the exact technique
that was employed in the such activities.
Third, for attribution purposes, we propose a correlation approach that fuses probing
activities with malware samples. The approach aims at detecting whether Internet-scale
machines are infected or not as well as pinpointing the exact malware type/family, if the
machines were found to be compromised. To achieve the intended goals, the proposed
approach initially devises a probabilistic model to filter out darknet misconfiguration traf-
fic. Consequently, probing activities are correlated with malware samples by leveraging
fuzzy hashing and entropy based techniques. To this end, we also investigate and report
a rare Internet-scale probing event by proposing a multifaceted approach that correlates
darknet, malware and passive dns traffic.
Fourth, we focus on the problem of identifying and attributing large-scale probing cam-
paigns, which render a new era of probing events. These are distinguished from previous
probing incidents as (1) the population of the participating bots is several orders of mag-
nitude larger, (2) the target scope is generally the entire Internet Protocol (IP) address
space, and (3) the bots adopt well-orchestrated, often botmaster coordinated, stealth scan
strategies that maximize targets’ coverage while minimizing redundancy and overlap. To
this end, we propose and validate three approaches. On one hand, two of the approaches
rely on a set of behavioral analytics that aim at scrutinizing the generated traffic by the
probing sources. Subsequently, they employ data mining and graph theoretic techniques
iv
to systematically cluster the probing sources into well-defined campaigns possessing sim-
ilar behavioral similarity. The third approach, on the other hand, exploit time series
interpolation and prediction to pinpoint orchestrated probing campaigns and to filter out
non-coordinated probing flows.
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Cyberspace is the electronic world created by interconnected networks of information tech-
nology and the information on those networks. It can be defined as the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructure, including the Internet, telecommuni-
cation networks, computer systems, and embedded industrial processors and controllers.
Cyberspace is a global commons where more than 1.7 billion people are linked together
to exchange ideas and services [8]. Moreover, it underpins almost every facet of a modern
society and provides critical support for the economy, civil infrastructure, public safety,
and national security. Cyberspace is controlled and operated using information and com-
munication technologies. The latter could be considered as the nervous system of our
today’s world, as critical infrastructure such as telecommunication, transportation, finan-
cial services, agriculture, electric grids and public health services profoundly depend on it
for their successful operations.
It is evident that individuals, industry and governments are embracing the many
advantages that cyberspace offers. According to two recent reports [8, 9], 87% of North
American corporations used the cyberspace to conduct business, where the online sales
revenue due to that were estimated at $62.7 billion. Moreover in 2013, 74% of households
had paid Internet service, 59% of personal tax filings were completed electronically and
67% of North Americans had banked online. Furthermore, governments have also become
increasingly dependent on the Internet. The Canadian federal Government alone offers
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more than 130 commonly used services online, including tax returns, employment insur-
ance forms and student loan applications [10]. Thus nowadays, the success of cyberspace
is an essential asset which demands protection against malicious misuse and other destruc-
tive attacks. This task is indispensable yet very challenging.
Recent events have indeed demonstrated that cyberspace could be subjected, at the
speed of light and in full anonymity, to severe attacks with drastic consequences. One
particular research revealed that 90% of corporations have been the target of a cyber
attack, with 80% suffering a significant financial loss [11]. In addition, the cyber security
report [8] elaborated that in a recent one year period, 86% of large North American
organizations had suffered a cyber attack where the loss of intellectual property as a
result of these attacks doubled between 2011 and 2013. Moreover, the report alarmed
that more than 60% of all the malicious code ever detected, originating from more than
190 countries, was introduced into cyberspace solely in 2013. In general, cyberspace could
facilitate the following cyber attacks:
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [12]: It is an attempt to make a computer or
network resources unavailable. It consists of attacks that are deployed to temporar-
ily or indefinitely shutdown services. The timing of such attacks can be coordinated
to exploit the availability of critical organization infrastructure by directing enor-
mous flood of Internet traffic towards a small set of targeted Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses. By flooding the available bandwidth with intensive traffic, DDoS can
effectively bring down a service with potential loss of financial revenue.
• Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) [13]: These cyber attacks employ high stealthy
techniques and are typically target-specific threats. They are advanced since their
operators have a full spectrum of intelligence-gathering techniques at their disposal.
APTs assign priorities to specific tasks rather than opportunistically seek informa-
tion for financial or other gain. The attack is typically conducted through continuous
monitoring and interaction in order to achieve the defined objectives. Further, such
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attacks are executed by coordinated human actions rather than just relying on au-
tomated pieces of code. Their operators are often very skilled, motivated, organized
and well funded by external organizations.
• Zero-day Attacks [14]: These attacks exploit the observation of newly discovered yet
un-patched vulnerabilities to achieve their malicious tasks. While a number of de-
tection mechanisms have been proposed to protect against these attacks, including,
access control lists on the edge network, port-knocking and application white-listing
[15], these cyber attacks are still very dominant and pose serious issues and chal-
lenges.
• Cyber Terrorism: With the increase of cyber warfare incidents such as Stuxnet [16]
and the Russian-Georgian War [17], cyber attacks can shift from targeting corpo-
rations to targeting governments and military facilities. With the ever escalating
political tension between various world parties, these cyber attacks are becoming a
fourth dimension of warfare [18] and a leading advantage to their operators.
Further, numerous incidents demonstrated that cyberspace has been exposed to am-
plified, debilitating and disrupting cyber attacks leading to drastic impacts on provided
network and Internet services. For instance, Google has recently been targeted by a cyber
attack in which 7 of its services, including, maps, news and translator, were hacked and
defaced [19]. Further, a leading North American university has lately announced that a
critical online database containing students and professors sensitive information, including
social insurance numbers, addresses, and salaries, has been leaked to an anonymous party
[20]. Another academic institute disclosed that several high-ranked employees’ direct-
deposit earnings have been hijacked and redirected to unknown and untraceable bank
accounts [21]. Moreover, the Petroleum Producers’ Associate, an oil and gaz organiza-
tion, suffered from a devastating cyber attack that hit its website and its operations [22].
Another example would be numerous governmental websites of the United States, Russia,
Finland, Pakistan, and Armenia that were also recently deemed as victims of cyber crime
[23, 24, 25]. Indeed, despite efforts to protect the cyberspace, the latest reports from
senior government officials [26] highlighted that only limited progress has been made in
3
improving the cyber security of crucial networks.
1.1 Context and Motivation
Probing, the task of scanning enterprise networks or Internet wide services, searching for
vulnerabilities or ways to infiltrate IT assets, is a significant cyber security concern. The
latter is due to the fact that probing is commonly the primary stage of an intrusion attempt
that enables an attacker to remotely locate, target, and subsequently exploit vulnerable
systems. It is basically a core technique and a facilitating factor of the above mentioned
and others cyber attacks. For instance, hackers have employed probing techniques to iden-
tify numerous misconfigured proxy servers at the New York Times to access a sensitive
database that disclosed more than 3,000 social security numbers [27]. Further, the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) revealed that attackers had
performed coordinated probing activities to fingerprint WordPress sites and consequently
launched their targeted attacks [28]. Moreover, it was disclosed that hackers had lever-
aged sophisticated scanning events to orchestrate multiple breaches of Sony’s PlayStation
Network taking it oﬄine for 24 days and costing the company an estimated $171 million
[29]. More alarming, a recent incident reported that attackers had escalated a series of
“surveillance missions” against cyber-physical infrastructure operating various US energy
firms that permitted the hackers to infiltrate the control-system software and subsequently
manipulate oil and gas pipelines [30]. Thus, it is not surprising that Panjwani et al. [31]
concluded that a momentous 70% of attacks against cyber systems are preceded by some
form of probing activity.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this thesis is to generate cyber threat intelligence related to the
inference and attribution of probing activities. Indeed, the capability to infer and attribute
probing activities is a very important task to achieve, as this will aid in preventing cyber
attacks from occurring or vulnerabilities from being exploited. Specifically, the mentioned
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aim could be clarified by the following three complementary objectives:
• Provide inferences and insights to enterprise networks related to their perceived prob-
ing activities in addition to generating global cyber intelligence related to Internet-
wide malicious activities.
• Investigate probing activities in an attempt to attribute such activities to certain
malware infections as well as to certain Internet-scale malicious events.
• Design approaches that can infer and attribute large-scale probing campaigns, which
refer to a very recent phenomenon of such activities.
This thesis attempts to tackle the above mentioned objectives. To this end, our
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Design and implementation of approaches for inferring probing activities.
• Design and implementation of correlation mechanisms between probing activities,
malware samples and passive dns traffic for attribution purposes.
• Design and implementation of approaches and techniques for inferring and attribut-
ing large-scale probing campaigns.
It is worthy to mention that the outcome of this thesis has been published in [32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 7, 37, 38]. Moreover, other work, which was executed during the course of
the Ph.D. but is not included in the thesis, has appeared in [39, 40, 41, 42, 43].
1.3 Organization
The road-map of this thesis is as follows. In the next Chapter, we provide a survey related
to the probing topic. Further, we provide necessary background information related to
network telescopes and show how it can be exploited to generate various cyber threat
intelligence. In Chapter 3, we elaborate on the work related to the design, implementation
and validation of approaches for inferring enterprise and Internet-scale probing activities.
In Chapter 4, we describe the design and implementation of a correlation mechanism
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between probing and malware activities for attribution purposes. To this end, we also
report a rare Internet-scale malicious event by executing a multifaceted approach that
correlates three types of real cyber security data. In Chapter 5, we tackle the problem
of inferring and attributing large-scale probing campaigns. In this context, we present,
validate, compare and contrast three devised approaches. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes
this thesis, summarizes its contributions and highlights some research gaps that pave the




In this chapter, we present a comprehensive survey of the entire probing topic. Further,
we disclose necessary background information that aims at facilitating the highlighted
concepts in this thesis.
2.1 Cyber Scanning: A Comprehensive Survey
This section presents a comprehensive survey of the entire probing topic. It categorizes
cyber scanning by elaborating on its nature, strategies and approaches. It as well provides
the reader with a classification and an exhaustive review of its techniques. Moreover,
it taxonomies the current literature by focusing on distributed cyber scanning detection
methods.
2.1.1 Related Surveys
Although probing or cyber scanning has been studied before, especially its detection tech-
niques, the literature still lacks a survey that provides the readers, coming from different
backgrounds, with a comprehensive coverage of the topic. For instance, Barnett et al. [44]
solely focused on scanning techniques by providing a taxonomy. Their taxonomy analyzed
three main scanning techniques, namely, TCP, UDP and ICMP scans. They presented
the techniques using patterns and utilized scanning speed as an additional attribute. In
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another survey, Bhuyan et al. [45] elaborated on port scans and their detection method-
ologies. This survey highlighted on single-source and distributed detection techniques.
Moreover, it provided some information on available detection data sets and evaluation
metrics. The above two surveys are the closest to the work that we present in this section.
However in this manuscript, we assert that we further contribute in the following points:
1. By primarily providing a categorization of the entire probing topic. We achieve this
by discussing cyber scanning’s nature, approaches and strategies. This offers the
readers a strong, coherent and a clear entry point into the topic.
2. By providing a classification for 19 cyber scanning techniques. We thoroughly fur-
ther discuss this exhaustive and comprehensive list of techniques, and provide their
advantages and disadvantages. We as well present a complete summary of those
techniques.
3. By withdrawing a unique literature taxonomy of distributed cyber scanning detection
methodologies. This as well covers new material after 2010, the year of the latest
related survey [45].
2.1.2 Cyber Scanning: Nature, Strategies & Approaches
In this section, we provide a categorization of the entire cyber scanning topic as depicted
in Figure 2.1. We further present a discussion that elaborates on the nature, strategies
and approaches of cyber scanning.
Nature of Cyber Scanning
The cyber scanning topic can be first classified based on its nature. The nature deals with
whether the scanning or probing is performed actively or passively. In this section, we
present those criteria and consequently discuss their advantages and disadvantages.
Active Scanning: Active scanning is the process of identifying network services by
injecting certain packets known as the probe packets towards network hosts and devices


















Figure 2.1: A Categorization of the Cyber Scanning Topic
malicious adversaries to probe a network for certain vulnerabilities. However, active scan-
ning has a legitimate use as part of a robust network security policy. It allows a network
operator to discover the open services in the network in an attempt to check those for
known vulnerabilities. The probe packets could either be generic, targeting a specific pro-
tocol rather than a certain application, or they can be targeted, focusing on a precise host
application. An instance of a generic probe packet could be the typical TCP handshaking
procedure [46] for establishing a connection. The latter technique could be used to identify
services operating on well-known ports. However, this technique is deficient in two cases.
First, this method will only verify the readiness to open a TCP connection and not what
service is supported by the connection. Thus, it tends to misinterpret services running on
non standard ports. Second, it fails to classify services that have no standard ports, or
those that use dynamic port assignment such as services utilizing the remote procedure
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call (RPC) protocol [47]. UDP probing is another employed approach for active scanning.
Certain protocols, especially those running on well-known UDP ports, will successfully
respond to a UDP probe packet. Moreover, it can be indirectly inferred the presence of a
UDP service by lack of a negative response; many hosts automatically generate ICMP port
unreachable messages [31] when no process is listening to a given UDP port. Although a
lack of response is not definitive, but it might indicate the presence of a UDP service.
One example of active scanning is known as operating systems fingerprinting [48].
This procedure is rendered by the real-time attempt to remotely determine the operating
system (type and version) of a particular host of interest. The idea is to send packets
to a host so that any responses (or lack of responses) could be analyzed. The responses
to these sequences of packets form a signature or a fingerprint for the remote operating
system that can be compared against a signature database of known operating system
versions. Operating system fingerprinting takes advantage of the observation that each
operating system’s network stack [46] (i.e., software that implements the TCP/IP pro-
tocol) has slight variations in the way it responds to certain packets. These variations
offer the ability to determine the type of the remote host operating system. Another
example of active scanning is application fingerprinting [49]. It is the real-time action of
trying to remotely determine the applications or services running on a particular host of
interest. Servers routinely send information about the applications they are running to
client systems during normal connection activities. The initial text sent by servers during
a connection attempt is known as a banner. The act of harvesting banners during an
active identification of network systems and their applications [50] is an interesting and
a beneficial concept. For instance, banner grabbing would be routinely performed dur-
ing vulnerability testing (i.e., penetration testing) of the network. The software versions
advertised in application banners can identify potential security issues if it is determined
that the software version contains known vulnerabilities.
Passive Scanning: Passive scanning [51] identifies network services by observing
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traffic generated by servers and clients as it passes an observation point. Specialized hard-
ware or software could be inserted and installed at the monitoring point to successfully
establish passive monitoring. Many routers can ‘mirror’ ports, sending copies of packets
out another interface to a monitoring host. Furthermore, hardware taps such as optical
splitters place no additional burden on the router, but require a brief service interruption
to install. Alternatively, Wireshark [52] is one of the most prominent passive software tools.
Detection of well-known services (both TCP and UDP) with passive monitoring is
fairly straightforward. An exchange of traffic with a given host indicates an operational
service. For TCP, the monitoring host only need to capture TCP connection setup mes-
sages (i.e., the SYN packets [46]); completion of the three way handshake clearly indicates
that a service is available. Under normal operations, the presence of a positive response
to a connection request (SYN/ACK) is a sufficient evidence of a TCP service. UDP ser-
vices can also be identified by observing traffic; however, since UDP is a connectionless
protocol, the concept of ‘server’ and ‘client’ is not sufficiently clear without application
protocol information. In addition, while bi-directional traffic positively indicates a UDP
service, unidirectional traffic may also indicate a service (since UDP does not mandate
a response), but may as well indicate unsolicited probe traffic. As with active probing,
passive scanning can not identify services that do not run on well-known ports.
One example of passive monitoring is Passive Asset Detection System (PADS) [53].
The system is a signature-based software used to passively detect network assets using
application fingerprinting. It attempts to provide an accurate and current listing of the
hosts and services offered on the network. It utilizes the TCP, ARP, and ICMP protocols
[54] to perform its signature matching.
Discussion: Based on the aforementioned active and passive scanning descriptions,
we consequently discuss their advantages and disadvantages.
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In general, active scanning provides a comprehensive report of all open and unpro-
tected ports at the time of the probing. However, it will not detect ports that are filtered
by firewalls or obscured by mechanisms such as port knocking [55]. Active scanning typi-
cally performs very fast in achieving its task. The main disadvantage of active probing is
that it is very intrusive. Active probes solicit a response that would not have been sent
otherwise. This can be detected and logged by the host or intrusion detection systems,
particularly if one systematically scans all hosts in a region. A second disadvantage of
active scanning is that it does not identify hosts that may be temporarily unavailable
at the time of the scan. This disadvantage can be mitigated with multiple active scans,
although additional scans my draw further attention and hence increase the probability
of being detected.
Passive monitoring has the advantage of being non-intrusive. In fact, it generally
cannot be detected by either communication parties. A second advantage of passive mon-
itoring is that it can better detect active services running on transient hosts. Thus, it
is specifically effective against machines that are frequently powered off such as laptops,
or hosts temporarily disconnected from the network. Third, passive monitoring can de-
tect services that active probing misses because of firewall configurations. Fourth, passive
monitoring can also provide insights into trends and other behaviors which active probing
cannot. While monitoring servers, passive monitoring can also track clients, providing
extra information such as server popularity and server load. Finally, since passive moni-
toring consumes no network resources (other than the monitoring host), it can be run on
a long-term basis as part of normal network operations. The main disadvantage of passive
monitoring is that it only detects services that are active. Therefore, silent servers go un-
monitored, even though they may still pose vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, this disadvantage
can be mitigated by long term monitoring.
Cyber Scanning Strategies
Cyber scanning activity can as well be defined by which strategy it adopts. Mainly, we
can classify those strategies into four classes; remote to local scanning, local to remote
12
scanning, local to local scanning and remote to remote scanning. The first three classes
take into consideration the boundaries of a specific enterprise network and define the direc-
tion of the cyber scanning activity. Such activity can be generated by a diverse numbers
of hosts, targeting any number of hosts, and using various cyber scanning methods and
techniques.
The remote to local scanning refers to a remote host, outside the boundary of a
specific network, performing some sort of cyber scanning on a host inside the enterprise
network. This strategy is the most worrisome for enterprise network administrators as
they attempt to protect their IT infrastructure from unknown external adversaries. Local
to remote cyber scanning occurs when a host, within the administrative control of the
enterprise network, scan systems outside the network boundary. In this context, the scan-
ning host is performing network reconnaissance against external systems. This strategy
may cause serious legal issues against the enterprise network since its infrastructure would
be used for malicious purposes against Internet systems [56]. Moreover, local to local
cyber scanning refers to a host that scans systems within the boundaries of the enterprise
network in which it resides. Topological scanning worms [57] frequently employ this type
of scanning strategy. Local to local scanning activity can occur within or between network
subnets. Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the aforementioned discussed three strategies.
On the other hand, remote to remote scanning does not depend on certain bound-
aries. It can be defined as world wide cyber scanning campaigns. Rather than focusing
on a specific enterprise network as a target, this strategy aims at probing and sequentially
exploiting Internet’s wide services. This strategy is often distributed, possesses sophisti-
cated stealth capabilities and is typically highly coordinated. Chapter 5 of this thesis will
tackle the latter problem.
Cyber Scanning Approaches
The third classification of the cyber scanning topic, as shown in Figure 2.1, is based on





Figure 2.2: Remote to Local Probing
what is being targeted while the methods state how the cyber scanning is performed. The
latter are discussed subsequently.
Wide Range Cyber Scanning: Wide-range reconnaissance can be defined as the
rapid scanning of large blocks of Internet addresses in the search for a specific service or
vulnerability. Typically, there is little human interaction in this type of reconnaissance.
This is characteristic of auto-rooters [58] and worm propagation. Auto-rooters are com-
posite tools that augment basic port scanning functionality by launching an attack as soon
as an open port is located on a target system; they are often used for the rapid enrollment
of vulnerable systems into botnets [59] compromised systems. Simple scanning worms
propagate by indiscriminately probing the Internet as rapidly as possible to locate and
infect vulnerable systems.
Target-Specific Cyber Scanning: In contrast, numerous sophisticated scanning
techniques allow stealthy, focused scanning of a predetermined target host or network.
The following techniques belong to this category:





Figure 2.3: Local to Remote Probing
other systems to attack the same victim. If the scanning activity from the scanning
system is detected, the attacker simply uses another scanning system. A slightly
more sophisticated variation uses throw-away scanning systems; previously compro-
mised systems are disposed by the attacker after executing the malicious tasks. In
this case, any traced back scanning activity will be attributed to the owner of the
compromised system and not to the real attacker.
• Botnet scanning [60] occurs when a collection of compromised systems (bots or
zombies) are used to scan a target. The bots are not necessary on a contiguous set
of IP address but rather could be very dispersed. For instance, consider a botnet
that has an exploit capability against a network service. A botnet of just 254 systems
would be able to scan an entire Class C network for that service by sending a single
packet from each bot (each with a unique IP address). In this example, perhaps
correlating the scanning campaign would be possible, however, it would not reveal
the true adversary (the operator of the command and control center) since the bots
are basically zombie members.





Figure 2.4: Local to Local Probing
network (i.e., a single scanning campaign may take days, weeks or months). Slow
scans may blend into the network noise never exceeding detection thresholds or ex-
hausting detection system state.
Single Source Cyber Scanning: A single source cyber scanning activity oper-
ates in a one (source) to many (targets) fashion. Single source cyber scanning could be
classified as belonging to one of four types; vertical, horizontal, strobe and block scans
[62]. A vertical scan consists of a port scan of some or all ports on a single computer.
The other three types of scans are used over multiple IP addresses. A horizontal scan is
a scan of a single port across multiple IP addresses. If the port scan is of multiple ports
across multiple IP addresses, it is called a strobe scan. A block scan is a port scan against
all ports on multiple IP addresses. Note that in general, a vertical scan can be defined as
consisting of six or more ports on a single computer, while a horizontal scan as consisting
of five or more IP addresses within a single subnet.
Distributed Cyber Scanning: Distributed scanning [63] occurs when multiple
systems act in a union strategy to scan a network or host of interest. Typically, one
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system will act as a central node and collect the scanning results from all participating
systems. Distributing the scanning activity reduces the scanning footprint from any single
system and thus decreasing the likelihood of being detected.
Summary
In this section, we provided a categorization of the cyber scanning topic. Additionally, we
presented a discussion that elaborated on the nature, strategies and approaches of cyber
scanning. From the above, we can extract the following few points:
• Active scanning is efficient but is very intrusive.
• Passive scanning is less intrusive, works well in the presence of firewalls and is opti-
mized to operate effectively with transient hosts.
• Cyber scanning strategies include remote to remote scanning also dubbed as cyber
scanning campaigns. The latter possess sophisticated stealth capabilities and are
typically highly coordinated.
• Botnet scanning is both target-specific and a distributed cyber scanning method.
2.1.3 Cyber Scanning Techniques
In this section, we introduce a classification of probing techniques as shown in Figure 2.5.
We elaborate on this by presenting the techniques and their details in terms of exchanged
messages and their scanning abilities. Moreover, we pinpoint and discuss, when applicable,
their advantages, their disadvantages and the scenarios when the techniques are best used.
Finally, we present a summary of the cyber scanning techniques that includes, but is not
limited to, the transport protocol the technique aims to identify, their exchanged messages,
and whether the technique is immune to firewall detection.
Open Scan
Open scan, also known as the vanilla scan, is the simplest scanning technique. It refers to
the method that follows the same TCP handshake connection that every other TCP-based
17
Cyber Scanning Techniques

























Figure 2.5: A Classification of Cyber Scanning Techniques
application uses. Hence, this scanning technique is considered ‘Open’ since it reacts as a
normal TCP connection to determine if a port is available. It utilizes the connect() [64]
call functionality that is used by the operating system to initiate a TCP connection to a
remote device. The Open scan is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
This technique utilizes the TCP protocol and the SYN flag to detect TCP ports.
When a closed port is targeted, the victim replies with a RST flag. On the other hand,
when an open port is detected, the victim replies with an ACK flag. It is worthy to
note that this simple technique is easily detected by a firewall. An advantage of this
technique is that it can achieve its scan in a very simplistic way without requiring any
other functionalities or privileges. The latter fact is because this technique utilizes systems’
normal TCP-based methods when connecting to the target. A disadvantage of this scan






Figure 2.6: The Open Scan targeting a closed (2.6a) and an open port (2.6b)
the completion of a TCP connection, normal application processes immediately follow.
Although these applications are directly met with a RST packet, however, the application
has already provided the appropriate login screen or service page. By the time the RST is
received, the application initiation process is already well underway and additional system
resources are used. Because this scan technique is evident and easily identified when
browsing through applications event logs, it might be considered the TCP scan of last
resort. If privileged access is not available and the determination of open TCP ports is
absolutely necessary, this scan may be the only method that is available and can be used.
Half-Open Scan
The Half-Open scan, commonly dubbed as the TCP SYN scan, is a common method
for port identification that allows the scanner to gather information about open ports
without completing the TCP handshake process. When an open port is identified, the
TCP handshake is reset before it can be completed. Similar to an Open Scan, a Half-
Open scan targeting a closed port will receive a RST packet. However, if the source
receives an acknowledgment to a SYN request, meaning a port is open, then the source
directly sends a RST frame to reset the session, and therefore the handshake is never
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Figure 2.7: The Half-Open Scan targeting a closed (2.7a) and an open port (2.7b)
Since this scan technique never actually creates a TCP session, it is advantageous
in two ways. First, it is not logged by destination applications. This point makes the
Half-Open method somehow more stealthier than the Open-Scan method, as it is less
visible in the destination systems’ application logs. Second, it is less stressful to the
application service because it does not force the application to initialize or for systems
resources to be allocated. On the other hand, this method suffers from one disadvantage.
Since there is a need to create new raw packets that do not completely abide by the TCP
handshake, the half-open connection process requires some elevated systems privilege at
the source to be successful, which is not always feasible. It is significant to mention that
this method can operate on any operating platform and the fact that it only half-opens the
TCP connections, makes it a very efficient and a streamline method. Nevertheless, since
the Half-Open scan technique is structured and uses known TCP flags, it is effortlessly
detected by an edge firewall.
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Version Detection Scan
Although the Version Detection scan does not aim to detect open ports as the previous
mentioned methods, however, it exploits them by probing the software applications run-
ning on remote devices. This method would typically utilize the Half-Open scan technique
prior to executing its own scan method. If open ports are found, the Version Detection
scan will begin the probing process by directly communicating with the remote applica-
tions on the open ports to uncover as much information as possible. Such information
may include the type, the version and the status of that service, the underlying operating
system and its version and other services that depend on that running service. This infor-
mation can be of benefit to a network manager for proper and effective patching purposes
or it can be analyzed by the scanner or attacker to exploit a certain known vulnerability










Figure 2.8: The Half-Open scan (2.8a) executing prior to the Version Detection Scan
(2.8b)
this illustration, the Version Detection Scan technique first executed the TCP SYN scan.
After detecting that port 80 is open, it ran its own scan to probe the service on that
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port. This method poses two advantages from a network management perspective. Its
aids in network host applications’ version management where hosts showing older software
revisions are identified and further action is taken. Second, it assists in locating software
that is not compliant with organizational standards. This is as well an effective method
of verifying the licenses of application services. Nonetheless, this technique possesses two
disadvantages. First, it requires significant processing power (less significant using today’s
machines but still a point to consider) and elevated networking bandwidth since it needs
to probe all the services and consequently transmit all their information. Second, and
since this technique will open numerous sessions with the remote applications, its activity
is usually written in application logs which makes it a less stealthier technique.
Stealth Scans
The aforementioned cyber scanning techniques only use the typical SYN flag to investigate
open ports. Hence, they are easily detected and logged by intrusion detection systems. In
this section, we present and discuss stealth scans. These techniques try to avoid filtering
devices by employing certain set of flags other than SYN to appear as legitimate traffic.
All these techniques resort to inverse mapping to determine open ports.
SYN|ACK Scan: The SYN|ACK scan is a slight modification of the Half-Open
scan. Instead of just sending a SYN flag, the source sends a SYN in addition to an ACK
flag to the target. For a closed port, the target will reply with a RST flag while a re-
quest to an open port will not generate a response. The latter is due to the fact that
the TCP protocol requires a sole SYN flag to initiate a connection. The SYN|ACK scan
is illustrated in Figure 2.9. This scan technique may generate a notable amount of false
positives. For instance, packets dropped due to filtering devices, network traffic, timeouts,
etc. can provide an incorrect inference of an open port while the port is in fact closed.
However, this is a relatively fast scan method that avoids the three-way handshake and




Figure 2.9: The SYN|ACK Scan targeting a closed (2.9a) and an open port (2.9b)
IDLE Scan: A more complex stealth technique that utilizes the previous SYN|ACK
scan and the Half-Open scan is known as the IDLE scan. The technique aims at gathering
port information using another station on the network (the zombie) where the scanning
process appears as it has been initiated from the zombie IP address instead of the actual
source station. This scanning method exploits IP fragmentation identification sequences
and implements IP address spoofing. For the scanning process to be executed, the identi-
fied zombie machine should satisfy the following two requirements:
• The zombie host must be idle (hence the name ‘IDLE’ scan). This requirement en-
sures that the IP identification frames will remain consistent throughout the duration
of the scan.
• The zombie host must provide consistent and predictable IP identification (IPID)
values. Most operating systems satisfy this requirement.
This technique is clarified in Figure 2.10.
First, in Figure 2.10a, the source sends a SYN/ACK flags to the zombie host ex-
pecting a RST flag as a response. This RST packet contains the initial IPID. In Figure
2.10b, the source executes a Half-Open scan, using the spoofed IP address of the zom-
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Figure 2.10: IDLE scan executing process
zombie with a SYN/ACK. The zombie, not expecting a SYN/ACK since he never sent a
SYN, will reply by a RST packet. The latter response will indeed increment the zombie’s
IPID. Finally, in Figure 2.10c, the original host resends the initial SYN/ACK probe to the
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zombie station. If the IPID has been incremented, then the source will infer that the port
that was spoofed in the original SYN frame is open on the destination target. If the IPID
has not been incremented, then the source will conclude that the port is closed. IDLE scan
technique of spoofing IP addresses and checking IPIDs allows the source to find open ports
from a distance, even if packet filters are in place. The source simply requires any open
port to a zombie host to complete the communication process. One of the core advantages
of this technique is its stealth factor. A destination station will never identify the IP
address of the scanning host. On the other hand, the disadvantages of this technique are
three folds. First, there should be a satisfaction of the zombie workstation requirements
prior to commencing the scanning process, especially the idle state requirement. Second,
and although the technique implements source IP address spoofing, however, the source
will still be identified if the technique is used on a local subnet. This last fact is legitimate
since the source MAC address on that subnet is not spoofed and hence with some network
investigation the source would be pinpointed. The third disadvantage is similar to the
disadvantage of the Half-Open scan technique which is rendered by the inability to create
raw packets that do comply completely with the TCP handshake procedure without ele-
vation of privileges, which is not always achievable.
FIN, Xmas Tree, and Null Scans: These three cyber scanning techniques are
grouped together since their individual functionality is very similar. They are members
of the ‘stealth’ scans because they send a single frame to a TCP port without any TCP
handshaking or any additional packet transfers. They operate identically to the SYN|ACK
scan, but they differ by which flags they send. The FIN, the Xmas Tree and the Null scan-
ning techniques respectively send packets with the FIN flag, URG, PUSH, and FIN flags,
and packets with empty flags. In all cases, the closed ports are required to reply to the
probe packet with RST, while open ports must ignore the packet in question [46, 65]. Note
that, the Xmas Tree scan takes its name from the flags related to (00101001), which appear
similar to the lights of a Christmas tree. The latter technique is depicted in Figure 5.2c,
while the FIN and Null scans have similar illustrations as Figure 2.9 but with different flags





Figure 2.11: The Xmas Scan targeting a closed (2.11a) and an open port (2.11b)
are remarkably quiet from the perspective of the remote device’s applications. Therefore,
none of these scans should appear in any of the application logs. These scans are as well
some of the most minimal port-level scans that could execute. For a closed port, only two
packets are transferred. On the other hand, only a single frame is necessary to identify an
open port. However, these techniques have two drawbacks. They are ineffective against
Microsoft machines as all ports will appear to be closed regardless of their actual state.
Nonetheless, this provides a backhanded advantage, since any device showing open ports
must not be a Windows-based device. The second drawback is related to generating raw
packets, which as mentioned earlier in this section, requires elevation of systems’ privileges.
ACK Scan: The ACK scan is not intended to identify an open port. This stealth cy-
ber scanning technique will only provide a filtered (non-reachable) or an unfiltered (reach-
able) disposition because it never connects to an application to confirm an ‘open’ state.
At a first glance, this appears to be rather limiting but in reality, the ACK scan can
characterize the ability of a packet to traverse firewalls or packet filtered links. Another
implementation of the ACK scan can take advantage of the IP routing function to deduce
the state of the port from the time to live (TTL) value [66]. An ACK scan operates
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by sending a TCP ACK frame to a remote port. If there are no responses or an ICMP
destination unreachable message is returned, then the port is considered to be filtered. If
the remote port returns a RST packet, the connection between the source and the remote




Figure 2.12: The Ack Scan targeting a non-reachable (2.12a) and a reachable target (2.12b)
On one hand, and since the ACK scan does not open any application sessions, the
conversation between the source and the remote target is relatively simple. Thus, the scan
of a single port is almost invisible, especially when combined with other network traffic.
On the other hand, the ACK scans simplicity is also its largest disadvantage. Because
it never tries to connect to a remote device, it can never definitively identify an open
port. Although the ACK scan does not identify open ports, it does an impressive job of
identifying ports that are filtered through a firewall. This list of filtered and unfiltered
port numbers is extremely useful as a reconnaissance method for a future more detailed
scan that focuses on specific port numbers and perhaps their vulnerabilities.
Window Scan: The Window scan, dubbed after the TCP sliding window [46], is a
scanning technique used with certain TCP stacks. It is almost identical to the ACK scan,
however, it has been found that certain TCP stacks return a window size number when
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responding to an ACK packet; a RST frame response from a closed port replies with a
window size of zero and a RST frame response from an open port replies with a non-zero





Figure 2.13: The Window Scan targeting a closed (2.13a) and an open port (2.13b)
An advantage of the window scan is that it does not open a session, hence there ex-
ist no application log associated with the scanning operation. Unless there are additional
firewalls or network limits at the operating system level, the scan should go unnoticed.
However, the window scan does not operate on all devices, and the number of operating
systems vulnerable to this unintended window size consistency is dwindling as operating
systems are upgraded and patched. In general, the window scan is useful when looking
for open ports while simultaneously maintaining a low level of network traffic. When vul-
nerable operating systems are identified, the window scan provides a low impact method
of locating open ports.
TCP Fragmentation Scan: This stealth scanning technique can be defined as a
process of executing a scan rather than a scanning technique by itself. It employs either
the Half-Open scan or the FIN scan techniques to carry out its scanning methodology.
This technique exploits the idea of decomposing the packet header (the probe packet) into
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smaller packets in an attempt to evade packet filters. This technique almost always is
effective since packet filters or intrusion detection systems do not buffer the entire set of
packets due to performance issues. Rather, they process the packets individually causing
the bypass of the assembled scanning packet. One possible drawback of this technique
is rendered by the fact that some destinations do not have the ability to correctly merge
the decomposed packets causing dropped probe packets and eventually the failure of this
method.
Sweep Scans
At the beginning of this section, we have discussed certain cyber scanning techniques
that solely adopt the SYN flag to carry out their procedure. Subsequently, we presented
and elaborated on stealth scanning techniques that utilize a mixture of flags to achieve
their goal. In this section, we highlight on Sweep scans. These techniques do not aim at
identifying active ports but rather at identifying active hosts. They are characterized as
performing sweeps, since their purpose is to identify the status of as many hosts as possi-
ble instead of focusing on an individual host. In fact, they typically utilize the network’s
subnet broadcast address as a destination address to target the majority of the hosts.
They operate by generating any request that would prompt a remote station’s response.
They can be defined as cyber scanning facilitators because they pinpoint active hosts just
before the actual scanning techniques of active hosts take place.
ICMP Echo Request Scan: This technique is one of the simplest and most known
scanning technique to identify active hosts. It is abundantly used on Windows and Linux
machines by invoking the ‘ping’ command. The idea is to send an ICMP echo request
message to the target and wait for a reply. If there is an ICMP Echo Reply message,
this indicates that the target is active. Otherwise, it means either the target is not active
(request timed out reply) or the the original request never reached the target (destination
unreachable reply). Figure 2.14 portrays this technique.
An advantage of the ICMP echo technique is that it does not depend on any par-




Figure 2.14: The ICMP Echo Request targeting a non-active (2.14a) and an active host
(2.14b)
then it is most often a candidate for the ICMP echo request scan. A disadvantage of this
technique is that ICMP is one of the most filtered protocols in enterprise networks. Since
the ICMP protocol has the ability to redirect traffic, identify available workstations, and
pinpoint closed ports on a target, when a firewall or packet filter is first installed, it is a
common security guideline to restrict ICMP.
ICMP Timestamp & Address Mask Scans: These techniques take advantage of
the seldom used ICMP messages (Timestamp & Address Mask) to determine if a remote
target is active. They function similarly to other ICMP-based scans; the source sends
an ICMP Get Timestamp or Get Address Mask messages and wait for an ICMP Send
Timestamp or ICMP Send Mask responses. ICMP Timestamp scan is shown in Figure
2.15.
Both methods suffer from serious drawbacks. In both techniques, their correspond-
ing probing messages are very rare to occur in a network and thus they can be very easily




Figure 2.15: The ICMP Timestamp scan targeting a non-active (2.15a) and an active host
(2.15b)
updated operating systems or networking hardware.
TCP SYN Scan: This cyber scanning facilitator technique is operationally identi-
cal to the Half-Open scan technique but the goal in this case is different. In this TCP SYN
scan, the source scanner is awaiting a RST packet from a closed port or an ACK packet
from an open port. The interesting and effective point of this technique is that either
result from the scan will provide the source with a proof that an active system resides
at that destination IP address. This technique is advantageous since it accomplishes its
goal in just few packets. Such minimal amount of network traffic appears to be similar to
a typical TCP handshake. As a result, this technique can appear as legitimate network
traffic and would go undetected.
Miscellaneous Scans
This section aims at providing further cyber scanning insights by shedding the light on
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Figure 2.16: The FTP Bounce scan targeting a closed (2.16a) and an open port(2.16b)
FTP Bounce Scan: Similar to IDLE scan, the FTP bounce attack employs a
third host (the FTP server) to act as a proxy between the source host (scanner) and
the destination target. The FTP bounce attack takes advantage of the passive mode FTP
[67]. This mode completely separate the command connections from the data connections.
This allows the FTP server to be effective in the presence of firewalls since the FTP server
would be responsible for building the outbound data connection with the remote host.
Furthermore, it allows the source to send a PORT command [67] to the proxy FTP server
where the latter would direct the data towards a completely different host (the target).
The FTP Bounce scan is simplified in Figure 2.16. The first step of the FTP Bounce scan
occurs when the source connects to the vulnerable FTP server. Sequentially, the source
transmits a PORT command [67] coupled with the IP and port of the target. The FTP
server forwards that request to the target. If the intended target’s port is closed (Figure
2.16a), the FTP server responds to the source stating the it can not build the connection.
On the other hand, if the port is open (Figure 2.16b), the FTP server responds with a
message stating that a transfer has been successfully completed. Depending on the reply,
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the source will infer if the port is open or closed. The advantages of this technique are
two folds. First, the technique uses the standard FTP communication to achieve its task.
Since the FTP service is found in the majority of enterprise networks, the technique seems
feasible almost all the time. Second, it possesses stealth features as the source is using a
proxy to direct his scan. Conversely, the disadvantages of the FTP bounce scan comprise
of the following: First, this scan technique is only successful on TCP ports. Since FTP
does not connect to remote devices using UDP, it is not possible to retrieve any feedback
on the availability of UDP ports. Second, the process of bouncing through an FTP server
is slow when compared to other scanning methods. Additionally, the port scanning re-
quests can only check a single port at a time. Third, and since this technique initiates an
application session with the FTP server, the FTP servers will log the connection and all
its commands making this method vulnerable to being detected.
UDP Scan: UDP scan does not require any SYNs, FINs, or any other handshaking
flags. The lack of formal communications process in UDP greatly amplifies the effective-
ness of this scan technique. The UDP scan is demonstrated in Figure 2.17.
A closed port will reply with an ICMP port unreachable message while an open port
responds with some UDP data. A critical advantage of this technique is that it operates
very efficiently on Windows-based devices since they do not usually implement any type
of ICMP rate limiting [68].
IP Protocol Scan: The goal of the IP protocol scan is to inquire about any addi-
tional IP protocols in use by the target station, including ICMP, TCP, and UDP. If a router
would be scanned, additional IP protocols such as EGP or IGP may be identified. Figure
2.18 depicts this technique. An unavailable IP protocol does not respond to the scan while
an available IP protocol provides a response specific to the protocol type. An IP protocol
scan looks fairly obvious if packet traces are investigated; since most networking proto-




Figure 2.17: The UDP scan targeting a closed (2.17a) and an open port (2.17b)
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.18: Unavailable (2.18a) Vs. An Available IP Protocol (2.18b)
RPC Scan: In an attempt to disclose applications’ information that operate using
the remote procedure call (RPC) [47], the RPC scan sends RPC null messages to previously
detected open ports. If any RPC application is running on the target, the reply will include
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CST EOP ID. T ID. U PR SM RMC RMO IFD
Open scan -
√
- TCP SYN RST ACK -
Half-Open scan
√ √
- TCP SYN RST ACK -
Version Detection scan - - - TCP SYN RST ACK -
SYN|ACK scan √ √ - TCP SYN/ACK RST - √
IDLE scan -
√
























- TCP SYN or FIN RST -
√
ICMP Echo scan - - - ICMP ICMP Echo ICMP MSG ICMP Reply -
ICMP Timestamp scan - - - ICMP ICMP Timestamp - Timestamp -
ICMP Sub. Mask scan - - - ICMP ICMP Sub.Mask - Sub. Mask -
TCP SYN scan - - - TCP SYN RST ACK -
FTP Bounce scan -
√
- TCP PORT Error MSG Conn. Est. -
UDP scan - -
√
UDP UDP Pkt ICMP Unreach. UDP Data -
IP Protocol scan - - - IP IP Prot. MSG - Protocols -
RPC scan - - - RPC RPC NULL - RPC App Info -
Table 2.1: Summary of Probing Techniques
information such as the application’s name, version and status. This technique possess the
ability to detect RPC applications running on non-RPC default ports. On the contrary,
and since the technique establishes application sessions, its transaction events will be
written in application logs, and thus the technique is easily detected. Another drawback
of this technique is that it relies on previously detected open ports to operate and does
not detect open ports by itself.
Summary
The previously discussed cyber scanning techniques are summarized in Table 2.1. The
summary includes the cyber scanning technique (CST), whether or not it requires eleva-
tion of systems’s privileges at the source to operate (EOP), whether it identities TCP or
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UDP ports (ID. T/ ID. U), the protocol it employs (PR), its messages that it sends (SM),
its received messages when the target port is closed or the host is unreachable (RMC), its
received messages when the target port is open or the host is reachable (RMO) and finally
whether the technique is immune to firewall detection (IFD).
From the summary table, we can extract the following few points:
• TCP is the most employed cyber scanning protocol.
• Although stealth scanning techniques are immune to being detected by a firewall,
however, almost all except the IDLE scan necessitate elevation of systems’ privilege
at the source to successfully operate.
• To identity UDP ports, only one cyber scanning technique could be utilized.
• The Half-Open scan technique could be used for port-identification as well as for
detecting active network hosts.
2.1.4 Literature Review - Distributed Detection Techniques
In this section, we present a review of the recent literature on distributed cyber scanning
detection techniques. Distributed cyber scanning, which is illustrated in Figure 2.19, refers
to the task of decomposing and coordinating the scanning using various compromised
systems or bots. Typically, the scanning is controlled by a main attacker dubbed as
the scanning botmaster who operates the command and control center and the entire
network of bots (or botnet) for coordinated communication, propagation, and other attack
activities. Distributed cyber scanning is often thought of as operating in a many (sources)
to one (target) fashion, where the target system is often a single entity or a limited number
of systems. Moreover, this type of scanning possess stealth features and could be performed
during a prolonged period of time (i.e., a slow scan).
The work presented in this section covers the period from 2001 up to November 2012.
The studied literature solely focus on distributed detection techniques (many to one) and
excludes single source detection techniques (one to one and one to many). For the latter,
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Cyber Attacker/Scanning Botmaster 
Bots/Compromised Machines 
Target Server 
Figure 2.19: Executing Distributed Cyber Scanning
please refer to survey [45]. Many to many detection techniques, as briefly discussed in
Section 2.1.2, are yet to be investigated in the literature. The generated taxonomy on
distributed cyber scanning detection techniques is shown in Figure 2.20. It is based on
the approaches taken by the authors to achieve their detection task. The approaches
are decomposed into four categories, namely, statistical, algorithmic, mathematical and
heuristical.
Statistical Approaches
These distributed cyber scanning detection approaches include techniques such as sta-
tistical characterization (features) of data samples, extrapolation or interpolation of data
based on some best-fit, error estimates of observations, or spectral analysis of a data model.
Zhang et al. [1] proposed a scan detection method based on a distributed coop-
erative model. Their technique is composed of feature-based detection, scenario-based
detection and statistic-based detection. Their proposed architecture, which is depicted in
Figure 2.21, is decomposed into 5 layers; sensors, event generators, event detection agents,
a fusion center, and a control center.
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Figure 2.20: Taxonomy-Distributed Cyber Scanning Detection Techniques
The authors explained that the sensors collect data and system log information. Event
generators check and filter data based on normal and abnormal information. Event de-
tection agents detect the integrated data so as to decide whether the event is an intrusion
behavior or not. The undetermined data is sequentially sent to a fusion center for further
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Figure 2.21: Distributed Architecture of Cooperative Intrusion Detection [1]
data submitted by event detection agents in order to increase the decision accuracy. Fi-
nally, the control center monitors, coordinates and adjusts each event detection agent and
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its corresponding load. The technique’s statistic-based detection is based on predefined
thresholds that allowed the detection of both scan attack and denial of service attacks.
The authors claimed that their method not only can detect those scan attack with obvious
features, but also it can detect the attack with stealth features and variants of the attack.
A positive point of this paper is that the proposed technique is well suited in a
distributed large-scale environment. Moreover, the multi-layer architecture exploits the
advantages of various approaches, including, statistical and scenario-based. However, few
drawbacks could be extracted. First, the paper’s experimental results were based on a
simulated described scenario rather than real world data samples. Second, the authors
did not test the accuracy of their technique against large-scale distributed scans.
In another work [2], Baig et al. proposed a time independent feature set model
(IFSM) for the detection of slow, random and distributed cyber scanning activity. Their
proposed technique is based on the observation that scanners, being unaware of systems
and network topologies, send most of their probes to inactive hosts or closed ports result-
ing in many RST and ICMP packets. They designed a database that records information
about that case and they took into consideration hosts that are behind a network ad-
dress translation (NAT) [69] routers and those who use the dynamic host control protocol
(DHCP) [70] server. The authors developed as well an algorithm that implemented that
technique in addition to a pruning method used when system memory runs low. Finally,
the authors empirically tested their technique using DARPA’s data set [71]. The results
demonstrated that their proposed IFSM performs well for detecting slow and fast scans.
A snapshot of their technique detecting ports scans and IP sweeps is shown if Figure 2.22.
The work in [2] is a successful example of the usage of statistical feature-based
elements in detecting cyber scanning. Nevertheless, this papers suffers from two core dis-
advantages. The technique presented in the paper is solely dependent on RST and ICMP
packets. Thus, the technique can only detect scans that actually use or return those pack-
ets. Although the latter task can be a common behavior, a significant number of network
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Figure 2.22: IFSM detecting Ports Scans and IP Sweeps [2]
devices do not allow the propagation of those packets back to the source. Second, although
the authors claimed that their technique is effective in detecting slow and distributed cyber
scanning, they did not demonstrate that empirically nor did they provide any scenarios
to achieve that.
Furthermore, Staniford et al. [72] presented a method for the detection of stealth
port scans. Their technique is divided into two layers; the Stealthy Probing and Intru-
sion Correlation Engine (SPICE) and the Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection Engine
(SPADE). Using an entropy-based metric, SPADE determines if a packet is malicious and
sequentially pass to SPICE. The latter engine inserts the packet into a correlation graph,
where the nodes represent packets and the connections between nodes contain weights
indicating the strength of the relationship between the packets. The weights are based
on a combination of four feature characteristics, namely, equality, proximity, separation,
and covariance. In the final graph, all edges with weights less than a certain threshold are
dropped, and the remaining subgraphs represent interesting network events.
The work done by Staniford et al. [72] has the following weaknesses. Firstly, SPICE
was not designed specifically to detect coordinated scanning activity, rather it just forms
clusters based on similar properties using the correlation graph. Secondly, the authors
do not report the true and false negative and positive rates for their approach. Thirdly,
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although the authors claimed that they detect distributed scanning, they have not provided
sufficient details to replicate or proof their results.
Algorithmic Approaches
These distributed cyber scanning detection approaches employ step-by-step procedures
for calculations, data processing, and formal automated reasoning.
Baldoni et al. [3] proposed a collaborative architecture where each target network
deploys local sensors that send alarms to a collaborative layer. This, in turn, correlates this
data with the aim of (1) identifying coordinated cyber scanning activity while (2) reducing
false positive alarms and (3) correctly separating groups of attackers that act concurrently
on overlapping targets. The proposed architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.23. Locally
Figure 2.23: Proposed Collaborative Architecture [3]
41
deployed sensors adopt graph-based clustering algorithms over non-established TCP con-
nections to generate alarms. The collaborative layer employed a similarity approach to
aggregate alarms and approximated optimization algorithms to separate distinct group of
attackers. The soundness of the proposed approach was tested on real network traces.
The above work however has the following limitations. First, their proposed system
is designed to leverage information coming from various network domains to detect dis-
tributed scanning. Hence, the collaborative layer, in fact, is totally ineffective when the
adversary is acting only against one network domain. Second, their system assumed that
the target set of an attack contains contiguous IP addresses, which is not always true.
Third, if the distributed scanning is being generated by a large number of nodes, where
each node only sends one or few number packets, then the system would consider those as
individual scans rather than correlating them.
In an another research work on distributed cyber scanning detection [73], the author
presented an approach to detecting coordinated attacks that is based on adversary mod-
eling of the desired information gain. In this research paper, a detection algorithm has
as well been developed that is based on solutions to the set covering problem, where the
aim was to recognize coordinated activity by combining events such that a large portion
of the information space is covered with minimal overlap. The author demonstrated the
approach by developing a coordinated scan detector, where the targets of a port scan
are distributed amongst multiple coordinating sources. The author elaborated that in
this case, the adversary wishes to gain information about the active hosts and ports on
a particular network. Moreover, the paper provided an algorithm that is capable of de-
tecting horizontal and strobe scans against contiguous address spaces. Finally, the paper
presented experimental results of the proposed algorithm in a controlled environment,
demonstrating that it has an acceptably low false positive rate.
A core limitation of the work in [73] is that the input for the proposed algorithm
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Figure 2.24: Darkports and Exposure Maps in detecting Scanning [4]
consists of single-source port scans. Thus, if an attacker can avoid detection by the single-
source scan detector, then he as well would avoid detection by the developed coordinated
scan detector.
In an alternative research article, Whyte et al. [74] discussed the notions of dark-
ports and exposure maps. The former are unused ports on active systems while the latter
is a technique rendered by passively characterizing the connectivity behavior of internal
hosts in a network as they respond to both legitimate connection attempts and scanning
attempts. Their proposed technique differs from other scanning detection techniques as
they rely on identifying the services offered by the network instead of tracking external
connection events. Moreover, the authors demonstrated how they could exploit darkports
for defensive purposes as shown in Figure 2.24. Additionally, they presented some meth-
ods to detect advanced cyber scanning activity such as distributed scanning. Finally, they
evaluated their approach using three different real data sets.
The above work has the following limitations. First, the proposed approach requires
a prolonged training period (initializing time) to build the network map, decreasing its
chances from being operationally feasible. Second, the actual network map populating
process is based on observed TCP SYN ACK. Nowadays, there exist a significant num-
ber of stealth cyber scanning activity that never utilizes the TCP SYN ACK. Third, the
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authors’ proposed heuristics to detect, attribute and match distributed cyber scanning
is based on source IP grouping. They also considered clusters of three or more remote
hosts that target the same destination ports as a distributed scan. This is ineffective if
the sources are spoofed, change regularly due to DHCP usage, or target different ports.
Furthermore, Yegneswaran et al. [75] presented a broad, empirical analysis of Inter-
net intrusion activity using a large set of NIDS and firewall logs. Their breakdown of scan
types showed not only a large amount of worm activity but also a substantial amount of
scanning activity. To gain insight into the global nature of intrusions, the authors used
their data to project the activity across the global Internet. They also presented a high
level information theoretic evaluation of the potential of using data shared between net-
works as a foundation for a distributed intrusion detection infrastructure. Their analysis
indicated that small collections of logs from smaller networks may not be sufficient to iden-
tify either worst offenders or most popular port targets for attacks. Additionally, their
research claimed to detect distributed scanning activity by defining a distributed scan as
scans from multiple sources (five or more) aimed at a particular port of destinations in
the same /24 subnet within a one hour window.
A main drawback, related to the authors’ definition of coordination or distributed
scans, could be withdrawn from the above work. The definition misses several possible
coordinated/distributed scans, such as scans from fewer than five sources, or scans where
each source scans in a different hour. Additionally, they did not consider the case where
completely unrelated sources might scan the same port on the same /24 subnet within the
same hour. Their technique will neither report nor detect that case as a distributed cyber
scanning activity.
Mathematical Approaches
These distributed cyber scanning detection approaches utilize mathematical models, finite
state machines and other algebraic and geometric techniques to achieve their detection
task.
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The author, Treurniet J., of [76] presented an approach that is based on the idea
that anomalous scanning activity could be detected using a finite state machine model
that reflects the progression of a TCP connection through a sequence of states via its
control flags. By storing such anomalies and applying correlation mechanisms, the author
claim that she could detect slow and distributed scans. A proof of concept prototype
was implemented which used both DARPA’s data [71] and operational data injected with
crafted anomalies to test the system. The author reported zero false negative and very
few false positives.
The system proposed in this work [76] is evidently advantageous by its space re-
quirements which makes it operationally feasible. On the other hand, this research work
is limited in the following: First, the experimental data was based on filtered data which
can not accurately reflect the system’s performance. Second, the system’s implementa-
tion is based on MATLAB [77] which reduces its operational capabilities from an efficacy
point of view. Third, the distributed correlation engine is based on simplistic criteria and
operates erroneously when the scan is destined to overlapping targets or ports.
In another work by the same author [78], a new system was proposed that is capable
of detecting slow scans and distributed scans. The work was built on previous work [76]
by refining the TCP model and adding support for UDP and ICMP. The proposed method
is composed of two stages. First, sessions are formed from packet data using simple state
machine models of TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic. Second, common activities are identi-
fied in terms of groups of sessions which are referred to as activity patterns. The author
verified that the system correctly identifies crafted slow scans injected into real traffic and
found that most scans are below current detection thresholds. By combining the detected
scans with the session directionality, the author was able to give context to the scan alerts
and identify the scans that require immediate attention.
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The research work presented above possess the following advantages. First, it re-
quires no training period and little knowledge of the local network configuration. Second,
it successfully attempts to separate backscatter [79] from inverse mapping traffic. On the
other hand, and although the author claimed the the system is able to detect distributed
scans, the system inaccurately group targeted distributed scans with other similar un-
targeted scans.
Bhuyan et al. [80] presented the adaptive outlier based approach for coordinated
scan detection (AOCD). Their proposed approach is based on two techniques. First, the
principal component analysis based feature reduction technique was adopted to identify
the relevant feature set. These feature sets are used during cluster formation. Second, a
variant of the Fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm [81] was as well employed to cluster
information. Their algorithm also adopts an outlier scoring mechanism for each feature
traffic data object and sequentially report it as malicious or not. The authors tested their
algorithm using different real-life datasets and against other available literature techniques.
The work in [80] has few limitations. Firstly, it requires a training period and
hence 1) its accuracy can be significantly affected when dealing with other new data
and 2) it requires some initialization time which is not always feasible in an operational
environment. Secondly, the empirical results demonstrated in the work were tested with
only four scan types and hence other scan types might either go undetected or have
inaccurate clustering. Thirdly, their proposed approach assumed that the target of the
scanning is a set of contiguous addresses, which is not always correct.
Heursitical Approaches
These distributed cyber scanning detection approaches utilize non-formal expert based
analysis including, but not limited to, visualization techniques, filter-based heuristics,
previous incident analysis, and multidisciplinary techniques.
Robertson et al. [5] introduced the System Detection surveillance techniques for
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enclave environments (ESD) and peering center environments (PSD). The system em-
ployed a cascading filter design, as depicted in Figure 2.25, which coordinated a series
of specialized heuristics across connection records, individual probes, scans and coordi-
nated scanning groups. Their proposed approach operates as follows. First, approximate
Figure 2.25: Architecture of Surveillance Detection [5]
sessions between source and destination IP pairs are extrapolated in accordance with a
certain model. Second, each extrapolated session that represents a failed connection at-
tempt is assumed to be a probe. Third, each probing IP is given a score based on the
number of unique destination IP/port pairs probed. The IP is in turn considered a scanner
if its score is greater than an empirically derived alert threshold. Their system was tested
using real-time data and has shown to accurately discover great quantities of surveillance
activities, including distributed scans.
The above system is advantageous in being scalable due to data reduction in the
used filters and efficient in high bandwidth environments. However, on the other hand,
their work assumed, with regards to distributed scanning activity, that a scanner is likely
to use several IP addresses on the same subnet to carry on its probing act. This implies
that if a particular IP address scans a network, IP addresses near this IP address, rather
than those far away, are more likely to have also scanned the network. This assumption is
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not always valid, especially when dealing with botnet scanning. Another limitation is that
their proposed algorithm could be susceptible to decoys intended to cause false positives.
In a different research work, Choi et al. [6] presented the parallel coordinate at-
tack visualization (PCAV) as illustrated in Figure 2.26. PCAV displays network traffic
Figure 2.26: PCAV System’s Design [6]
on the plane of parallel coordinates using the packet flow information such as the source
IP address, destination IP address, destination port and the average packet length in a
flow. The parameters are used to draw each flow as a connected line on the plane, where a
group of polygonal lines form a particular shape in case of an attack. From the observation
that each attack type possesses a unique pattern, the authors developed nine signatures
coupled with their detection mechanisms based on an efficient hashing algorithm. The au-
thors validated their proposed technique on three real network data samples and reported
a very low false positive rate.
Although the authors asserted that their technique is able to detect and visualize
distributed and coordinated scanning, they did not empirically validate that.
Stockinger et al., in their published research [82], presented a multidisciplinary high-
performance query-driven visualization technique for the purpose of anomaly detection.
They combined indexing mechanisms with a new approach to visual analytics to efficiently
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populate visual histograms. Additionally, the authors applied the histogramming technol-
ogy in conjunction with a specialized visual analytics application for analyzing distributed
scans. They tested their system using network connection data that was collected by Bro
[83] at a governmental location.
The work presented by Stockinger et al. possesses few drawbacks. First, their sys-
tem is passive in the sense that it might be effective in the analysis of distributed scans
but not in real-time detection. Second, since the technique is based on visualization, it
is hard to provide numerical analysis of the technique’s false positive and negative rates.
The authors did not provide any guidelines concerning that fact.
Last but not least, the authors of [84] discussed the application of visualization
techniques to the problem of anomaly fingerprinting. This research work explored the
application of several visualization techniques and their usefulness towards identification
of attack tools and incidents. They used application, network and transport layer infor-
mation to accomplish the visualization. The authors argued that their technique will aid
other detection systems such as those using signature and statistical-based approaches to
detect anomalies. Moreover, the authors briefly discussed the effectiveness of their tech-
nique in detecting distributed cyber scanning activity.
The work in [84] is interesting by allowing the identification of various scanning
tools by visualizing their corresponding traffic. Indeed, this allows the detection of new
attack tools and types without replying on signature based systems that would typically
fail in such scenarios. Nevertheless, the work lacks the following. First, the authors did
not provide any metrics on how their system would perform when operating on real-time




This section presented a literature review by solely focusing on many to one cyber scanning
detection techniques, commonly referred to as distributed approaches. From what has been
previously discussed, we can extract the following few points:
• In general, limited work has been done targeting the problem of detecting distributed
cyber scanning detection.
• Statistical methods are the least exploited to solve that problem.
• Algorithmic approaches, especially those utilizing clustering mechanisms, are the
most effective techniques.
• There exist a lack of effective, accurate and efficient distributed source scanning
clustering techniques.
2.2 Network Telescopes
In this section, we provide brief but relevant background information related to network
telescopes in addition to clarifying how they can be exploited to generate various cyber
threat intelligence.
A network telescope, also commonly referred to as a darknet or an Internet sink,
is a set of routable and allocated yet unused Internet Protocol (IP) addresses [85]. It
represents a partial view of the entire Internet address space. From a design perceptive,
network telescopes are transparent and indistinguishable compared with the rest of the
Internet space. From a deployment perspective, it is rendered by network sensors that are
implemented and dispersed on numerous strategic points throughout the Internet. Such
sensors are often distributed and are typically hosted by various global entities, including
Internet Service Provides (ISPs), academic and research facilities and backbone networks.




Figure 2.27: A Network Telescope as part of the Internet Space
The aim of network telescopes is to provide a lens on Internet-wide malicious traffic;
since telescope IP addresses1 are unused, any traffic targeting them represents a continu-
ous view of anomalous unsolicited traffic. Such traffic, which is often dubbed as Internet
Background Radiation (IBR) [86, 85], could be leveraged to generate various cyber threat
intelligence, related, but not limited to, probing activities, denial of service attacks and
reflective amplification attacks. In the sequel, we briefly clarify how the latter is achieved.
A network telescope is indeed an effective approach to infer various Internet-scale
probing activities [87]. Figure 2.28 illustrates a simplistic example in which a probing
machine is scanning the Internet space. Such machine could have been previously infected
by a worm and is trying to propagate or perhaps is participating in an automated wide
Internet-scale scanning task. Whatever is the reason behind its scanning activities, it can
be seen that some of its network probe packets hit the network telescope and thus are
subsequently captured. Recall, that the probing machine, while spraying its probes across
the Internet space, can not avoid the network telescope as it does have any knowledge
about its existence. Further, it has been shown in [88] that it is extremely rare if not
impossible for a probing source to have any capability dedicated to such avoidance.
A network telescope is as well effective in pinpointing victims of denial of service
(dos) attacks [89]. Figure 2.29 illustrates such scenario. The compromised machines are





Figure 2.28: A Network Telescope capturing Probing Activities
directed to launch a distributed denial of service attack towards SRV1. To hide their iden-
tities, these machines spoof their addresses and replace them with random IP addresses.
In this specific scenario, they replace their addresses with those of machines M1, M2 and
other IP addresses. Such other addresses happen to be those of the network telescope.
When the attack is launched, the reply packets will be directed towards M1 and M2 as
well as to some dark IP addresses. Traces that hit the telescope are often dubbed as
backscattered packets and could be effectively employed to infer that SRV1 has been the
target of a dos attack.
In this last scenario, a network telescope is leveraged to infer reflective/amplified dos
attacks [90]. Indeed, such attacks are an emerging form of distributed dos attacks that
rely on the use of publicly accessible UDP servers2, known as open resolvers, as well as









Figure 2.29: A Network Telescope pinpointing Victims of Denial of Service Attacks
bandwidth amplification factors to overwhelm a victim with a significant amount of traf-
fic. The idea is to send simple queries to such resolvers in which the replies, that aim at
flooding the victim, are orders of magnitude larger. Such approach is behind the notorious
300 and 400 Gbps attacks that hit the Internet in the last few years [92]. Figure 4.5 de-
picts a specific scenario where the resolvers are open Domain Name System (DNS) servers.
The compromised machines are directed to execute a reflective dos attack against
Org1. To achieve that, they initially spoof their identities by using those of Org1 and
subsequently send simple ANY queries to the DNS open resolvers. The latter DNS query
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Figure 2.30: A Network Telescope pinpointing Sources of Reflective DoS Attacks
intends to pull all the available information from the DNS resolvers related to a requested
domain. The domain in the request trace is often a noteworthy one that possess a sig-
nificant amount of information. Commonly, the compromised machines will spray such
queries on the Internet space in a hope to reach as many open resolvers as possible in
order to increase the overall amplification factor. Intuitively, some of those requests will
hit the network telescope and hence will be captured. Requests that actually reach open
resolvers will be amplified and directed towards Org1.
It might be beneficial to mention at this point of the thesis that, for the past three
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years, we have been receiving, on a continuous real-time basis, raw darknet/telescope data
from a trusted third party, namely, Farsight Security [93]. Such traffic originates from the
Internet and is destined to numerous /13 network sensors. The data mostly consists of
unsolicited TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic3. In this thesis, we will be leveraging various
portions of such data to validate the numerous proposed models and approaches.
In the next chapter, we will be focusing on the problem of Inferring enterprise as





In this chapter, we elaborate on the design, implementation and validation of approaches
for inferring enterprise and Internet-scale probing activities.
3.1 On the Inference of Enterprise Probing Activities
We present in this section an approach that tackles the issue of detecting corporate cyber
scanning. The employed technique is based on a non-attribution anomaly detection ap-
proach that focuses on what is being scanned rather than who is performing the scanning.
To empirically validate the proposed technique, we utilize and examine two real network
traffic datasets and implement two experimental environments. The results show that for
a class C network with 250 active hosts and 5 monitored servers, the training period of
the proposed detection technique required a stabilization time of less than 1 second and a
state memory of 80 bytes. Moreover, in comparison with Snort’s sfPortscan technique, it
was able to detect 4215 unique scans and yielded zero false negative.
3.1.1 The Non-Attribution Anomaly Detection Technique
In this section, we present the non-attribution anomaly detection technique and provide
a discussion related to its training and detection periods.
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Idea Rationale
The rationale behind the idea states that the available services that are provided by the
hosts within an enterprise network represent the facade of that network; the offered services
induce the possible leakage of information that could be retrieved by an attacker during a
successful scan. Hence, the idea takes full advantage and solely of the network topology by
constructing what we refer to as ‘local host facade’ (LHF) and ‘enterprise network facade’
(ENF). The former is the accessible services per host while the latter is the combination
of all accessible services of all active hosts within the network.
ENF Management
In the training phase of our technique, we leverage the SNMP [94] to manage the ENF.
SNMP is an Internet-standard protocol for managing devices on IP networks. It consists of
components for network management, including an application layer protocol, a database
schema, and a set of data objects. The protocol’s information exchange is performed be-
tween a management station and an agent (embedded in the managed entity) in the form
of SNMP messages. For an in-depth review of SNMP, including its inner workings, we
refer the readers to [95].
The idea is to exploit specific de-facto SNMP procedures to manage the ENF. The
latter task is divided into constructing the ENF by retrieving the list of listening ports
on each host and maintaining (adding/deleting certain IPs/ports) the list in case of any
change in accordance with a certain predefined update threshold. In the following, we
briefly discuss the employed SNMP procedures and consequently elaborate on their roles
in managing the ENF.
The SNMP Receive-GetRequest procedure [94] is issued by an SNMP management
station in order to read or retrieve an object value from a managed entity. The managed
SNMP entity responds to a GetRequest protocol data unit (PDU) with a GetResponse
PDU. The GetRequest operation is atomic; either all the values are retrieved or none is.
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If the responding entity is able to provide values for all the variables listed in the incom-
ing VariableBindings list, then the GetResponse PDU includes the VariableBindings
field coupled with a value supplied for each variable. If at least one of the variable values
cannot be supplied, then no values are returned [94].
In this current work, the procedure, namely, SNMP Receive-GetRequest, is used to
construct the ENF by leveraging the following two request methods:
GetRequest(ipRouteDest, tcpNoPorts)
GetRequest(ipRouteDest, udpNoPorts)
On the other hand, the task of maintaining the ENF could be divided into two sub-
tasks. The first is when we need to update the list of active IPs/hosts and the second is
when we need to modify the list of listening TCP and UDP ports for a specific host. To ac-
complish this, another SNMP procedure is presented, namely SNMP Receive-SetRequest
[94] .
The procedure SNMP Receive-SetRequest is issued by an SNMP entity on behalf
of a management station. It has the same PDU exchange pattern and the same format as
the GetRequest PDU. However, the SetRequest is used to write an object value rather
than reading or retrieving one.
In this work, we exploit SNMP Receive-SetRequest to update the ENF; based on
a predefined update threshold, and whenever there is an update in the hosts (changing
status from active to non-active or vice-versa) or their corresponding listening ports, we
issue a SetRequest PDU to reflect the changes. For instance, if we notice that an active
(i.e., connected) host with an IP address of 10.0.0.1 is no longer active (i.e., disconnected),
the following SNMP request [94] is issued to remove that host from the ENF:
SetRequest(ipRouteDest.10.0.0.1 = invalid)
The above two procedures provide methods to construct and maintain what we
have defined as the enterprise network facade. Recall that this characterizes the training
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period of our proposed non-attribution detection technique. Since the management of the
ENF is dependent solely on the enterprise network services and is totally decoupled from
any external traffic, our approach is advantageous in two core areas. First, it requires
almost negligible time to stabilize which renders its implementation very operationally
feasible. Second, it relies on the observation and manipulation of a protocol (SNMP)
found in every network, where its actual overhead on network bandwidth and hardware is
minimal even in large network environments [96, 97].
Using ENF for Scan Detection
Once the training period has completed and an ENF is constructed, the anomaly detection
phase commences. Scan detection is performed by monitoring external incoming TCP or
UDP connection attempts. The attempts could be destined to the following targets: (1)
an unallocated IP address, (2) an allocated IP address with a port combination not found
in the ENF, (3) an allocated IP address with a port combination found in the ENF and (4)
an allocated or an unallocated IP address outside of the monitored zone. In our approach,
the detection occurs when we notice target 2 occurring, namely, an attempt to an allocated
IP address with a port combination not found in the ENF. If the latter case occurs, we flag
the connection attempt and log its corresponding details such as source and destination
IP and port, protocol, and the timestamp. Target 1 is referred to as dark IPs [43] and
their analysis is outside the scope of this work. Target 3 is as well excluded from the
analysis. The exclusion of this target, at a first glance, seems to carry a limitation of our
work in that scans to valid services (i.e., entries in the ENF) will not be detected. For
instance, a DNS scan towards a naming (DNS) server is considered a valid activity and
thus would not be considered a scan. However, this type of scan would indeed be detected
using our approach as the same scan would almost certainly also occur against other hosts
in the network not offering DNS. The scanning activity would not be detected if it were
directed, although unlikely, solely at the naming server. However, we would consider the
latter activity to be an actual attack (i.e., such as a denial of service attack) rather than
a scan. Finally, target 4 depends on our monitored zone and intuitively we do not detect
scans outside the monitored areas.
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Discussion
In this part, we provide a discussion that is related to the technique’s training and detec-
tion periods.
The training period is the period during which we first construct the ENF. Hence, as
is the case with any technique that requires a training period, it is possible that malicious
hosts activity may become part of the reference baseline. For example, if a trojan horse
program [98] has been maliciously installed and has been running on one of the corpo-
rates’s network servers, then the program would typically open up listening ports that are
otherwise not supposed to be listening. To avoid this, we can match or verify the LHF
with the enterprise network’s security policy. Any inconsistencies are removed from the
LHF to securely build the ENF.
Moreover, our technique’s training period is efficient as the ENF only needs to record
and maintain the state of the network services. To further improve this, we can manipulate
SNMP to gather and record information only about specific hosts within the enterprise
network. For example, we can build a custom ENF that includes only some of the network
servers and to exclude other servers and workstations (we refer to those selected servers
as belonging to within the boundaries of the monitored zone).
On the other hand, our proposed anomaly scanning detection approach does not
rely on the identification of the scanning source. Therefore, it can detect certain classes of
sophisticated scanning techniques (such as distributed and slow scanning) that make de-
termining the root cause of the scanning activity impractical. Furthermore, the detection
technique requires only a single packet to flag an attempt as a scan event and requires
minimalistic system state storage especially if used with a custom ENF. Additionally, our
approach is transport protocol-independent and hence can detect both TCP and UPD
scans. Recall, that the outcome of this first technique is detected scans with minimal false
positive rate.
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3.1.2 Evaluation: Datasets, Methodologies and Results
For the purpose of empirically validating our approach, we utilized and examined two real
network traffic datasets and implemented two experimental environments.
We used a dataset that consists of unsolicited one-way telescope/darknet traffic re-
trieved in real-time. The traffic originates from the Internet and is destined to numerous
/24 and /16 network sensors. The data were collected during the period of November
1, 2012 and December 1, 2012. Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and Figure 3.1 show some network,
transport and application level statistical information about the dataset.
TCP UDP ICMP Others
86.3% 11.7% 1.8% 0.2%







Table 3.2: IP Class Distribution
We selected part of the traffic that is destined to a /24 network collected at the sen-
sor. We assumed that an operational/corporate network, having the same IP configuration
as the incoming traffic, exists behind the sensors. Consequently, we built the network that
is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The network has a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)
address of 192.168.1.0/24 and is composed of 250 active hosts divided into 245 worksta-
tions and 5 servers. We as well took advantage of the SNMP procedures of Section 3.1.1
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Figure 3.1: Application Layer Protocols
to develop an SNMP tool. The tool is based on the software components provided by
eMarksoft SNMP [99].
Internet Incoming Traffic
245 Workstations 5 Servers
HTTP/TELNET FTP DNS
SSH MS-AD/POP3
Figure 3.2: Enterprise Network
We first used the developed tool to execute the training period of our proposed ap-
proach. The ENF was populated with 5 LHFs (the other workstations are not offering any
services) as illustrated in Table 3.3. The task was completed in 0.32 seconds and required
80 bytes of state memory.
To validate the detection capabilities of our approach, we experimented with a one
day sample traffic captured from our dataset. We also compared our approach with Snort’s
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Host TCP Ports Description
Server 1 80, 23 HTTP/TELNET
Server 2 21 FTP
Server 3 53 DNS
Server 4 23 SSH
Server 5 445, 110 MS-Active Directory/POP3
Table 3.3: ENF Details
sfPortscan preprocessor using the same day sample. sfPortscan [100], a preprocessor plu-
gin for the open source network intrusion and detection system Snort [101], provides the
capability to detect TCP, UDP, and ICMP scanning. The sfPortscan preprocessor detects
scans by counting RST packets from each perceived target during a predetermined timeout
interval. Before declaring a scan, 5 events (i.e., RST packets) are required from a given
target within a window. The sliding timeout window varies from 60 to 600 seconds by
sensitivity level; at the highest level, an alert will be generated if the 5 events are observed
within 600 seconds. We have chosen to compare our approach with Snort’s sfPortscan pre-
processor since Snort is one of the most broadly deployed intrusion detection/prevention
technology worldwide and has become a de-facto standard.
According to the results, using our approach with this specific data sample, we were
able to detect 4215 unique scans (unique IP/port pairs). Moreover, Figure 3.3 illustrates
the top 6 scanned TCP ports. Scans towards those services could indicate that they are
vulnerable to exploits.
To elaborate on the results, we subsequently present an analytical discussion on our
technique’s false negatives and false positives.
False Negatives: We fed the same dataset as an input to Snort’s sfPortscan. We
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Figure 3.3: Top 6 Scanned TCP Ports - One Day Sample
relied on the output as a baseline for our comparison. Snort’s sfPortscan technique de-
tected 3690 unique scans. After a semi-automated analysis and comparison that was based
on the logged scanning traffic flows (i.e., source and destination IP and port, protocol, and
timestamp), we identified that all the 4215 scans that our approach detected include sf-
Portscan’s 3690 scans. Therefore, relative to this technique and experimenting with this
specific data set, we confirm that our approach yielded no false negative.
False Positives: Our approach flags an attempt as a scan whenever a connection
is made to a host or service not offered by the network. The following can exist as sources
of false positive: (1) User error and network misconfiguration; the intent was not to per-
form a scan but rather to access a legitimate service that have failed. Since there exists
no scientific way to judge the connection intention, we have to classify those attempts
as scans. (2) Backscattered traffic [102] destined to the corporate network; such traffic
commonly refers to unsolicited traffic that is the result of responses to denial of service
attacks with spoofed source IP addresses. To avoid this false positive, we can investigate
such traffic using the proposed method in [86], which uses flags in packet headers, such as
TCP SYN+ACK, RST, RST+ACK, and ACK, to accomplish the filtering. (3) Attempts
to newly available services that were not part of the training period; to reduce the occur-
rences of this, we can optimize the update threshold of an ENF to include the new services.
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Moreover, our approach can detect certain types of scans that were not included
at the time of the experiment, and by default, in Snort’s sfPortscan definitions. These
include scans from a single host to a single port on a single host, slow scans and a specific
host scanning multiple ports on multiple hosts. In general, we claim that a certain limited,
acceptable and a manageable number of false positives will occur. Although future manual
packet inspection needs to be performed to get the exact number of false positives, we
need as well to consider Snort’s sfPortscan false negatives and the different types of scans
that our approach was able to detect.
To further evaluate the proposed non-attribution anomaly detection approach that
was presented in Section 3.1.1, we consider another network scenario. We selected part of
the traffic that is destined to a /24 network collected at the sensor. We assumed that a
De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) perimeter network, having the same IP configuration as the
incoming traffic, exists behind the sensors. A DMZ network typically refers to a logical sub-
network that contains and exposes an organization’s external-facing (i.e., public) services
to a larger untrusted network, such as the Internet. Consequently, we built the network




Figure 3.4: The DMZ Network
The DMZ network consists of three public servers. The corresponding ENF is sum-
marized in Table 3.4. The procedure to build the ENF executed in 0.23 seconds and
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required 54 bytes of state memory.
Host TCP Ports Description
Server 1 443 HTTPS
Server 2 989, 990 FTPS
Server 3 53 DNS
Table 3.4: ENF Details
To validate the detection capability of our approach, we experimented with a one
day sample traffic captured from our dataset. We also compared our approach with Snort’s
sfPortscan preprocessor using the same data sample. Table 3.5 summarizes the findings.
After a semi-automated analysis and comparison that was based on the logged scanning
traffic flows (i.e., source and destination IP and port, protocol, and timestamp), we iden-
tified that all the 3421 scans that our approach detected include sfPortscan’s 3112 scans.
Therefore, relative to this technique and experimenting with this specific data set, we
confirm, once again, that our approach yielded no false negative.
Detected Scans-Proposed Approach Detected Scans-Snort’s sfPortscan
3421 3112
Table 3.5: Summary-Detection Capability
3.2 On Fingerprinting Internet-scale Probing Activities
Motivated by recent cyber attacks that were facilitated through probing, limited cyber
security intelligence and the lack of accuracy that is provided by scanning detection sys-
tems, this section presents a new approach to fingerprint Internet-scale probing activities.
It investigates whether the perceived traffic refers to probing activities and which exact
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scanning technique is being employed to perform the probing. Further, this work strives
to examine probing traffic dimensions to infer the ‘machinery’ of the scan; whether the
probing is random or follows a certain predefined pattern; which probing strategy is being
employed; and whether the probing activity is generated from a software tool or from a
worm/bot. The approach leverages a number of statistical techniques, probabilistic dis-
tribution methods and observations in an attempt to understand and analyze probing
activities. To prevent evasion, the approach formulates this matter as a change point
detection problem that yielded motivating results. Evaluations performed using 55 GB
of real darknet traffic shows that the extracted inferences exhibit promising accuracy and
can generate significant insights that could be used for mitigation purposes.
3.2.1 Proposed Approach
Internet security operators on the global scale are interested in generating insights and
inferences concerning any probing activities that they might perceive. It is significant for
them to have the capability to fingerprint probing events. Thus, they would benefit from
knowing if the perceived traffic is related to scanning or not and if it is, exactly which
scanning technique has been employed. This section aims at tackling these two issues.
The rationale of the proposed method states that regardless of the source, strategy
and aim of the probing, the reconnaissance activity should have been generated using a
certain literature-known scanning technique (i.e., TCP SYN, UDP, ACK, etc. [45]). We
observe that a number of those probing techniques demonstrate a similar temporal corre-
lation and similarity when generating their corresponding probing traffic. In other words,
the observation states that we can cluster the scanning techniques based on their traffic
correlation statuses. Subsequently, we can differentiate between probing and other mali-
cious traffic (i.e., Denial of Service (DoS)) based on the possessed traffic correlation status.
We can as well attribute the probing traffic to a certain cluster of scanning techniques (i.e.,
the probing activity, after confirmed as probing, can be identified as being generated by
a certain cluster of techniques that possess similar traffic correlation status). To identify
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exactly which scanning technique has been employed in the probing, we statistically esti-
mate the relative closeness of the probing traffic in comparison with the techniques found
in that cluster.
To enable the capturing of traffic signals correlation statuses, the proposed method
employs the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) technique. DFA was first proposed
in [103] and has since been used in many research areas to study signals correlation. Very
limited work in the areas of cyber security and malicious traffic detection has utilized DFA
[104, 105], and to the best of our knowledge, no work has leveraged the DFA technique to
tackle the problem of fingerprinting probing traffic.
The DFA method of characterizing a non-stationary time series is based on the root
mean square analysis of a random walk. DFA is advantageous in comparison with other
methods such as spectral analysis [106] and Hurst analysis [107] since it permits the de-
tection of long range correlations embedded in a seemingly non-stationary time series.
It avoids as well the spurious detection of apparent long-range correlations that are an
artifact of non-stationarity. Another advantage of DFA is that it produces results that are
independent of the effect of the trend [108].
Given a traffic time series, the following steps need to be applied to implement DFA:





where B(i) is the ith interval and Bave is the average interval.
• Divide the time series into “boxes” (i.e., bin size) of length n.
• In each box, perform a least-squares polynomial fit of order p. The y coordinate of
the straight line segments is denoted by yn(k).
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• In each box, detrend the integrated time series, y(k), by subtracting the local trend,








• Repeat this procedure for different box sizes (i.e., time scales) n
The output of the DFA procedure is a relationship F (n), the average fluctuation as a
function of box size, and the box size n. Typically, F (n) will increase with box size
n. A linear relationship on a log-log graph indicates the presence of scaling; statistical
self-affinity expressed as F (n) ∼ nα. Under such conditions, the fluctuations can be
characterized by a scaling exponent α, which is the slope of the line relating logF (n) to
log(n). The scaling exponent α can take the following values, disclosing the correlation
status of the traffic time series.
• α < 0.5: anti-correlated.
• α ≈ 0.5: uncorrelated or white noise.
• α > 0.5: correlated.
• α ≈ 1: 1/f -noise or pink noise.
• α > 1: non-stationary, random walk like, unbounded
• α ≈ 1.5: Brownian noise.
We proceed by fingerprinting the scanning techniques. For the scope of the current work,
we have selected 10 cyber scanning techniques. To accomplish the task, we created an
experimental environment that includes two virtual machines, a scanning and a target
machine. Note that the virtual environment was hosted by VMware software while the
machines were running Ubuntu Linux 10 with 2GB of RAM and 2.1GHz dual core CPUs.
The machines are isolated from any external networks to prevent any noise in the gener-
ated signal. The target machine does not operate any special service. We have also setup
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Table 3.6: Selected Cyber Scanning Techniques and Nmap Command Flags
a TCPDUMP [109] sink on the target to collect the network traffic data originating from
the scanning machine. It is worthy to note that we do not record the traffic response from
the target as our intention is to capture the scanning techniques’ traffic regardless of the
offered services by the probed machine. To execute the scanning activity, we have utilized
Nmap [110], an open source utility for network scanning and discovery. We ran Nmap 10
times, once for each scanning technique, and collected the generated traffic in 10 packet
capture (pcap) [109] traffic files. The selected scanning techniques and the correspond-
ing required Nmap command flags to execute each of the techniques are summarized in
Table 3.6. For detailed information about the concerned scanning techniques, we refer
the reader to [45, 110]. The generated packets’ distribution of the 10 scanning techniques
is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Subsequently, we applied the DFA technique on each of the
scanning techniques’ traffic signals. To achieve that, we have utilized the DFA MATLAB
code found in [111] and used 1ms as the bin size for all the 10 scanning techniques. The
outcome of applying the DFA on the previous scanning traffic time series distributions is
shown in Figure 3.6 and the output of the scaling exponents α is summarized in Table 3.7.



























































































































TCP SYN Scan Packets Distribution


























































































































TCP Connect() Scan Packets 
Distribution






























































































































































































































































































IP Protocol Scan Packets Distribution



































































































































































































































RPC Scan Packets Distribution
(j) RPC Scan




































































Figure 3.6: Applying DFA on the Scanning Techniques Traffic Signals
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Cyber Scanning Technique Scaling Exponent
TCP SYN Scan 0.57









Table 3.7: Summary of the DFA Scaling Exponent α
status, we can produce Table 3.8 that discloses that a number of scanning techniques
in fact demonstrated a similar temporal correlation and similarity when generating their
corresponding probing traffic.
It is significant to pinpoint that such results are independent from the used scan-
ning tool. In this work, we have used Nmap since it is the most widely adopted and
well established scanning tool. Moreover, it provided a simple mechanism to generate the
scanning traffic. We argue that same scanning techniques will generate a somehow similar
traffic distribution regardless of the tool used and hence will output similar DFA results.
To support this statement, we executed an experiment using Fing [112], another network
scanning and discovery tool. We also selected the TCP SYN Scan since it is the most
popular scanning technique [72]. We repeated the same experimentation as we did with
the other scanning techniques. The output of the DFA scaling exponent α was = 0.55.
Therefore, the correlation status was shown to be ‘correlated’ which is coherent with the
DFA results that we have previously obtained with the TCP SYN Scan when we used
Nmap. We can generalize such result to other techniques as well; since DFA operates on
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Table 3.8: Cyber Scanning Techniques and Corresponding Correlation Statuses
packets distribution in a time series, where similar scanning techniques, when following
the protocol and technique standards, will possess similar distributions when probing their
target, then we can expect similar DFA results regardless of the tool used.
It is also noteworthy to mention that attackers/scanners will not be able to avoid
detection by modifying the correlation status of a probing signal because of two reasons.
First, since they are going to employ one of the techniques of Table 3.7, which presents a
comprehensive list of scanning techniques, regardless of whether they use a tool or any-
thing else, they will indeed generate a probing signal that will be fingerprinted by the
proposed approach. Second, the fact the we aim to leverage a darknet space to perform
the inference in which the scanners have no knowledge about its existence, will cause the
scanners to be detected. We argue that scanners will not go into the trouble of developing
entirely new probing techniques that do not rely on the techniques of Table 3.6 and at
the same time possess the capability to detect darknets, where both tasks are known to























Figure 3.7: Employed System Process
We proceed by presenting Figure 3.7, which depicts the system process that is
adopted by the proposed approach to permit the inference of the probing activities as
well as the employed probing techniques. One of the issues that arises is where to apply
DFA given a traffic time series that needs to be tested; this problem could be re-stated as
follows: given a traffic time series St, find a starting position X and an ending position
X + σ in St where we can apply DFA on. Assuming a ‘random’ or a ‘predefined’ window
location in the time series St to apply DFA on will be erroneous as this will result in
wrong inferences. For example, if the traffic time series that needs to be tested is of length
5 minutes, applying DFA on the entire distribution could indicate a result (suppose it
was inferred that it is not scanning) while the actual scanning starts on the 3rd minute;
the entire distribution’s correlation status appears to be close to noise (i.e., α value ≈ 1
and hence not scanning) while from the 3rd minute up to the 5th the signal is correlated
(i.e., scanning). To tackle this, we present Algorithm 1 which discloses an approach to
approximate when to apply DFA, to correctly infer whether or not the traffic refers to
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probing activities.
Algorithm 1: Approximating the starting location on where to apply DFA
in St
input : A time series St of the distribution under testing; the set of time
series Scp of the distributions of the scanning techniques.
output: X, reflecting the starting location on where to apply DFA in St
1 m=length(St);
2 for every Scp do
3 n=length(Scp);
4 for i=1 → (m− n) do







12 for i=1 → n do
13 K[i]= ‖E‖ = d(A(i), B(i));
14 sum+=K[i];
15 return (sum);
As shown in Figure 3.7, Algorithm 1 takes as input the time series St of the dis-
tribution under testing and all the other distributions of the scanning techniques Scp of
Figure 3.5. For every distribution related to the scanning techniques, it calculates the eu-
clidean distance E between the points in Scp and St. Subsequently, the scanning technique
distribution is moved one point in a sliding window fashion against St. For each sliding
window, it records the distance between Scp and St. After finishing all the sliding window
procedures, the algorithm stores the minimum distance between both sliding windows in
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all the iterations. The algorithm finally selects X as the minimum of all the distances in
all sliding windows after all the techniques Scp have passed on St. This will approximate
the starting position on where to apply DFA in St. Note that, σ in the ending position
X + σ, that was previously mentioned, is the length of the scanning technique Scp where
X was derived from. It is significant to note that we use the scanning techniques Scp
of Figure 3.5 as a way to infer, in an apriori fashion, where to start applying DFA and
hence where we estimate that the scanning is initiated; we are not completely matching
the techniques with the input time series St. In fact this is not the intention of Algorithm
1 and hence we do not expect the techniques to completely overlap the input time series
St. Thus, any variation of scanning techniques’ distributions is tolerated and manageable,
as long their correlation status, as we expect and observe, are kept stable.
After applying DFA, given the output information of Algorithm 1, we end up with
a certain correlation status. We expect that the correlation status indicates a probing
activity (recall Table 3.8). However, we may encounter the case where the correlation
status does not indicate probing (i.e., uncorrelated, 1/f -noise or Brownian noise). If the
activity refers to probing, then the output correlation status will lead us to a certain
cluster of scanning techniques (of Table 3.8) that this probing activity has been generated
from. To exactly identify which scanning technique has been used to probe, we present
Algorithm 2, which discloses an approach to achieve that.
As depicted in Figure 3.7, Algorithm 2 takes as input a time series Sb of the probing
distribution that DFA was previously applied on; Sb refers to the time series extracted from
X to X + σ. For each of the scanning techniques Scbi in the cluster Scb that is related to
the previous output correlation status, we statistically measure the relative closeness of Sb
to each scanning technique in that cluster using Bhattacharyya distance [114], Bha. The
latter statistic test is an established and an effective metric to determine the overlap of two
sample distributions [114]. Intuitively, the algorithm selects the technique’s distribution
that is closer to Sb, Scbi. Scbi will be identified as the scanning technique that Sb was
employing.
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Algorithm 2: Identifying the scanning technique
input : A time series Sb of the probing distribution that DFA was
previously applied on; a cluster of time series Scb of the
distributions of the scanning techniques related to the correlation
status.
output: Scbi, reflecting one scanning technique that is estimated to be
generating the probing activity found in Sb.
1 for every Scbi do
2 Bhabi = ‖Bha‖ = d(Scbi,Sb);
3 end
4 di = Min(Bhabi);
5 return (Scbi|i of di);
3.2.2 Observation Validation
From what has been presented in Table 3.8, we deduced that the techniques could be
clustered into 3 groups based on their probing traffic correlation statuses. Thus, the null
hypothesis states that the scanning techniques’ traffic originates from 3 independent clus-
ters. However, by default, the DFA approach, especially in the context of probing activity,
is not an established method to identify clusters. We now aim to validate the proposed
method by comparing it with the well established machine learning clustering approaches,
namely, the K-means and the Expectation Maximization (EM) techniques. These tech-
niques and the validation results are consequently discussed.
The EM algorithm is an effective and popular technique for estimating the mixture
model parameters [115]. Note that, the K-means algorithm operates by minimizing the
sum of squared Euclidean distances between data records in a cluster and the clusters mean
vector. This assignment criterion implicitly assumes that the clusters are represented by
Gaussian distributions located at the k cluster means. Moreover, since the K-means al-
gorithm utilizes the Euclidean metric, it does not generalize to the problem of clustering
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discrete or categorical data. Furthermore, the K-means algorithm employs a membership
function which assigns each data record to exactly one cluster. This harsh criteria does not
allow for uncertainty in the membership of a data record within a cluster. On the other
hand, the mixture model framework adopted by the EM relaxes these assumptions. Due
to the probabilistic nature of the mixture model, clusters can be effectively represented
by a suitable component density functions (i.e., Poission, non-spherical Gaussians, etc.).
Additionally, categorical or discrete data is similarly handled by associating discrete data
distribution over these attributes (i.e., Multinational, Binomial, etc.). In this work, we
adopt both the K-means and the EM algorithm to validate the DFA approach that was
previously proposed. The EM algorithm is thoroughly discussed next.
The mixture model approximates the data distribution by fitting k component den-
sity functions fh, h = 1, . . . , k, to a database D having m records and d attributes. In
our work, the attributes represent packet features extracted from the scanning machines,
the records represent the data instances related to those features and the database D is
the complete set of data instances. Let x be a record from D, then the mixture model




wh · fh(x|Φh) (3.3)




wh = 1, wh ≥ 0
The functions fh(x|Φh) h = 1, . . . , k are the clusters or component density functions
modeling the records of the hth cluster, and Φh represents the specific parameters used to
compute the value of fh (i.e., for a Gaussian component density function, Φh is the mean
and the covariance matrix).
The mixture model also allows for overlapping clusters; data records may belong to
all k clusters with different probabilities of membership. The probability of membership





wi · fi(x|Φi) (3.4)
By making the assumption that the attributes of the database are independent over
records within a given cluster, the component density functions can be decomposed as a





Although the framework we present in this work is general enough to address mix-
ture model estimation having both continuous and discrete attributes, we focus on its
application to continuous-valued data, modeled by multivariate Gaussians. In our current
work, this choice of Gaussians for continuous-valued data is motivated by a result from
density estimation theory stating that any distribution can be effectively approximated
by a mixture of Gaussians [116].
Each population (i.e., cluster) is modeled by a d-dimensional Gaussian probability
distribution. The multivariate Gaussian distribution for cluster h = 1, . . . , k is parametrized







(x− µh)T (Σh)−1(x− µh),
x and µh are column vectors, the superscript
T indicates the transpose to a row vector, |Σh|
is the determinant of Σh and (Σh)
−1 is its matrix inverse. The Gaussian mixture model
parameters consist of the means and covariance matrices for each cluster h = 1, . . . , k along
with the weights wh associated with each cluster. Let Φ = {(wh, µh,Σh), h = 1, . . . , k} be
the collection of mixture model parameters. The quality of a given set of parameters Φ is
a measure of how well the corresponding mixture model fits the data. This is quantified












The EM algorithm begins with an initial estimation of Φ and iteratively updates it.
The sequence of Φ-values is such that L(Φ) is non-decreasing at each iteration. We next
outline the operation of the EM algorithm.
Given a database D with m records with d continuous-valued attributes, a stopping
tolerance  > 0 and a mixture model parameters Φj at iteration j, compute Φj+1 at
iteration j + 1 as follows:
1. For each database record x ∈ D, compute the membership probability of x in each




wji · fi(x|µji ,Σji )















wjh(x)(x− µj+1h )(x− µj+1h )T∑
x∈D
wjh(x)
stopping criteria: if |L(Φj)−L(Φj+1)| ≤ , stop. Else set j ← j+ 1 and go to 3.3. L(Φ)
is given in
3.7.
Note that, steps 1 and 2 are respectively referred to as the estimation and maximiza-
tion steps. Moreover, a full data scan is required at each iteration of the EM algorithm
to compute the membership probability for each data record in each cluster. The number
of iterations required before the stopping criteria is satisfied is dependent upon the initial
parameter values and the actual data distribution. In general the number of iterations is
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arbitrary but the procedure is guaranteed to converge. Note that, all the mathematical
notations that were presented in this section coupled with their corresponding definitions
are summarized in Table 3.9.
Mathematical Notation Definition
p(x) Probability density function evaluated at a data record x
wh The probability of a data record belonging to a cluster h
fh(x|Φh) Component density functions
Φh The parameters of the component density function∏d
j=1 fh,j(xj |Φh) The product of density functions over the attributes
µh Mean vector
Σh Covariance matrix
L(Φ) The mixture model
Table 3.9: Mathematical Notations and Definitions
Recall that the aim is to validate the soundness of our proposed method by com-
paring it with the discussed machine learning clustering approaches. We proceed by going
back to our scanning traffic pcap files that we have previously collected. Subsequently, we
extracted from them a total of 29 data link, network and transport layer packet features
as summarized in Table 3.10. This feature extraction procedure was achieved using the
open source jNetPcap API [117]. We consequently compiled the extracted features into a
unified data file of 7138 data instances. To apply the K-means and the EM algorithm on
our data file, we have respectively used MATLAB’s default clustering functionality and
the WEKA data mining tool [118]. The output of those procedures is depicted in Figure
3.8.
Figure 3.8 clearly shows the formation of 3 clusters. This result provides evidence
that the traffic originates from 3 different classes. To further test the validity of this









5 The flag ‘frame’ is marked
Network Layer Features
6 IP Header length
7 IP Flags.
8 IP Flags: reversed bit
9 IP Flags: do not fragment bit
10 IP Flags: more fragments bit
11 IP Fragment offset
12 IP Time to live
13 IP Protocol
Transport Layer Features
14 TCP Segment length
15 TCP Sequence number
16 TCP Next sequence number
17 TCP Acknowledgement num-
ber
18 TCP Header length
19 TCP Flags
20 TCP Flags: congestion window
reduced
21 TCP Flags: ECN-Echo
22 TCP Flags: Urgent
23 TCP Flags: Acknowledgement
24 TCP Flags: Push
25 TCP Flags: Reset
26 TCP Flags: Syn
27 TCP Flags: Fin
28 TCP Window size
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Figure 3.8: Method Validation through Unsupervised Learning
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Typically, a silhouette plot displays a measure of how close each point in one cluster is to
points in the neighboring clusters. A value of 1 indicates that the points are very distant
from neighboring clusters, a value of 0 informs that the points are not distant from other
clusters while a negative value indicates that the points are erroneously placed in that
cluster. From Figure 5.23b, it is shown that a significant amount of points in all the 3
classes have a large silhouette value, greater than 0.6 [119], indicating that the clusters
are separated from neighboring clusters. This provides incentives to validate the quality
of the formed K-means clusters. Further, the output of the EM clustering procedure on
the same data file is shown in Figure 3.8c. Similar to the K-means results, we can notice
the formation of 3 distinct classes. These results relatively validate the proposed method
by revealing that the scanning traffic originates from 3 distinct classes; we accept the null
hypothesis that stated that the scanning techniques’ traffic originates from 3 independent
clusters.
Is the probing random?
When probing activities occur, it would be interesting to possess insights related to how
it is being generated; does the scanning occur in a random manner or does it follow a
certain predefined pattern. Patterns existence provide cyber security intelligence about
bots orchestration behavior. The latter is specifically important when trying to obtain in-
ferences related to cyber scanning campaigns, such as the one reported in [120]. To answer
this question, we proceed as follows. For each distinct pair of hosts retrieved from the
probing traffic, we test for randomness in the generated traffic using the Wald-Wolfowitz
(also known as the runs) statistic test [121]. If the result is positive, we record it for
that specific session and apply the test on the remaining probing traffic. If the outcome
is negative, we infer that the generated traffic follows a certain pattern. To capture the
specific employed pattern, in this work, we model the probing traffic as a Poisson process1
and retrieve the maximum likelihood estimate intervals (at a 95% confidence level) for the
Poisson parameter λ that corresponds to that traffic. The choice to model the traffic as a
1The modeling approach is not very significant but rather the consistency of adopting one approach on
all the probing sources.
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Poisson distribution is motivated by [122], where the authors observed that probe arrivals
is coherent with that distribution.
How are the targets being scanned?
As revealed in [120, 123], coordinated probing bots employ various strategies when prob-
ing their targets. These strategies could include IP-sequential [124], reverse IP-sequential
[125], uniform permutation [126] or other types of permutations. In an attempt to capture
the probing strategies, we execute the following. For each probing source in the probing
traffic, we extract its corresponding distribution of target IPs. To differentiate between
sequential and permutation probing, we apply the Mann-Kendall statistic test [127], a non-
parametric hypothesis testing approach, to check for monotonicity in those distributions.
The rational behind the monotonicity test is that sequential probing will indeed induce a
monotonic signal in the distribution of target IPs while permutation probing will not. Fur-
ther, in this work, we set the significance level to 0.5% since a higher value could introduce
false positives. To differentiate between (forward) IP-sequential and reverse IP-sequential,
for those distributions that tested positive for monotonicity, we also record the slope of the
distribution; a positive slope defines a forward IP-sequential strategy while a negative one
implies a reverse IP-sequential strategy. For those distributions that tested negative for
monotonicity (i.e., not a sequential strategy), we leverage the chi-square goodness-of-fit
statistic test. The latter insight will inform us whether or not the employed strategy is
a uniform permutation; if the test fails, then the employed strategy will be deemed as a
permutation; uniform permutation otherwise.
Who is generating the probing activity?
When an enterprise fingerprint probing (i.e., detect activity and identify the technique), it
is of value as well to infer about the ‘machinery’ behind the source of the probing. Specif-
ically, it would be significant to pinpoint whether the scanning is generated by a scanning
tool or a worm/botnet. One use case for this, is for instance, when an Internet Service
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Provider (ISP) notices that one of its customers is generating probing where that probing
is generated by a worm/botnet. Keeping in mind that most probing activity is generated
from non-spoofed Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (so the actual attacker/scanner can
essentially get back the probing results), then the ISP can react on that and provide the
suitable anti-malware solution to that specific customer.
From the two previous questions, we can infer those probing events that are ran-
dom and monotonic. It is known that monotonic probing is a behavior of probing tools
in which the latter sequentially scan their targets (IPs and ports) [128]. Furthermore,
for random events, the monotonic trend checking can help filter out traffic caused by the
non-bot scanners [129]. Thus, we deem a probing source as leveraging a probing tool if
their traffic is randomly generated and if they adopt a sequential probing strategy (i.e.,
including reverse IP-sequential); a worm/bot otherwise. Although in the current work
we do not directly differentiate between scanning generated by worms or bots, however,
future work would couple such information with real malware data (that we possess as
well) to provide more accurate inferences, including the type of malware or the botnet
orchestration pattern.
Note that the ‘machinery’ of the scan aim to provide inferences and insights related
to probing activities targeting a certain organization. Although the latter could be inter-
esting to the organizations being scanned, we envision in future work that such proposed
approach could be leveraged to automatically infer large-scale probing campaigns, such
as the one analyzed in [120]. More specifically, we intend to employ that latter coupled
with other inferences that we are currently developing to cluster the probing sources that
possess similar probing behaviors.
3.2.3 Empirical Evaluation
We possess real darknet data that we are receiving on a daily basis from a trusted third
party. Such traffic originates from the Internet and is destined to numerous /13 network
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sensors. The darknet sensors cover more than 12 countries and monitor around half a
million dark IPs. The data mostly consists of unsolicited TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. It
might contain as well some DNS traffic. In a nutshell, darknet traffic is Internet traffic des-
tined to routable but unused Internet addresses (i.e., dark sensors). Since these addresses
are unallocated, any traffic targeting them is suspicious. Darknet analysis has shown to
be an effective method to generate cyber threat intelligence [130, 131]. We use one week
of data (55GB), extracted from multiple /24 networks, that was collected during the dura-
tion of February 24th to March 3rd 2013, to empirically evaluate our approach. Darknet
traffic is typically composed of three types of traffic, namely, scanning, backscattered and
misconfiguration [132]. Scanning arises from bots and worms while backscattered traffic
commonly refers to unsolicited traffic that is the result of responses to denial of service
attacks with spoofed source IP addresses. On the other hand, misconfiguration traffic is
due to network/routing or hardware/software faults causing such traffic to be sent to the
darknet sensors.
The first aim is to filter out misconfiguration data. We use a simple metric that
records the average number of sources per destination darknet address. This metric should
be significantly larger for misconfiguration than scanning traffic. However, although it dif-
ferentiates misconfiguration from scanning traffic, it could include as well backscattered
traffic as they also can possess a large average number of sources per destination (i.e, in
case of a DoS). To cope with this issue, we observe, per the technique in [132], flags in
packet headers, such as TCP SYN+ACK, RST, RST+ACK, ACK, etc., that resemble
backscattered traffic [132]. Subsequently, we filter out flows that lack that observation,
deeming them as misconfiguration.
Second, we aggregate the connections into sessions using an approach similar to the
first step algorithm by Kannan et al. [133]. We consider all those connections within
Taggreg of each other as part of the same session for a given pair of hosts. We used the
same threshold, Taggreg = 100 seconds, and found that this seems to correctly group the
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Figure 3.9: Sessions Distribution
extracted 100 sessions for a total of 700 sessions.
We setup an experimental environment using Java and implemented Algorithms 1
and 2. For all the statistical test techniques, including DFA, Bhattacharyya distance,
Mann-Kendall and Wald-Wolfowitz, we employed their MATLAB implementations [111,
134, 135, 136].
We first applied the approach to attempt to differentiate between scanning and
backscattered traffic (i.e., DoS related activity). Recall, that we have identified scanning
as having the correlation statuses of Table 5.2. Figure 4.7 represents how the 700 sessions
were distributed and fingerprinted. It is shown that probing activity corresponds to 87%
(612) of all the sessions. This scanning to backscattered traffic ratio is somehow coherent
with other darknet studies [132]. Note that in Figure 4.7, DoS related activity was fin-
gerprinted as such since it was shown from its DFA results that 13% (88) of the sessions
possessed correlation statuses corresponding to either uncorrelated, 1/f -noise or Brownian
noise. The fact that DoS related traffic demonstrated noise or Brownian noise is compliant
with what was found in [104] when the authors performed DFA analysis on DoS traffic.
To further validate such inference, we implemented the DoS detection algorithm by Moore
et al. [137] and applied it on the 88 sessions. 77 sessions out of the 88 were detected as
DoS related. Thus, with our approach, we have erroneously fingerprinted 11 sessions as
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DoS related (assuming the mentioned DoS detection algorithm did not produce any false
positive). To understand why that occurred, we inspected the 11 sessions. 7 sessions out
of the 11 possessed a DFA scaling exponent α ranging from 1.51 to 1.59, and accordingly
were fingerprinted as Brownian noise (i.e., DoS related). However, after inspecting their
traffic packets, they were shown to be a rare type of RPC scanning traffic. This suggests
that one should not consider large α values as valid results or at least keep those incidents
in a ‘quarantine’ for further automated post-processing. The remaining 4 sessions that
were also erroneously fingerprinted seem to be misconfiguration that apparently, were not
previously filtered as expected.
To evaluate the scanning fingerprinting capabilities of our approach, we experi-
mented with Snort’s sfPortscan preprocessor using the same 612 sessions that were previ-
ously fingerprinted as probing. sfPortscan [100], a preprocessor plugin for the open source
network intrusion and detection system Snort [101], provides the capability to detect
TCP, UDP, and ICMP scanning. The sfPortscan preprocessor detects scans by counting
RST packets from each perceived target during a predetermined timeout interval. Before
declaring a scan, 5 events (i.e., RST packets) are required from a given target within a
window. The sliding timeout window varies from 60 to 600 seconds by sensitivity level;
at the highest level, an alert will be generated if the 5 events are observed within 600
seconds. We have chosen to compare our approach with Snort’s sfPortscan preprocessor
since Snort is one of the most broadly deployed intrusion detection/prevention technology
worldwide and has become a de-facto standard.
We relied on sfPortscan’s output as a baseline for our comparison. Snort’s sfPortscan
detected 590 scans. After a semi-automated analysis and comparison that was based on
the logged scanning traffic flows (i.e., source and destination IP and port, protocol, and
timestamp), we identified that all the 612 scans that our approach fingerprinted as probing
activity include sfPortscan’s 590 scans. Therefore, relative to this technique and experi-
menting with this specific data set, we confirm that our approach yielded no false negative.
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Figure 3.10: Probing Techniques Distribution
considered as false positive. It is worthy to pinpoint that our approach can detect certain
types of scans that were not included at the time of the experiment, and by default, in
Snort’s sfPortscan definitions. These include scans from a single host to a single port on
a single host, slow scans and a specific host scanning multiple ports on multiple hosts. In
general, we claim that a certain limited, acceptable and a manageable number of false pos-
itives might occur (taking into consideration the system that we compare our approach
with). We need as well to consider Snort’s sfPortscan false negatives and the different
types of probing that our approach is able to fingerprint.
We next applied the proposed approach to identify which techniques were leveraged
in the previous fingerprinted probing activity. Figure 4.8 reveals that TCP SYN scanning
leads with 35% (212) of all the sessions, followed by UDP, TCP connect() and ACK
scanning. FIN, Xmas Tree, and Null scanning are typically considered as members of
the ‘stealth’ scans because they send a single frame to a TCP port without any TCP
handshaking or any additional packet transfers. They are relatively effective in evading
firewall detection and they are often employed. The fact that the latter techniques were
found to be among the least leveraged in the previous fingerprinted probing activity in
our data set is quite puzzling.
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Figure 3.11: Probing Activity Dimensions Analysis
3.2.2 and 3.2.2. We applied the proposed approach which yielded the output of Figure
3.11. The results disclose that around 81% of the probing activity is being generated
by worms or bots. Only 21% are being generated by probing tools. These percentages
infer that leveraging real malware data, in a future study, could reveal substantial cyber
security insights. The results also elaborate on the manner in which worms/bots generate
their probing traffic. It is demonstrated that 66% of that probing traffic follows a random
approach, while the remaining 34% follow a certain pattern when scanning their targets.
Concerning the employed probing strategy, it is shown that 57% of the probing sources
leveraged a permutation while the remaining adopted a sequential strategy when probing
their targets. Of those that employed a permutation, 76% used a uniform permutation
while 24% adopted other types of permutations. The majority (≈ 95%) of those that
employed a sequential strategy were found to adopt a forward IP-sequential strategy while
only 5% adopted a reverse IP-sequential strategy. The latter insights allows us to 1) track
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the probing activity that possess similar scanning patterns and strategies and perhaps
attribute it to the same campaign, 2) apply similar mitigation steps to probing activity
with similar patterns and techniques and 3) provide inferences, although not decisive,
that the probing is being generated by an orchestrated botnet. Note that we also generate
supplementary material related to the above mentioned probing activity (i.e., worm, bots,
probing patterns) including geo-location information per real source, organization, ISP,
city, region and country. However, we refrain from publishing those due to sensitivity/legal
issues.
3.2.4 Evasion Prevention
To fingerprint probing activity (i.e., detect activity and identify the technique), our ap-
proach, as stated in Section 3.2.1, leverages the DFA time series technique and operates
on traffic distributions. However, it is realistic to pinpoint that the approach could be
evaded in two ways. First, by a malicious attacker who deliberately injects a number of
packets while performing his probing activity. Second, due to network fluctuations (i.e.,
delay), the distribution could be distorted. In both cases, our approach might erroneously
miss the probing, attribute the probing to the wrong technique cluster or fail to identify
the exact technique. We project that by formulating this problem as a time series change
point detection problem, we can detect if and where the distribution has been susceptible
to any sudden modifications. The time series change point detection problem has been
excessively reviewed in the literature [138, 139]. For the sake of this work, as a proof of
concept, we selected the work from Adams et al. [139] to experiment the effectiveness
of such approach. We decided to leverage this specific work since it adopts a statistical
approach which is coherent with the theme of our approach, is highly respected in its
domain, and is directly applicable to our work that is related to time series distributions.
Further, concerning its performance, in the worst-case, it is linear in space and time com-
plexity according to the number of data points observed before the sudden fluctuation,
which renders it practically viable. We employed the authors’ MATLAB implementation,
experimented with three different types of scanning traffic, namely, TCP SYN, UDP and
ACK, and emulated a malicious attacker by injecting packets in the probing distributions
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using ‘packit’ [140], a packet analysis and injection tool.
Figure 3.12 shows how the TCP SYN, UDP and ACK scan distributions is being
generated with a low frequency distribution. Suddenly, the malicious attacker injects
random packets. The marked ‘X’s on the Figure demonstrate how the change point de-
tection technique was successfully able to detect the change. In the context of our work,
to prevent distribution modifications, we can simply remove the distributions between the
first marked ‘X’ and the second marked ‘X’ to retrieve the original distributions, namely
the probing distributions. Although we admit that further experimentation should be
undertaken to thoroughly authenticate the effectiveness of such change point detection
techniques in providing evasion prevention to our approach, the obtained preliminary re-
sults seem to be promising and thus motivating.
3.2.5 Approach Limitations
We acknowledge a number of limitations in our proposed approach. First, although in
this work, the approach exhibited promising accuracy when evaluated using darknet (i.e,
malicious) data, we have not tested the approach using normal two way traffic. Normal
network traffic (i.e., benign http and ftp traffic for example) is known to be self-similar
(i.e., possesses long traffic correlations). This directly affects the accuracy of our approach.
We believe this point is manageable by applying pre-processing filtering mechanisms to
filter out the benign traffic before applying our proposed approach. The payload analysis
techniques in [141] seem viable to accomplish that. To verify this, we have executed the
following experiment. We obtained a mixture of normal/malicious traffic data set from
DARPA2. Subsequently, we executed the approach on that dataset after employing the
payload filtering technique [141]. The approach’s accuracy scored around 83% in compari-
son with DARPA’s ground truth information. We believe that such percentage of accuracy
is motivating, keeping in mind that our approach is primarily targeted towards darknet
analysis. Second, in its current state, our approach does not fingerprint ICMP scanning.






Figure 3.12: Approach Evasion Prevention using a Change Point Detection Technique
95
this limitation by analyzing/fingerprinting the distributions related to such traffic and
performing experimentation validation as we did to other scanning techniques. Third, the
approach does not differentiate between worms and bots probing. If accomplished, it will
yield significant cyber security intelligence for attribution and mitigation purposes. This
task is currently work in progress. Finally, bots probing orchestration is not yet confirmed.
Coupled with probing patterns that we have generated in this work, it could be used for
tracking cyber scanning campaigns and for effective mitigation.
3.3 Related Work
In this section, we discuss cyber scanning related detection and clustering techniques and
subsequently pinpoint the drawbacks of attribution-based approaches. Further, we pin-
point few works related to probing detection/analysis using statistical approaches.
Zhang et al. [1] proposed a scan detection method based on a distributed coop-
erative model. Their technique is composed of feature-based detection, scenario-based
detection and statistic-based detection. Their proposed architecture is decomposed into
5 layers (sensors, event generators, event detection agents, a fusion center and a control
center) that collaborate to achieve the intended task. The technique’s statistic-based de-
tection employs predefined thresholds that allows the detection of both scan and denial
of service attacks. A positive aspect of this work is that the proposed technique is well
suited to distributed large-scale environments. However, the presented work was based
on an illustrated described scenario and the authors did not discuss its applicability on
real data samples. In [80], Bhuyan et al. presented the adaptive outlier based approach
for coordinated scan detection (AOCD). First, the authors used the principal component
analysis feature reduction technique to identify the relevant feature set. Second, they
employed a variant of the fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm to cluster information. The
authors tested their algorithm using different real-life datasets and compared the results
against other available literature techniques. Their approach assumes that the target of
the scanning is a set of contiguous addresses, which is not always the case. In another
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work, Baldoni et al. [3] proposed a collaborative architecture where each target network
deploys local sensors that send alarms to a collaborative layer. This, in turn, correlates
this data with the aim of (1) identifying coordinated cyber scanning activity while (2)
reducing false positive alarms and (3) correctly separating groups of attackers that act
concurrently on overlapping targets. The soundness of the proposed approach was tested
on real network traces. Their proposed system is designed to leverage information coming
from various network domains to detect distributed scanning. Hence, the collaborative
layer appears to be ineffective when the adversary is acting only against one network
domain. In a more general work, Dainotti et al. [120] presented the measurement and
analysis of a 12-day world-wide cyber scanning campaign targeting VoIP (SIP) servers.
The authors used darknet/telescope data collected at the UCSD network telescope to ex-
clusively focus on the analysis and reporting of that SIP scanning incident.
Most of the aforementioned detection and clustering techniques and other litera-
ture work [84, 78, 72] could be noted as being attribution-based; they detect and cluster
distributed scanning based on the last perceived scanning source. Hence, they might
encounter one of the following issues:
• Determining attribution is not always possible, which might decrease the effective-
ness of such techniques.
• The scans may either be so slow or so broadly distributed that they exhaust the finite
computational state of scanning detection systems or fail to exceed some predefined
alert threshold.
• A significant amount of system state (i.e., memory, network topology information,
storage) needs to be maintained by the monitoring system in order to perform effec-
tively (reducing the detection time window to accommodate network traffic fluctu-
ations might cause excessive false negatives and false positives).
Further, our work that is related to Internet-scale probing inference is different
from the above related work as it does not rely on identifying the scanning source and
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is independent from the scanning strategy. Moreover, the proposed approach does not
rely on a certain predefined alert threshold, the transport protocol used or the number of
probed destinations and ports. Additionally, we attempted to go further than detection
by analyzing probing traffic dimensions, namely, employed technique, monotonicity and
randomness.
3.4 Summary
This chapter proposed a non-attribution anomaly detection technique. Motivated by the
shortcomings of attribution-based approaches to cyber scan detection, this technique pre-
sented an alternative view of the problem/solution. The idea is to focus on what is being
offered by the network and hence on what is being scanned rather than who is performing
the scanning. To characterize this, we introduced and elaborated on the notion of enter-
prise net- work facade. To construct and maintain the ENF, we leveraged the SNMP by
presenting certain management procedures. The approach’s training period is decoupled
from any external traffic which makes its implementation very operationally feasible, in
addition to having fast stabilization time yet requiring minimalistic system state storage.
The technique’s detection period is attribution-independent, which allows the detection
of sophisticated reconnaissance activity, requires only a single packet to detect a scan
and allows the detection of both TCP and UDP scans. To evaluate our technique, we
experimented using a real network traffic dataset and implemented a proof-of-concept en-
vironment. The results demonstrated that for a class C network with 250 active hosts
and 5 monitored servers, the proposed technique’s training period required a stabilization
time of less than 1 second and a state memory of 80 bytes. Moreover, in comparison with
Snort’s sfPortscan technique, it was able to detect 4215 unique scans and yielded zero false
negative.
This chapter also presented a new method to fingerprint Internet-scale probing ac-
tivity. It aims at detecting the cyber scanning activity and identifying the exact technique
that was employed in the activity. Further, it analyzes certain probing traffic dimensions
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such as monotonicity and randomness to generate inferences related to the ‘machinery’ of
the scan (i.e, probing tools Vs worms/bots), the approach of the scanning (i.e., randomness
Vs. probing patterns) and the employed probing strategy (i.e., sequential Vs. permuta-
tion). The approach leverages and employs several statistical techniques to achieve the
required tasks. Empirical evaluations performed using real darknet traffic showed that the
extracted inferences exhibit promising accuracy.
In the next chapter, we attempt to tackle the problem of attributing the inferred
probing activities to certain malware for attribution purposes.
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Chapter 4
Probing and Event Attribution
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of a correlation mechanism
between probing and malware activities for attribution purposes. To this end, we also
report on an Internet-scale malicious probing event by executing a multifaceted approach
that correlates three types of real cyber security data.
4.1 Inferring Internet-scale Infections by Correlating Mal-
ware and Probing Activities
This section presents a new approach to infer worldwide malware-infected machines by
solely analyzing their generated probing activities. In contrary to other adopted methods,
the proposed approach does not rely on symptoms of infection to detect compromised
machines. This allows the inference of malware infection at very early stages of contami-
nation. The approach aims at detecting whether the machines are infected or not as well
as pinpointing the exact malware type/family. The latter insights allow network secu-
rity operators of diverse organizations, Internet service providers and backbone networks
to promptly detect their clients’ compromised machines in addition to effectively provid-
ing them with tailored anti-malware/patch solutions. To achieve the intended goals, the
proposed approach exploits the darknet Internet space and initially filters out misconfigu-
ration traffic targeting such space using a probabilistic model. Subsequently, the approach
employs statistical methods to infer large-scale probing activities as perceived by the dark
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space. Consequently, such activities are correlated with malware samples by leveraging
fuzzy hashing and entropy based techniques. The proposed approach is empirically eval-
uated using a recent 60 GB of real darknet traffic and 65 thousand real malware samples.
The results concur that the rationale of exploiting probing activities for worldwide early
malware infection detection is indeed very promising. Further, the results, which were
validated using publically available data resources, demonstrate that the extracted infer-
ences exhibit noteworthy accuracy and can generate significant cyber security insights that
could be used for effective mitigation.
4.1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Today, the safety and security of our society is significantly dependent on having a secure
infrastructure. This infrastructure is largely controlled and operated using cyberspace.
Although tremendous efforts have been carried out to protect the cyberspace from diverse
debilitating, intimidating and disrupting cyber threats, such space continues to host highly
sophisticated malicious entities. The latter could be ominously leveraged to cause drastic
Internet-wide and enterprise impacts by means of large-scale probing campaigns [120],
distributed denial of service attacks [142], advanced persistent threats [143] and spam-
ming botnets [144]. According to Panda Security, a staggering 33% of worldwide Internet
machines are infected by malware [145]. Moreover, McAfee records over 100 thousand
new malware samples every day; a momentous 69 threats every minute or around one new
threat every second [146].
Network security operators of private and governmental organizations, Internet Ser-
vice Provides (ISPs) and content delivery networks as well as backbone networks face,
on a daily basis, the crucial challenge of dealing with their clients’ malware-infected ma-
chines. The latter not only hinders the clients’ overall experience and productivity but
also jeopardizes the entire cyber security of the provider (i.e., causing vulnerabilities or
opening backdoors in the internal network). Further, it significantly degrades the provided
quality of service since the compromised machines will most often cause excessive increase
in bandwidth that could be rendered by extreme Peer to Peer (P2P) usage, spamming,
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command-and-control communications and malicious Internet downloads. Additionally, if
providers’ networks were used to trigger, for instance, a malware-orchestrated spamming
campaign, then such providers could as well encounter serious legal issues for misusing
their infrastructure (i.e., for example, under the Canadian House Government Bill C-28
Act [147]). Consequently, this will immensely adversely affect the operators’ business,
reliability and reputation.
Thus, network security operators are interested in possessing a cyber security ca-
pability that generates inferences and insights related to their clients’ malware-infected
machines. It is significant for them to be able to pinpoint such machines in addition to
extract intelligence related to the exact malware type/family. The latter will facilitate the
distribution of suitable and tailored anti-malware solutions to those compromised clients.
Indeed, this cyber security capability should possess the following requirements.
First, it should be prompt; it must possess the ability to detect the infection as early as
possible in an attempt to thwart the creation of botnets and to limit the sustained possi-
ble collateral damage and any symptoms of infection. Second, it should be cost-effective;
the approach should not overburden the provider with implementation scenarios and their
corresponding supplementary costs. In fact, this last point is extremely imperative and
decisive; ISPs are frequently accused of ignoring their clients’ malware infections because
the task to detect and disinfect them is tedious, prolonged and undoubtedly expensive
[148, 149]. This section elaborates on such a cyber security capability that satisfies the
mentioned requirements. Specifically, we frame the contributions as follows:
• Proposing a new probabilistic model to preprocess telescope/darknet data to pre-
pare it for effective use. The aim is to fingerprint darknet misconfiguration traffic
and subsequently filter it out. The model is advantageous as it does not rely on ar-
bitrary cut-off thresholds, provide separate likelihood models to distinguish between
misconfiguration and other malicious darknet traffic and is independent from the
nature of the source of the traffic.
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• Proposing a new approach to infer Internet-scale malware-compromised machines.
The approach aims at detecting such machines as well as identifying their exact
infection type. The approach achieves its aims without recording or analyzing the
symptoms of infection (i.e., spamming, excessive bandwidth usage, etc.), which ren-
ders it efficient from both space and processing perspectives. Further, it exploits
probing activities to attain early detection of contamination incidents in addition to
requiring no implementation at the providers’ premises, eliminating the cost burden.
• Leveraging the darknet Internet space, around half a million routable but unallocated
IP addresses, which permits the observation and identification of worldwide probing
activities and thus malware-infected machines, without requiring any providers’ aid
or information.
• Correlating malware and probing network activities to achieve the intended goals by
employing numerous statistical, fuzzy hashing and entropy based techniques.
• Evaluating the proposed approach using a recent 60 GB of real darknet traffic and
65 thousand real malware samples.
4.1.2 Proposed Approach
In this section, we elaborate on the proposed approach as depicted in Figure 4.1. Specif-
ically, we discuss its rationale, describe its components and present its employed mecha-
nism, methods and techniques.
The rationale behind the proposed approach stems from the need to detect the in-
fection at early stages of contamination. In this context, probing or scanning activities are
known to be the very first symptoms of infection [35, 7]. On the other hand, the Internet
dark space (i.e., dark sensors) has shown to be an effective method to generate Internet-
scale cyber threat intelligence [130, 43]. In brief, darknet traffic is Internet traffic destined
to routable but unused Internet addresses. Since these addresses are unallocated, any
traffic targeting them is deemed as suspicious. Thus, in a nutshell, the proposed approach





































Figure 4.1: The Components of the Proposed Approach
them with malware samples. By leveraging geo-location information, the approach strives
to generate insights related to worldwide compromised machines in addition to identifying
their exact infected malware type/family. The approach is envisioned to be operated by a
central authority, for example, an incident response center, where the latter will distribute,
in real-time, the extracted inferences to concerned parties. In the sequel, we elaborate on
each component of the proposed approach in accordance with Figure 4.1.
Misconfiguration Filtering
As mentioned, Internet traffic destined to routable yet unallocated IP addresses is com-
monly referred to as telescope or darknet data. Such malicious traffic is frequently, abun-
dantly and effectively exploited to generate various cyber threat intelligence related but
not limited to, scanning activities, distributed denial of service attacks and malware iden-
tification. However, such data typically contains a significant amount of misconfiguration
traffic caused by network/routing or hardware/software faults. The latter immensely af-
fects the purity of darknet data, which hinders the accuracy of detection algorithms that
operate on such data in addition to wasting valuable storage resources. This section pro-
poses a probabilistic model to preprocess telescope data to prepare it for effective use. The
aim is to fingerprint darknet misconfiguration traffic and subsequently filter it out. The
model is advantageous as it does not rely on arbitrary cut-off thresholds, provide separate
likelihood models to distinguish between misconfiguration and other darknet traffic and
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is independent from the nature of the source of the traffic. To the best of our knowledge,
the proposed model renders a first attempt ever to tackle the problem of preprocessing
darknet traffic.
In a nutshell, the model aims at computing an access probability distribution for
each darket IP address, derived across all remote sources that target those dark IPs. Thus,
the model initially estimates the degree to which access to a given dark IP address is un-
usual. The model further considers the number of distinct dark IP addresses that a given
remote source has accessed. Subsequently, the joint probability is formulated, computed
and compared. If the probability of the source generating a misconfiguration is higher
than that of the source being malicious (i.e., scanning or backscattered), then the source
is deemed as misconfigured, subsequently flagged, and its corresponding generated darknet
flows are filtered out.
Let D = {d1, d2, d3, · · ·} represent the set of darknet IP addresses and Di a sub-
set of those accessed by source si. First, the model captures how unusual the accessed
destinations are. The idea behind this metric stems from the fact that misconfigured
sources access destinations that have been accessed by few other sources. Thus, the model






where ns(di) is the number of sources that have accessed di. In contrary, a malicious
darknet source will access a destination at random. Typically, defining a suitable probabil-
ity distribution to model the randomness of a malicious source targeting a specific darknet
destination is quite tedious and unsystematic; often a simplistic assumption is applied to
solve this issue. In this context, a very recent work by Durumeric et al. [87] assumed
that darknet sources will probe their targets following a random uniform distribution. By
adopting that assumption, one can model the probability of a darknet destination accessed
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However, in this work, we thought it would be beneficial and more precise to ver-
ify the soundness of that assumption before completing the description of the proposed
model. To successfully achieve the latter, we perform three experiments using simulation,
emulation and real malicious darknet traffic. The first experiment is rendered by a sim-
ulation executed using Opnet Modeler1. The simulation is comprised of a probing source
and 100 probing destinations/targets. The source and the destinations are represented
using commodity machines. The probing source is instructed to generate three types of
probing towards the targets, namely, TCP SYN, UDP and ACK scanning, for a duration
of 15 minutes. The latter are typically common types of probing activities [35]. Fig-
ure 4.2a represents the outcome of this experiment. According to the assumption given
by the uniform distribution, each target should theoretically receive around 100 packets.
On average, the goodness-of-fit was around 76%, significantly below the acceptable 95%
threshold [150]. To further assess the accuracy of the uniform distribution in modeling the
target access distribution, we executed a second experiment. In this experiment, we em-
ployed Nmap, an open source scanning tool, to emulate the probing traffic. The emulation
environment included a probing machine running the tool in addition to 5 target Virtual
Machines (VMs). The probing machine repetitively executed Null, FIN and Xmas scan-
ning towards the virtual machines for a duration of 10 minutes. The depiction of Figure
4.2b clearly demonstrates that the uniform distribution does not appear to be a good fit
for such traffic. Although the latter simulation and emulation experiments demonstrated
that the assumption of modeling malicious packets using the random uniform distribution
is not quite accurate, we thought it would be interesting and more realistic to utilize real
darknet traffic to assess that hypothesis. Subsequently, we extract one day of darknet
data (≈ 8GB) from April, 2014, divide it into slots of 4 hours and monitor the number
of probing packets targeting 20 darknet destinations over the 6 slots. Figure 4.2c illus-
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Figure 4.2: Uniform distribution of malicious packets in all experiments
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should theoretically receive around 120 probing packets. On average, the goodness-of-fit
was less than 78%. Such results from all the above experiments concur that the assump-
tion of modeling darknet malicious packets towards darknet destinations by adopting the
uniform distribution is not accurate; there indeed exists an imperative requirement to
determine the most appropriate probability distribution model that best fits malicious
darknet packets.
Recall, that the latter requirement needs to be fulfilled to accurately model darknet
destinations targeted by a malicious source in order to continue the elaboration of the
proposed model. To achieve that, we proceed by performing another set of experiments.
Such experiments also rely on simulation, emulation and the utilization of real darknet
traffic, and their corresponding setup environments is quite similar to those of the previous
experiments. One difference is that we execute the experiments for 10 times and average
the outcome. Another difference is related to the number of targeted destinations, in
which we increase the latter number, for accuracy purposes, from 100 to 500 targeted
destinations, 5 to 12 VMs and 20 to 110 monitored darknet destination, in the simulation,
emulation and real traffic experiments, respectively. To determine the best fit model,
we utilized a generic Matlab parametric probability distributions’ fitting function and
calculated the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [151] for each of the models in relation
to our data. The latter metric is an established criterion for model selection among a finite
set of models. Typically, the lower the BIC is, the better is the fit. Figures 4.3a to 4.3c
demonstrate the outcome probability density estimations in the three experiments. In the
simulation experiment, it is evident that the Gaussian or the Normal distribution provides
the best fit for modeling malicious darknet packets. In the second experiment, namely, the
emulation experiment, it is revealed that the Pareto distribution provides the best fit; this
is quite interesting as such distribution is often employed in modeling normal (i.e., benign)
network traffic. Figure 4.3b further demonstrates that the inverse Gaussian distribution,
which is analogous to the Normal distribution, also shows a positive BIC, resembling a good
fit. Finally, the third experiment that employs real darknet traffic undoubtedly validates
that the Gaussian distribution provides the best fit to model malicious packets targeting
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darknet destinations. It is worthy to note that neither of the three experiments portray
the uniform distribution between the top 6 models providing a best fit. Such results concur
that it is relatively accurate and practical to adopt the Gaussian distribution instead of
the uniform distribution to model targeted darknet destinations.
Thus, at this point, equation (4.2) could be adjusted to match the probability density
function of a Normal distribution. Consequently, we can now model the probability of a








where σ is the standard deviation, µ is the mean, σ2 is the variance and x is the
location of the darknet destination following the distribution. Recall that equations (4.1)
and (4.3) allows the model to initially capture how unusual the accessed destinations are.
However further, the model considers how many darknet destinations have been accessed
by a given source. The latter will be subsequently described.
Given a set of Di, darknet destinations accessed by a specific source si, the model
eventually aims at measuring two probability distributions, namely, Pmisc(Di) and Pmal(Di).
The former being the probability that Di has been generated by a misconfigured source
while the latter is the probability thatDi has been generated by a malicious darknet source.
Let D1 = {di1, di2, di3} be those darknet addresses accessed by s1. The model
captures the probability P (D1) of the source generating {di1, di2, di3} as the probability
of s1 accessing this specific combination of destinations knowing that it targeted three
destinations multiplied by the probability of s1 accessing any three destinations. The
latter could be formalized as
P (Di) = P (Di = {di1, di2, · · · , din} | |Di|= n)× P (|Di|= n) (4.4)
For both, a misconfigured and a malicious source, the first term of equation (4.4)
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(c) Real Traffic Experiment
Figure 4.3: Model fitting sorted by BIC in all experiments
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could be modeled as










where K, a normalization constant which is solely employed to allow the probabilities






The likelihood that a source will target a certain number of darknet destinations
(i.e., the second term of equation (4.4)) depends on whether the source is malicious or
misconfigured. Characteristically, misconfigured sources access one or few destinations




Pmal(|Di|) = 1|D| (4.9)
where the term (e − 1) in equation (4.8) guarantees that the distribution will sum
to 1. It is noteworthy to mention that equation (4.8) ensures that the probability will sig-
nificantly decrease as the number of targeted destinations increases. In contrast, equation
(4.9) captures a malicious darknet source accessing a random number of darknet addresses.
By combining the above equations, we can model the probability of a source being














Algorithm 3: Inferring misconfiguration flows using the probabilistic model
Data: Darknet Flows, DarkF lows
Result: Flag, MiscF lag, indicating that the DarkF low is originating from a
misconfigured source
1 for DarkF lows do
2 MiscF lag=0
3 i=DarkF lows.getUniqueSources()
4 Amalgamate DarkF lowsi originating from a specific source si
5 Update si(Di)
6 Compute Pmisc(Di), Pmal(Di)




Indeed, Algorithm 3 provides a simplistic mechanism to infer misconfigured sources
by employing the proposed darknet preprocessing model. It is worthy to note that step 6
of the algorithm (i.e., the computation of Pmisc(Di) and Pmal(Di)) is easily accomplished




Thus, Algorithm 3 deems a source and its corresponding flows as misconfiguration
if Lmal(Di) − Lmisc(Di) > 0.
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Probing Extraction
In accordance with Figure 4.1, another component of the proposed approach is probing
extraction. In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we have proposed a new approach to fingerprint
Internet-scale probing activities. The approach aimed at detecting the probing activity
and identifying the exact technique that was employed in the activity. Recall that the
approach is advantageous in comparison with other methods [78, 72, 1, 3, 84] as it does
not rely on identifying the scanning source and is independent from the scanning strategy
(remote to local, local to remote, local to local), the scanning aim (wide range or target
specific) and the scanning method (single source or distributed). Further, the proposed
method does not depend (for detection) on a certain predefined alert threshold, the trans-
port protocol used (TCP or UDP) or the number of probed destinations and ports. When
empirically evaluated using a significant amount of real darknet data, the approach yielded
0 false negative and 2% false positive [7] in comparison with the leading Network Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS), Snort2. In this work, and to successfully extract probing activ-
ities from darknet traffic, we adopt and leverage an enhanced version of that previously
proposed approach. In what follows, we 1) perform another empirical evaluational of that
approach in comparison with the Bro NIDS3 for validation purposes and 2) describe the
enhancements of the previously proposed approach (of Section 3.2) that are employed in
this work.
1) Although the previously proposed approach was empirically evaluated and vali-
dated against Snort NIDS [7], we thought it would be also interesting in this section to
further evaluate it against another NIDS, namely, Bro [152]. This procedure aims at pro-
viding more confidence in the approach in addition to significantly motivating its use as
one of the initial components in Figure 4.1.
To achieve this procedure, we experimented with Bro NIDS. Paxson’s Bro [152]




list of services. A connection is considered to have failed if it is unanswered or if it generates
a TCP reset in response. For other services, Bro records information for all connection
attempts. If the number of connection attempts for these services exceed N , this source
is also identified as a scanner. The list of services and N are configured in various policy
scripts implemented by Bro. For the sake of this work, we deployed Bro 2.3 with default
configuration and employed the provided scanning script4. We use one week of darknet
data (52 GB) that was collected during the duration of March 1st to March 7th 2014, to





























Figure 4.4: Empirical Evaluation of [7] against Bro NIDS
By investigating the sources of the scanners, it was disclosed that the approach in [7],
similar to the outcome when previously compared with Snort NIDS, yielded 0 false nega-
tive; all the scanners detected by Bro were also detected by the fingerprinting approach.
Further, it could be noted that the approach generated an average of 8% false positive. It
is worthy to pinpoint that the approach, contrary to Bro NIDS, can detect various types
of scans, which could include scans from a single host to a single port on a single host,
slow scans and a specific host scanning multiple ports on multiple hosts. Nevertheless, in
4https://github.com/bro/bro-scripts/blob/master/scan.bro
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an attempt to reduce the number of false positives, we enhance the approach as explained
in the following.
2) We perform a crucial enhancement to the previously proposed approach of Sec-
tion 3.2 of Chapter 3 that we employ in this work. The modification is rendered by UDP
investigation. One of the issues related to the previously proposed approach is that it
does not differentiate between UDP probing and UDP packets arising from distributed
reflective denial of service attacks [153]; this can explain the relatively high percentage of
false positives. Indeed, such attacks are an emerging form of distributed denial of service
attacks that rely on the use of publicly accessible UDP servers as well as bandwidth am-
plification factors to overwhelm a victim with UDP traffic [41]. The idea is to send simple
queries to such resolvers in which the replies, that aim at flooding the victim, are orders of
magnitude larger. Such approach is behind the notorious 300 and 400 Gbps attacks that
hit the Internet in the last few years [92]. Figure 4.5 depicts a specific scenario where the
resolvers are open Domain Name System (DNS) servers.
The compromised machines are directed to execute a reflective dos attack against
Org1. To achieve that, they initially spoof their identities by using those of Org1 and
subsequently send simple ANY queries to the DNS open resolvers. The latter DNS query
intends to pull all the available information from the DNS resolvers related to a requested
domain. The domain in the request trace is often a noteworthy one that possess a signifi-
cant amount of information. Commonly, the compromised machines will spay such queries
on the Internet space in a hope to reach as many open resolvers as possible in order to
increase the overall amplification factor. Intuitively, some of those requests will hit the
network telescope/dark space and hence will be captured. Requests that actually reach
open resolvers will be amplified and directed towards Org1.
Typically, the UDP services that could be leveraged for UDP amplification attacks
are summarized in Table 4.1. To deal with this issue, we extend the previously proposed
approach of Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 by employing the post-processing Algorithm 4.
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Figure 4.5: A Network Telescope pinpointing Sources of Reflective DoS Attacks
The algorithm aims at validating whether the inferred UDP probing flow or ses-
sion from the outcome of [7] is indeed a probing activity or it is actually a false positive
related to UDP packets originating from distributed reflective denial of service attacks.
The algorithm achieves this by initially assuming that the flow is indeed a probing flow.
Subsequently, it attempts to negate the latter assumption by relying on two observations.
First, it monitors if the UDP flow in question is targeting one of those services of Table 4.1;
a positive result, at this stage, suggests that the UDP flow is either probing that service or
it is attempting to amplify a denial of service attack. If a positive result is recorded from
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Quake Network Protocol 26000
Table 4.1: UDP vulnerable services and corresponding ports
the latter, the algorithm then verifies whether the source is spoofed or not. The rational
behind that verification is based on the fact that probing packets are not spoofed (so the
scanner/attacker can actually retrieve back the result of the scan) while those of a denial
of service attack are indeed spoofed for identity anonymization purposes. The algorithm
accomplishes this by leveraging the work of Templeton et al. [154] that maintains a track
of the Time-To-Live (TTL) value of the packets generated by the same source. The core
idea behind that approach is rendered by the fact that packets’ TTL values fluctuate with
source IP addresses; that is, given a non-spoofed IP address, its packets’ TTL should re-
main constant (or within 10% change) throughout its communication period. It is worthy
to mention that in terms of complexity, the algorithm possesses O(PF) space complexity
and O(N) time complexity where PF is the number of probing flows and N is the number
of UDP flows. By implementing the proposed Algorithm 4, we recorded a decrease of
3.5% in false positives when we re-executed the empirical evaluation (against Bro NIDS).
Such result demonstrates that 1) the algorithm is effective in distinguishing between UDP
probing and UDP packets originating from amplified denial of service attacks and 2) that
the majority of the false positives were indeed caused by this issue.
Please recall that the outcome of this procedure (i.e., probing extraction in Figure
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Algorithm 4: Verifying if the UDP flow is a probing activity or related to UDP
distributed reflective denial of service attack
Data: Probing Flows, ProbingF lows;
List of Vulnerable UDP Services, UDPV ulList
Result: Flag, ProbF lag, indicating whether the UDP flow, UDPFlow, is a
true probing or not
1 for UDPFlow in ProbingF lows do
2 ProbF lag=0;
3 if UDPFlow.getTarget().getPort() in UDPV ulList then
4 TTL=UDPFlow.getTTL();
5 for UDPFlow in ProbingF lows do






4.1) are accurate and validated probing sessions in packet capture format (i.e., pcaps).
Malware Invocation
In accordance with Figure 4.1, another component of the proposed approach is malware
invocation. We operate a dynamic malware analysis module that is based on ThreatTrack
Security sandbox environment5 (i.e., controlled environment). After receiving daily mal-
ware samples from ThreatTrack feeds, they are interactively sent to the sandbox, where
they are executed by client machines. The clients could be virtual or real and possess the
capability to run Windows or Unix, depending on the malware type under execution. The
behavior of each malware is monitored and all its corresponding activities (i.e., created
files, processes, network traffic, etc.) are recorded. For the sake of this work, we extract
5http://www.threattracksecurity.com/
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the network traffic generated by approximately 65 thousand unique and recent malware
samples as pcaps. The pcaps contain communication traffic generated from the malware to
other internal or external hosts. Those malware samples belong to diverse malware types
including, Trojan, Virus, Worm, Backdoor, and AdWare coupled with their corresponding
families and variants. We rely on Kaspersky for a uniform malware naming convention6.
Correlation Execution
Consistent with Figure 4.1, the correlation engine formulates the problem of correlating
probing and malware sessions as follows. Given a probing session that is extracted from
darknet traffic, 1) investigate whether or not the session originates from a malware and 2)
identify the exact or probable malware type/family that is generating such probing, if it
was shown that the session is malware-related. In an attempt to address this problem, we
perform the following. We leverage Snort’s probing engine, the sfPortscan pre-processor,
to detect which malware pcaps possess any signs of probing activity. We omit those mal-
ware pcaps that demonstrate a negative output. To attribute a specific malware to a
probing session, we adopt a two-step procedure. First, we apply the notion of fuzzy hash-
ing [155] between the probing session and the remaining malware pcaps. Fuzzy hashing is
advantageous in comparison with typical hashing as it can provide a percentage of simi-
larity between two samples rather than producing a null value if the samples are different.
This popular technique is derived from the digital forensics research field and is typically
applied on files or images [155, 156]; to the best of our knowledge, our approach is among
the first to explore the capabilities of this technique on cyber security data. Readers that
are more interested in the advatanges of fuzzy hashing and its applicability to malware
research are kindly referred to [157, 158]. We further apply an information theoretical
metric, relative entropy, as proposed by Lee and Xiang [159], between the given probing









is a measure of the distance of the regularities between two datasets, pk and qk. If
the relative entropy is = 0, this indicates that the two datasets have the same regularity.
At this point, we 1) omit the probing sessions that demonstrate less than 5% similarity
using both tests7 and 2) select the top 10% malware pcaps that were found to minimize
the entropy and maximize the fuzzy hashing percentage. The rational behind the latter
approach stems from the need to filter out the malware pcaps that do not possess probing
signs similar to the probing session. Second, using the remaining 10% malware pcaps,
we extract their probing sessions as pinpointed by sfPortscan. For each of the malware
probing sessions, we apply the Bhattacharyya distance [160] between those and the given










is an established and an effective metric to determine the overlap of two sample
distributions, p and p′. The Bhattacharyya distance is often employed to measure the
disjunction of classes in a typical classification problem and it is considered to be more
reliable than other metrics, including for instance, the Mahalanobis distance [161]; when
the two classes have similar means but different standard deviations, the Mahalanobis dis-
tance would tend to zero, while the Bhattacharyya distance would grow and yield better
results depending on the difference between the standard deviations. By selecting 1% of
malware pcaps that were shown to reduce the Bhattacharyya distance, we further signifi-
cantly reduce the possible malware pcaps that the given probing session could be similar
to. Finally, to exactly attribute the given probing session to a specific malware, we employ
the two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic test [162] between the remaining malware
probing sessions and the given probing session. The test will output 0 if a positive match
occur; 1 otherwise. If a positive match occurs, this indicates that the probing session has
7These sessions indicate that they do not possess any malware-related behavior.
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been generated from the inferred exact malware. Otherwise, we refer back to the output
of the Bhattacharyya distance and select a set of probable malware pcaps that were shown
to be relatively close to the given probing session.
It is worthy to mention that from a processing overhead perspective, the proposed
approach is able to process and correlate one day of darknet data (≈ 8 GB) with 65 thou-
sands malware samples in less than 20 minutes. The latter information strongly advocate
that the approach is practically viable in a real-world environment and that it can be eas-
ily rendered as an operational cyber security capability providing prompt near real-time
inferences related to worldwide-compromised machines.
4.1.3 Empirical Evaluation
As previously mentioned in this thesis, we possess real darknet data that we are receiving
on a daily basis from a trusted third party, namely, Farsight Security. Such traffic orig-
inates from the Internet and is destined to numerous /13 network sensors. The darknet
sensors cover more than 12 countries and monitor around half a million dark IPs. Recall
that darknet traffic is Internet traffic destined to routable but unused Internet addresses.
Since these addresses are unallocated, any traffic targeting them is deemed as suspicious.
The data mostly consists of unsolicited TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. It might contain as
well some DNS traffic. We use one week of data (60 GB) that was collected during the
duration of April 1st to April 7th 2014, to empirically evaluate our approach.
Darknet traffic is typically composed of three types of traffic, namely, scanning,
backscattered and misconfiguration [132]. Scanning arises from bots and worms while
backscattered traffic commonly refers to unsolicited traffic that is the result of responses
to denial of service attacks with spoofed source IP addresses. On the other hand, misconfig-
uration traffic, as tackled in Section 4.1.2, is due to network/routing or hardware/software
faults causing such traffic to be sent to the darknet sensors.
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We first aggregate the darknet traffic connections into sessions using an approach
similar to the first step algorithm by Kannan et al. [133]. We consider all those connections
within Taggreg of each other as part of the same session for a given pair of hosts. We used
the same proposed threshold as in [133], Taggreg = 100 seconds, and found that this
seems to correctly group the majority of connections between any given pair of hosts. To
filter out misconfiguration data, we employ the proposed probabilistic model of Section
4.1.2 coupled with Algorithm 3. Figure 4.6 depicts the distribution of darknet sessions
between misconfiguration and malicious sessions while Table 4.2 presents a sample of 10
misconfigured sources as inferred by the algorithm.
76%
24%
Malicious Activity Misconfiguration Activity
Figure 4.6: The distribution of darknet sessions
It is revealed that close to 25% of the sessions are indeed related to misconfigura-
tion. This is relatively consistent with a previous study that we have performed in 2012
[41], which was solely based on manual verification. By further manually investigating the
inferred misconfiguration sessions, it was shown that all the sessions are single flows that
targeted the dark space only once in which 87% of them are malformed packets.
We further execute the enhanced probing fingerprinting approach that was high-
lighted in Section 10 to extract 400 probing sessions. It is noteworthy to mention, that
each of those probing sessions is being generated by a unique source. Keeping in mind that
most probing activity is generated from non-spoofed IP addresses (so the actual scanner
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Table 4.2: A sample of 10 misconfigured sources
can essentially receive back the probing results), the extracted probing sessions indeed
resemble real machines.
We proceed by investigating any signs of probing activities within the 65 thousand
malware pcaps. The output disclosed that 13,105 malware pcaps possessed such activities.
The latter corroborates that a significant amount of malware samples in fact generate
probing activities; leveraging such activities for early infection detection might be a viable
and a promising approach. The distribution of the types of those probing activities within
the identified malware pcaps is depicted in Figure 4.7. It is disclosed that UDP probing is
the most employed probing technique; such result is consistent with other malware studies
[163], where the authors revealed that UDP is the most used transport-layer protocol
for malicious command-and-control communications. Further, Figure 4.8 illustrates the
top 10 malware types that were found to trigger such probing activities. One interesting
observation that could be extracted from such result is related to ‘Virus.Win32.Sality.bh’;
Dainotti et al. [120] have recently documented a large-scale probing campaign that was

















Figure 4.7: Types of Probing Activities generated by Malware
pinpointed that the malware responsible for such campaign was in fact the Sality malware;
the same malware that we found, using our data set, to be generating the majority of the
probing activities.












Figure 4.8: Distribution of Probing Malware Types/Families
We proceed in an attempt to reduce the number of malware pcaps that could be
eventually attributed to the darknet probing sessions. In accordance with Section 11, we
executed the fuzzy hashing and relative entropy approach. To accomplish the former, we
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leveraged deeptoad8, a fuzzy hashing implementation, while we employed matlab9 to ac-
complish the latter. Subsequently, we select the top 10% (1,310) malware pcaps that were
found to minimize the entropy and maximize the fuzzy hashing percentage, in comparison
with the darknet probing sessions. At this point, 212 probing sessions were filtered out,
indicating that they do not possess any malware-related behavior.
For the purpose of attributing the remaining probing sessions to a manageable and a
probable set of malware pcaps, in coherence with the proposed approach of Section 11, we
proceed by executing the Bhattacharyya distance and selecting the 1% of malware pcaps
(13 pcaps) that are shown to be statistically close to each of the probing sessions. Table
4.3 provides a specimen that couples 5 probing sources with few of their corresponding
possible set of malware infections. Intuitively, we record the complete malware outcome
for all the probing sources.
Note that ‘Trojan-Downloader.Win32.KiayksayRen.b’, that frequently appears in
Table 4.3, has been confirmed by numerous anti-malware engines and services to be a
significant sign of machine exploitation10, particularly those running the Windows oper-
ating system. Thus, the proposed approach seems accurate and practical in pinpointing
compromised machines in addition to disclosing the probable malware types that caused
their contamination.
To exactly identify which malware sample is responsible for the darknet extracted
probings sessions, we proceed by employing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic test, as in-
structed in Section 11. Table 4.4 shows the extracted insights for a sample of 10 probing
































Table 4.3: Probing Sources coupled with their probable malware samples
Note that we also generate supplementary material related to the infections includ-
ing geo-location information per real source (i.e., hostname), organization, ISP, city, region
and country. Although, we refrain from publishing those due to sensitivity/legal issues,
we can note that the infections originate from 67 diverse operational providers, 67 distinct
ISPs and 38 different countries. Such results, which we postulate to be communicated to
concerned providers, concur that the proposed approach possesses the capability to infer
compromised machines in addition to pinpointing the exact malware type/family that was
responsible for their contamination.
Although we are unable to validate the existence of every single obtained inference
126
Figure 4.9: Inferred Worldwide Infections by Correlating Malware and Probing Activities
Probing Source a Trojan-Spy.Win32.VB.gt
Probing Source b Virus.Win32.Sality.s
Probing Source c Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.SmartFortress2012.jv
Probing Source d Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.dpdj
Probing Source e Backdoor.Win32.Bifrose.fur
Probing Source f Virus.Win32.Cabanas.MsgBox
Probing Source g Trojan.Win32.Jorik.Downloader.akr
Probing Source h Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.cwa
Probing Source i Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.bahq
Probing Source j Worm.Win32.Juched.djh
Table 4.4: A Sample of Inferred Infections
related to the extracted worldwide infections due to legal and logistic constraints, we per-
form two activities that advocate the accuracy and completeness of the proposed approach.
First, we have observed, from the obtained results, a number of events that support
the proposed approach. (1) We inferred that the majority of the infections that are re-
lated to the previously mentioned ‘Virus-Win32.Sality.bh’ are originating from Thailand;
in [120], the authors disclosed that the bots that contributed to the large-scale VoIP prob-
ing campaign that were found to be infected by the same Sality malware, were in fact
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attributed to Thailand. (2) We noticed that Chinese ISPs lead in the number of gener-
ated infections. According to our results, one of the top extracted malware infections that
is generated from those ISPs is the ‘Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banker.adx’. This malware is
a data stealing program that captures banking credentials such as account numbers and
passwords from infected users. The latter insights were confirmed by McAfee in which
they further concurred that China is in fact responsible from more than 45% of such con-
tamination11. (3) From our results, we deduced that the malware
‘Backdoor:Win32/Bifrose’ was originating from a specific middle-Eastern country. The
latter malware allows an external attacker to access the compromised machine to perform
various malicious actions. McAfee also confirmed our findings by revealing that the same
country is indeed the most contributor to such an infection12.
Second, we relied on third party publically available data sources provided by the
online services, ThreatStop13, MxLookup14, brightcloud15 and ReputationAuthority16 to
validate the obtained contamination incidents. The latter cyber security data repositories
provide information on Internet-scale contamination incidents per IP address. We compare
the extracted malware IP addresses that were inferred by the proposed approach against
those repositories. The outcome discloses that around 91% of the extracted malware
IP addresses from the proposed approach were indeed found as malware-related from
those repositories. The outcome also pinpointed that 57% of those overlapping confirmed
incidents are still active on operational machines. Such results demonstrate that the
extracted inferences from the proposed approach exhibit noteworthy accuracy and can









It is realistic to acknowledge a number of limitations in the proposed approach. First,
the approach leverages the dark space to infer Internet-scale probing activities. Although
the monitored space is relatively large (i.e., /13), we are unable to monitor events that
do not target such space. Subsequently, the approach will be unable to correlate those
“unseen” activities with malware samples, and thus will fail to detect and identify their
corresponding malware infections. Second, the approach relies on malware samples that
actually execute probing activities. Although, from our experiments, the number of those
malware seems to be significant, the approach will not be able to detect malware that
do not probe. In this case, our correlation engine could be used in conjunction with
already deployed approaches, similar to those that rely on honeypots to accomplish the
detection. Third, in relation to the misconfiguration darknet preprocessing model, there
is a need to design and implement confidence levels to assess whether the difference of the
two probability estimates is large enough to safely choose one model over the other. This
point is left for future work.
4.2 Multidimensional Investigation of Source Port 0 Prob-
ing
During November 2013, the operational cyber/network security community reported an
unprecedented increase of traffic originating from source port 0. This event was deemed as
malicious although its core aim and mechanism were obscured. This section investigates
that event using a multifaceted approach that leverages three real network security feeds
that we receive on a daily basis, namely, darknet, passive DNS and malware data. The
goal is to analyze such event from the perspectives of those feeds in order to generate sig-
nificant insights and inferences that could contribute to disclosing the inner details of that
incident. The approach extracts and subsequently fingerprints such malicious traffic from
the received darknet data. By executing unsupervised machine learning techniques on the
extracted traffic, we disclose clusters of activities that share similar machinery. Further,
by employing a set of statistical-based behavioral analytics, we capture the mechanisms
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of those clusters, including their strategies, techniques and nature. We consequently cor-
relate the sources with passive DNS in order to investigate their maliciousness. Moreover,
to examine if the sources are malware contaminated, we execute a correlation mecha-
nism between the darknet data and the malware feeds. The outcome reveals that such
traffic indeed is reconnaissance/probing activities originating from three different hori-
zontal scans utilizing packets with a TCP header length of 0 or packets with odd flag
combinations. The results as well demonstrate that 28% of the scanning sources host ma-
licious/blacklisted domains as they are often used for spamming, phishing and other fraud
activities. Additionally, the outcome portrays that the bot probing sources are infected
by ‘Virus.Win32.Sality’. By correlating various evidence, we confirm that such malware
specimen is in fact responsible for part of the source port 0 probing event. We concur that
this work is a first attempt ever to comprehend the machinery of such unique event and
we hope that the community could consider it as a building block for auxiliary analysis
and investigation.
4.2.1 Background
On November 2nd, 2013, security researchers at Cisco Systems reported that their world-
wide deployed sensors have detected a massive increase in TCP source port 0 traffic17.
They further elaborated that the magnitude observed by the sensors was elevated by 20
times than typical traffic originating from the same port and transport protocol on other
days. According to the researchers, such event renders the largest spike in network traffic
originating from TCP source port 0 in the last decade. In a follow-up discussion18, the
researchers noted that such port, according to its RFC, is engineered to be reserved, and
that such traffic could be used to fingerprint various operating systems. Additionally, the
security researchers speculated about the aim, mechanism and source of that traffic by
stating that such rare event could be some sort of a research project, a malware infected
probing botnet, a targeted reconnaissance event aiming to launch an immediate or a pro-




a bug in its scanning code.
The event was interestingly also observed by DShield/Internet Storm Center (ISC)19.
ISC data comprises of millions of intrusion detection log entries gathered daily from sensors
covering more than 500 thousand Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in over 50 countries.
As shown in Fig. 4.10, the event was apparent on four days, namely, November 2nd20,
November 21st, November 24th and November 25th, 2013. The latter fact is particularly
demonstrated by the peaks of the TCP ratio of port 0 on those specific days.
Figure 4.10: The Source Port 0 event as observed by DShield/Internet Storm Center
4.2.2 Contributions
Motivated by the requirement to shed the light on that incident in order to generate
inferences and insights that could contribute in disclosing the inner details of such an
unprecedented event, this section contributes by:
• Proposing a multifaceted approach that leverages three real network security feeds.
The approach exploits darknet data (i.e., Internet traffic destined to half a mil-
lion routable yet unallocated IP addresses) to extract, analyze and uncover the
machinery of such traffic. Further, the approach employs correlation between the
19http://www.dshield.org/port.html
20coinciding with Cisco reports although not quite as significant
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latter and passive DNS (i.e., Internet-wide authoritative DNS responses) to study
the maliciousness of the such traffic. Moreover, the proposed approach correlates
darknet-extracted traffic with malware feeds to answer questions related to contam-
ination and attribution. To the best of our knowledge, 1) the proposed approach
that correlates those three feeds in an effort to understand a cyber event has never
been attempted before and 2) the yielded outcome from adopting such an approach
related to this specific event is unique in the literature.
• Employing 1) machine learning data clustering techniques to partition the port 0
traffic according to similar machinery and 2) a set of novel behavioral analytics that
scrutinize such traffic to capture the behavior of the sources.
• Evaluating the proposed approach using 30 GB of real darknet traffic, 1.4 billion
DNS records and 30 million malware analysis reports.
4.2.3 Proposed Approach
In this section, we present the proposed approach that is composed of three mechanisms,
namely, darknet analysis, passive DNS correlation and malware correlation.
Darknet Analysis
As previously mentioned, we possess real darknet data that we are receiving on a daily
basis since three years from a trusted third party. Although the monitored darknet space
is relatively large (i.e., /13), we were unable to notice the existence of the source port 0
event on November 2nd or November 21st. However, we were able to retrieve around 30
GB of darknet data that encompasses the event from November 24th and 25th. We base
our darknet analysis approach on such data.
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Traffic Extraction
In order to retrieve the packets of the source port 0 event, we created a simplistic TCPdump
filter21 that captures any darknet traffic that is utilizing TCP as the transport protocol
and 0 as the source port. We applied the filter upon the 30 GB darknet data. We
further refined the output by filtering out any darknet misconfiguration that could exist.
To accomplish this, we adopt a metric that records the average number of sources per
destination darknet address. This metric should be significantly larger for misconfiguration
than probing traffic. However, although it differentiates misconfiguration from scanning, it
could include as well backscattered traffic as they also can possess a large average number
of sources per destination (i.e, in case of a DoS). To cope with this issue, we observe, per the
technique in [132], flags in packet headers, such as TCP SYN+ACK, RST, RST+ACK,
ACK, etc., that resemble backscattered traffic [132]. Subsequently, we filter out flows
that lack that observation, deeming them as misconfiguration. The remaining output is
rendered as the generated traffic from the source port 0 event, which is saved in a packet
capture (i.e., pcap) format for further analysis.
Traffic Fingerprinting
To identify the nature of the source port 0 event, we implemented the technique from Bou-
Harb et al. [33]. The latter approach specifically operates on darknet data and possesses
the capability to distinguish between probing and DoS sessions. To accomplish this, the
technique leverages the detrended fluctuation analysis statistical method and assigns a
certain unique correlation value depending on the nature of each session. Readers who are
interested in the inner details of such technique are kindly referred to [33]. By subjecting
the source port 0 event traffic to the technique, the outcome revealed that 97% of the
sessions are related to probing activities. We manually inspected the remaining 3%, which
demonstrated that they are misconfiguration traffic that apparently, were not previously
filtered as expected. We also confirmed such probing results by exposing the source port
21http://www.danielmiessler.com/study/tcpdump/
133
0 event traffic to Snort’s22 probing engine, the sfPortscan pre-processor23, which yielded
a similar result.
Traffic Clustering
For the purpose of disclosing the inner mechanisms of the source port 0 event, we refer
to machine learning techniques. Such techniques allows us to efficiently, effectively and
automatically uncover clusters of activities sharing similar machinery within the global
event, without relying on strenuous manual analysis.
When the data observations are not pre-labeled into defined numerical or categorical
classes, as in our case, two standard widely deployed algorithms for data clustering using
unsupervised learning could be employed. These are the k-means [164] and the EM [165]
algorithms. We proceed by going back to the source port 0 event traffic pcap file that we
have previously isolated. Subsequently, we extracted from it a total of 29 data link, network
and transport layer packet features as summarized in Table 3.10. The latter features have
been shown to produce distinguishing characteristics when applied on network data [166].
This feature extraction procedure was achieved using the open source jNetPcap API24.
We consequently compiled the extracted features into a unified data file and applied the
k-means and the EM algorithms, leveraging MATLAB’s default clustering functionality
and the WEKA data mining tool25, respectively.
Behavioral Analytics
In an attempt to capture the machinery of the probing sources/clusters, we present the
following set of novel behavioral analytics. Such proposed approach takes as input the
previously extracted probing sessions (recall Section 4.2.3) and outputs a series of be-
havioral characteristics related to the probing sources. In what follows, we pinpoint the







Is the probing traffic random or does it follow a certain pattern? When
sources generate their probing traffic, it is significant to capture the fashion in which they
accomplish that. To achieve this task, we proceed as follows. For each distinct pair of
hosts retrieved from the probing sessions (probing source to target), we test for random-
ness in the generated traffic using the non-parametric Wald-Wolfowitz statistic test. If
the result is positive, we record it for that specific probing source and apply the test for
the remaining probing sessions. If the outcome is negative, we infer that the generated
traffic follows a certain pattern. To capture the specific employed pattern, we model the
probing traffic as a Poisson process and retrieve the maximum likelihood estimate intervals
(at a 95% confidence level) for the Poisson parameter λ that corresponds to that traffic.
The choice to model the traffic as a Poisson distribution is motivated by [129], where the
authors observed that probe arrivals is coherent with that distribution. After the test has
executed for all the probing sources, we apply the CLUstEring based on local Shrinking
(CLUES) algorithm on the generated patterns. CLUES allows non-parametric clustering
without having to select an initial number of clusters. The outcome of that operation is a
set of specific λ intervals. The aim of this is to map each probing source that was shown
to employ a pattern to a certain λ interval by removing overlapping values that could have
existed within the initially generated λ intervals.
How are the targets being probed? As revealed in [120], coordinated prob-
ing sources employ various strategies when probing their targets. These strategies could
include IP-sequential, reverse IP-sequential, uniform permutation or other types of per-
mutations. In an attempt to capture the probing strategies, we execute the following. For
each probing source, we extract its corresponding distribution of target IPs. To differen-
tiate between sequential and permutation probing, we apply the Mann-Kendall statistic
test, a non-parametric hypothesis testing approach, to check for monotonicity in those
distributions. The rational behind the monotonicity test is that sequential probing will
indeed induce a monotonic signal in the distribution of target IPs while permutation prob-
ing will not. Further, in this work, we set the significance level to 0.5% since a higher
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value could introduce false positives. To differentiate between (forward) IP-sequential and
reverse IP-sequential, for those distributions that tested positive for monotonicity, we also
record the slope of the distribution; a positive slope defines a forward IP-sequential strat-
egy while a negative one renders a reverse IP-sequential strategy. For those distributions
that tested negative for monotonicity (i.e., not a sequential strategy), we leverage the chi-
square goodness-of-fit statistic test. The latter insight will inform us whether or not the
employed strategy is a uniform permutation; if the test fails, then the employed strategy
will be deemed as a permutation; uniform permutation otherwise.
What is the nature of the probing source? It is significant as well to infer the
nature of the probing source; is it a probing tool or a probing bot. From the two previous
questions, we can infer those probing events that are random and monotonic. It is known
that monotonic probing is a behavior of probing tools in which the latter sequentially
scan their targets (IPs and ports). Furthermore, for random events, the monotonic trend
checking can help filter out traffic caused by the non-bot scanners [129]. Thus, we deem a
probing source as leveraging a probing tool if their traffic is randomly generated and if they
adopt a sequential probing strategy (i.e., including reverse IP-sequential); a bot otherwise.
Is the probing targeted or dispersed? When sources probe their targets, it
would be interesting to infer whether their probing traffic is targeted towards a small
set of IPs or dispersed. To answer this, for each probing source b, we denote GF(b) as
the collection of flows generated by that specific source that target the dark space. The
destination target IPs used by the flows in GF(b) induce an empirical distribution. Subse-
quently, we borrow the concept of relative uncertainty, an information theoretical metric
and apply it on those distributions. The latter index is a decisive metric of variety, ran-
domness or uniformity in a distribution, regardless of the sample size. An outcome that is
close to 0 defines that the probing source is using a targeted approach while an outcome
value close to 1 means that its corresponding probing traffic is dispersed.
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It is evident that the latter set of behavioral analytics significantly depend on nu-
merous statistical tests and methods to capture the behavior of the probing sources. We
assert that such approach is arguably more sound than heuristics or randomly set thresh-
olds. It is also worthy to mention that all the employed statistical tests assume that the
data is drawn from the same distribution. Since the approach operates on one type of
data, namely, darknet data, we can safely presume that the values follow and are in fact
drawn from the same distribution.
Passive DNS Correlation
We are also receiving on a daily basis around 1.3 million Domain Name System (DNS)
messages. Such data is collected by observing DNS traffic between recursive DNS resolvers
on the Internet. The latter is often dubbed as passive DNS data, which constitutes the
successful translations and associations between domains and IP addresses. Passive DNS
analysis has shown to be an effective approach to generate cyber threat intelligence [167].
We amalgamate a database that contains the last three-year period of such traffic (≈ 1.4
billion records) in order to investigate the source port 0 probing event.
The rationale of employing passive DNS correlation is rendered by the requirement
to contribute in investigating and perhaps attributing the probing sources of such an
unprecedented event to certain malicious entities (i.e., malicious domains, for instance).
Particularly, we aim to extract the following information about the suspicious IP addresses
(previously retrieved from darknet analysis) that have participated in the probing event.
• Hosting capability: Malicious entities typically host a significant number of services
and malicious domains on a limited number of IP addresses for cost-effectiveness
reasons. Thus, by inferring domains that are resolved to a specific IP address, we
can pinpoint and analyze these hosted domains to reveal the level of maliciousness
of that IP address.
• Intensity: By computing the number of DNS messages that utilize a certain IP
address, we can deduce the levels of accessibility and involvement of that IP address
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in malicious activities.
• Aliveness: By recording the first and last timestamp that a specific IP address has
been observed in DNS traffic (i.e., resolved to certain domain(s)), we can infer the
participation period and aim of that IP address. Further, we can refine the analyzed
passive DNS interval for the purpose of investigating and attributing that IP address
with a certain cyber event.
Malware Correlation
We possess as well dynamic malware analysis reports (i.e., XML reports) of malware bi-
naries for the last four years. We are receiving such feed on a daily basis with an average
of 30 thousand XML malware reports from ThreatTrack Security26. Up to the event date
in November 2013, we have accumulated more than 30 million malware analysis reports
since January 2010. The XML reports are produced by analyzing the malware binaries
in a controlled environment. Each XML report corresponds to only one malware sample.
It is worthy to mention that these reports contain the executed activities by the malware
samples at the network and system levels. On one hand, the network level activities refer
to the connections and the exchanged packets, including IP addresses, port numbers, urls,
visited domains and the actual payload data that has been sent. On the other hand,
the system level activities constitute the list of Dynamic-link Library (DLL) files that are
utilized by the malware, the key registry changes, and the memory usage.
We leverage such XML reports to investigate the source port 0 probing event. Specifi-
cally, we attempt to answer the following two questions by presenting their corresponding
approaches:
Which malware has infected the probing machines before or during the
occurrence of the event? In order to infer which malware has infected the probing
machines, we present Algorithm 5. Simplistically, the Algorithm parses the XML reports
mining for those malware that utilize the probing machine IP addresses (previously re-
trieved from darknet analysis) as per the destination IP address criterion. The Algorithm
26http://www.threattracksecurity.com/
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Algorithm 5: Extracting malware samples that have infected the probing ma-
chines
1 Input: Dynamic malware analysis reports: XMLs;
2 List of the scanning source IPs: ProbingIPs;
3 Output: List of malware samples that infected the probing machines: MalwareList
4 for xml in XMLs do
5 if xml.getMalware().getdestIP() in ProbingIPs then





further refines the output by only considering those malware that connect to the probing
IPs in November, 2013.
Which malware generated the probing traffic? In an attempt to attribute
the probing machines to a certain malware, we perform the following. We filter the entire
set of malware XML reports by focusing on those samples that execute traffic from TCP
source port 0. We subsequently match the outcome from the latter procedure with the
list of malware that infected the probing machines that was derived from Algorithm 5.
The rational behind this approach states that if a certain machine has been infected by
a specific malware sample, in which it was derived that such machine is generating TCP
source port 0 traffic, then it is highly probable that this specific malware is causing such
traffic.
4.2.4 Empirical Evaluation
This section abides by the proposed approach that was previously discussed to disclose
various inferences from the perspective of the three data feeds.
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Darknet Inferences
The source port 0 event traffic was rendered by more than 1 million probing packets origi-
nating from TCP source port 0 destined to the monitored darknet space. It is significant to
note that we typically observe, on other days, less than 1000 packets per darknet day orig-
inating from TCP source port 0. The traffic originates from 27 unique hosts, 17 distinct
countries, 24 diverse Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and from within 25 operational
organizations. We refrain from publishing statistics and rigorous information related to
the latter due to sensitivity and legal issues. We next investigated some characteristics
related to those packets. We noticed that the Time to Live (TTL) values of the packets
change with the source IP addresses. This advocates that IP spoofing is less likely or non-
existent [154]. The fact that the source IP addresses are not spoofed corroborates that
such packets are indeed related to scanning/probing activities (so the actual scanner can
essentially receive back the probing results), as it was inferred in Section 4.2.3. We also
noticed that the packets arrival rate is slow, averaging around 3 packets per second. This
is compliant with slow scanning activities, which are known to be difficult to be detected
[168]. Upon a closer investigation of the packet headers, we observed that the majority of
the packets either include a TCP header length of 0 or are malformed. Further, almost all
the packets contain odd flag combinations (i.e., FIN, SYN, RST, PSH, ACK, FIN, URG,
PSH, Reserved). Typically, probing by employing the latter flags is considered as perform-
ing ‘stealthy’ scanning activities as they are engineered to evade firewall detection by only
sending a single frame to a TCP port without any TCP handshaking or any additional
packet transfers [35].
We proceed by executing the clustering approach in coherence with Section 4.2.3.
Recall, that the aim is to disclose traffic clusters that share similar machinery. The output
of the EM algorithm is depicted in Fig. 4.11; we omit the output of the k-means since it
revealed a similar result. Such outcome provides evidence that the traffic originates from 4
different classes. To further test the validity of this result, we produced a silhouette graph
of the EM clusters as shown in Fig. 4.12. Commonly, a silhouette plot displays a measure
of how close each point in one cluster is to points in the neighboring clusters. A value of 1
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Figure 4.11: Port 0 Event Traffic Clusters
indicates that the points are very distant from neighboring clusters, a value of 0 informs
that the points are not distant from other clusters while a negative value indicates that the
points are erroneously placed in that cluster. From Fig. 4.12, it is shown that a significant
amount of points in all the 4 classes have a large silhouette value, greater than 0.6, indi-
cating that the clusters are separated from neighboring clusters. This provides incentives
to validate the quality of the formed EM clusters. By closely investigating each cluster,
we determined that the first cluster represents a horizontal scan focused on destination
port 0 from a single IP address located in Germany targeting around 800 thousand unique
destination addresses. The use of destination port 0 is a frequently employed technique by
scanners to fingerprint the operating systems of the targeted destinations in order to tailor
future attacks based on that retrieved information. Further, the second cluster discloses
a probing campaign targeting more than 60 thousand destination ports and originating
from a single Dutch IP address. The latter insight was also observed and confirmed by
Cisco27. The third cluster renders another horizontal scan that specifically targeted three
destination ports, namely, TCP ports 445, 22 and 3389, which respectively represent the
Microsoft directory, the secure shell (i.e., ssh) and the remote desktop protocol services.
27http://tinyurl.com/kndnj82
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Figure 4.12: A Silhouette Plot of the EM Clusters
The latter are known to suffer from various vulnerabilities and are often exploited28. It is
worthy to mention that this horizontal scan targeted 9 thousand destinations on port 445,
7 thousand destinations on port 22 and around 5.5 thousand destinations on port 3389.
Recall, that all the probing activities in the three previous clusters originate from TCP
source port 0. The last minor cluster captured darknet misconfiguration traffic advocating
the obtained result of Section 4.2.3.
To further investigate the mechanisms of the probing sources, we invoked the be-
havioral analytics that were presented in Section 4.2.3. It was revealed that 62% of the
probing sources used certain patterns when generating their probing traffic. Concerning
the employed probing strategy, it is shown that 57% of the probing sources leveraged a
permutation while the remaining adopted a sequential strategy when probing their tar-
gets. Of those that employed a permutation, 76% used a uniform permutation while 24%
adopted other types of permutations. The majority (≈ 98%) of those that employed a
sequential strategy were found to adopt a forward IP-sequential strategy while only 2%
adopted a reverse IP-sequential strategy. It is noteworthy to mention that in [169], the
researchers dismissed the possible use of this strategy since, as they noted, the strategy
28http://tinyurl.com/kkfs6pq,http://tinyurl.com/m5684jo
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is difficult to be used to extrapolate certain metrics from especially when dealing with
partial probes. Further, the analytics disclosed that ≈ 55% of the sources were probes
from bots while the remaining were generated from probing tools. Moreover, it was in-
ferred that all the probing sources were generating probing that is dispersed as opposed
to targeting a small set of IPs. To the best of our knowledge, the previously generated
inferences represent the first comprehensive empirical results of probing behaviors. In the
context of the probing clusters that were disclosed in the previous section, it was shown
that clusters one and two were generating random probing traffic as opposed to using a
certain pattern, employed a sequential strategy when probing their targets and were found
to be leveraging a probing tool. The latter insight proposes that such probing activities
have been executed by the same ‘initiator/author’ since they are adopting the same mech-
anism and probing characteristics, which could reveal that they both intended to achieve
the same desired goal. Conversely, in the third cluster, the majority (≈ 92%) were found
to adopt certain patterns when generating their probing traffic, employed a permutation
when probing their targets and were inferred to be bots. This suggests that such prob-
ing activities could be malware-orchestrated [120] and thus there is a momentous need to
explore and investigate their malevolence.
Passive DNS Inferences
We employ the approach of Section 4.2.3 to investigate the maliciousness of all the probing
sources. Fig. 4.13 reveals the top 10 probing IP addresses that were shown to host (i.e.,
resolve to) the most domains. It could be inferred that the most significant number of
resolved domains ranges from around 13 thousand domains to peaking at around 110
thousand domains per the probing IPs. We also investigated a subset of those domains
that are related to malicious activities. To achieve this task, we correlated the extracted
domains with publically available datasets and resources, namely, the Malware Domain
List29, Zeus Tracker30 and McAfee’s siteAdvisor31. The outcome is also depicted in Fig.
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Figure 4.13: Hosted and blacklisted domains of the probing sources
IP addresses were shown to host numerous blacklisted/malicious domains provides an
alarming signal that the source port 0 probing traffic could be originating from a malicious
entity with malevolent goals. To identify the nature of those blacklisted domains, we
leveraged the Web of Trust reputation system32. The outcome from such a procedure













Figure 4.14: The nature of the blacklisted domains
domains could be attributed to malware; this advocates our decision to leverage malware
32https://www.mywot.com/
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data to investigate the event in question. It was also shown that those malicious domains
are blacklisted as they are often used for spamming, phishing and other fraud activities.
We further investigated those malicious domains by analyzing their aliveness and intensity
as discussed in Section 4.2.3 and exposed in Fig. 4.15. One can notice, on one hand, that
some IPs with their corresponding blacklisted resolved domains retain less active days but
possess high accessibility, which render them extremely effective in their maliciousness.
On the other hand, some domains have a prolonged online presence yet possess low access
counts. We envision that such malicious domains are intentionally not intended to be
accessed but are rather playing a hosting or a supporting (i.e., back-end) role for other





































Figure 4.15: Investigating the aliveness and access count of the malicious domains
Malware Inferences
Motivated by the fact that the sources of the 3rd probing cluster, as revealed in Section
4.2.4, were inferred to be bots coupled with the conclusion that more than half of the
probing sources resolve to malware-infected domains as demonstrated in Fig. 4.14, in this
section, we investigate the source port 0 probing event from the malware feed perspective,
in accordance with the proposed approach of Section 4.2.3.
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Fig. 4.16 depicts the malware samples and their corresponding number of connec-
tions to the probing machines. It could be noted that the malware specimens, namely,
Sality and Ngrbot, indeed refer to bot families33. Further, Table 4.5 reveals the malware
samples that generated TCP source port 0 traffic.










Figure 4.16: Malware and their corresponding number of connections
By correlating Fig. 4.16 and Table 4.5, we can notice that ‘Virus.Win32.Sality’ is
the common factor. In other words, such malware sample has infected some of the probing
machines and is simultaneously generating TCP source port 0 traffic. It is noteworthy to
mention that such sample has been previously attributed to malicious activities; Dain-
otti et al. [120] had documented a large-scale probing campaign that was able to probe
the entire IPv4 address space in 12 days. Interestingly, the authors pinpointed that the
malware responsible for such campaign was in fact the Sality malware. Thus, from all
the extracted insights and by leveraging the three data feeds, we strongly postulate that
























Table 4.5: Malware samples generating TCP source port 0 traffic
4.3 Related Work
In this section, we review some literature work related to malware and probing correlation
analysis. Further, we briefly highlight two approaches that are adopted in the industry
for the purpose of detecting malware-infected machines. Additionally, we pinpoint several
proposed methods for inferring worm infections.
Nakao et al. [170] were among the first to exploit the idea of correlating malware
and probing activities to detect zero-day attacks. The authors leveraged the nicter frame-
work [171] to study the inter-relations between those two activities. They developed scan
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profiles by observing the dark space and correlated them with malware profiles that had
been generated in a controlled environment. Their work seems limited in a number of
points. First, the authors did not validate the accuracy of the extracted probing activities
from the dark space. Second, the extracted profiles were based on few textual network
and transport-layer features, where the actual correlation engine’s mechanism was ob-
scured. Third, their experiments were based on only one malware sample. In contrary,
in this work, we first apply a validated statistical approach to accurately extract probing
activities from darknet traffic. Second, in a first attempt ever, we correlate probing and
malware activities by applying fuzzy hashing and information theoretical based techniques
on the entire network traffic that was generated by those activities. Third, our experi-
ments involve around 65 thousand malware samples. Fourth, the aim of this work differs
as it is rendered by the capability to provide network security operators, worldwide, with
the ability to rapidly and cost-effectively detect their clients’ infections, without requiring
the providers to maintain an implementation nor provide any aid or disclose any sensitive
network related information. In an another closely related work, Song et al. [172] car-
ried out correlation analysis between 10 spamming botnets and malware-infected hosts as
observed by honeypots. They disclosed that the majority of the spamming botnets have
been infected by at least four different malware. The authors as well developed methods to
identify which exact malware type/family has been the cause of contamination. Our work
differs from this work as we are correlating probing activities rather than spamming for
early infection detection. Further, we are leveraging the darknet space instead of honey-
pots to extract Internet-scale cyber security intelligence. In a slightly different work, Eto
et el. [173] proposed a malware distinction method based on scan patterns by employing
spectrum analysis. The authors stated that by observing certain probing patterns, one
can recognize the similarities and dissimilarities between different types of malware. The
authors noted that the latter could be used as a fingerprint to effectively infer infection.
The authors however, did not perform any correlation but rather limited their work to
observation and analysis.
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The industry has also developed approaches to identify malware compromised ma-
chines. For instance, True Internet, one of Thailand’s largest ISPs, had adopted a be-
havioral approach to infer its clients infected machines. Their approach monitors the
symptoms of infection, including but not limited to, spamming, excessive P2P usage and
Denial of Service (DoS) attempts, and subsequently triggers an alert towards a controller,
which then automatically quarantine the client. Although such approaches might be effec-
tive, they are typically late in detection, which might cause serious vulnerabilities within
the provider. Moreover, they are usually not cost-effective as the provider ought to pur-
chase and maintain other detection systems. Another example would be NetCologne, an
ISP and cable provider in Germany, that took a different approach to automate how it
deals with subscribers that are infected with malware. NetCologne setup and maintained a
honeypot; infected machines often attempt to attack other computers on the same network
and hence the honeypot is an accessible target that allows the identification of compro-
mised machines. While this approach seems practical in detecting infected machines, it
is neither cost-effective since the provider needs to implement and maintain the honey-
pot nor it is able to identify the exact malware type/family that had contaminated those
machines. Moreover, honeypot evasion approaches are known to be effective [88] and are
often adopted by sophisticated malware.
In the context of inferring worm infections, Gu et al. [174] presented the design and
implementation of BotHunter, a perimeter monitoring system for real-time detection of
Internet malware infections. The core of BotHunter is rendered by a correlation engine
that performs alert consolidation and evidence trail gathering for investigating numerous
infections. In a slightly different work, Whyte et al. [175] correlated Domain Name System
(DNS) queries with outgoing connections from an enterprise network to detect worms
propagation attempts. Through empirical evaluations, their proposed approach yielded
efficient and accurate results and enabled automatic containment of worm propagation
at the network egress points. In an alternative work, schechter et al. [176] presented a
hybrid approach to detect scanning worms. Their approach, which is based on sequential
hypothesis testing and rate limiting algorithms, demonstrated low false positive rates when
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evaluated in a real operational network environment. A possible drawback of the previous
approaches is that they require to be deployed and maintained at the perimeter of the
enterprise network to be effective.
4.4 Summary
On one hand, this chapter presented a new approach to infer malware-infected machines.
The approach aims at providing network operators with a cyber security capability to de-
tect their clients’ compromised machines in addition to pinpointing the exact malware type
that caused their contamination. The approach is efficient as it does not record or analyze
the symptoms of infection. Further, it is prompt as it exploits probing activities, which
are the very first indications of contamination. Moreover, the proposed approach is cost-
effective as it does not require any implementation or maintenance costs at the providers’
sides. To accomplish its goals, the proposed approach exploits the dark space to infer and
validate Internet-scale probing activities after filtering out misconfiguration traffic using
a newly proposed probabilistic model. Consequently, it correlates probing activities with
malware samples by uniquely employing various statistical, fuzzy hashing and information
theoretical metrics. The approach was empirically evaluated using a significant amount of
real darknet and malware samples. The extracted inferences and insights revealed promis-
ing accuracy in addition to concurring that the rationale of exploiting probing activities
for worldwide early malware infection detection is indeed practically viable.
On the other hand, this chapter also investigated a rare cyber event that was ren-
dered by excessive traffic originating from source port 0. The goal was to shed the light
on the inner details of that event to uncover its mechanism and nature of its sources. To
achieve those goals, we proposed a multifaceted approach that exploited and correlated
a significant amount of real network security data, including, darknet, passive DNS and
malware information. The outcome revealed three probing clusters, in which one of them
was shown to be originating from infected bots. By analyzing the maliciousness of the
150
probing sources, the approach uncovered that 28% of those are related to malicious do-
mains. Further, by correlating darknet and malware data, the approach was capable of
attributing part of the event to the Sality malware. We envision that such approach could
be applicable to analyze other cyber events with similar nature.
In the next chapter, we attempt to tackle the problem of inferring and attributing
large-scale probing campaigns by solely observing network telescopes.
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Chapter 5
Inferring and Attributing Probing
Campaigns
In this chapter, we focus on the problem of identifying and attributing large-scale probing
campaigns, which render a new era of probing events.
5.1 Background
Lately, there has been a noteworthy shift towards a new phenomenon of probing events
which, throughout this section, is referred to as Cyber Scanning Campaign(s) (CSC(s)).
These are distinguished from previous probing incidents as (1) the population of the par-
ticipating bots is several orders of magnitude larger, (2) the target scope is generally the
entire Internet Protocol (IP) address space, and (3) the bots adopt well-orchestrated, of-
ten botmaster-coordinated, stealth scan strategies that maximize targets’ coverage while
minimizing redundancy and overlap. Very recently, Dainotti et al. [177] from the Coopera-
tive Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) presented a pioneering measurement
and analysis study of a 12-day Internet-wide CSC targeting VoIP (SIP) servers. In an-
other work [178], the same authors admitted that they have detected the reported SIP
CSC including the malware responsible for its actions (i.e., Sality malware) “serendipi-
tously” (i.e., luckily and accidentally) while analyzing a totally unrelated phenomenon.
They also stated that since currently there exist no cyber security capability to discover
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such large-scale probing campaigns, other similar events targeting diverse Internet and
organizational infrastructure are going undetected. In another inquisitive, well executed
work, an “anonymous” presented and published online [123] what they dubbed as the
“Carna Botnet”. The author exploited poorly protected Internet devices, developed and
distributed a custom binary, to generate one of the largest and most comprehensive IPv4
census ever.
The aforementioned two CSC studies differ on various key observations. The work
by Dainotti et al. disclosed that the bots were recruited into the probing botnet by means
of a new-generation malware while the Carna Botnet was augmented using a custom code
binary. Moreover, Dainotti et al. discovered that the bots were coordinated by a bot-
master in a Command-and-Control (C&C) infrastructure where the bots used a reverse
IP-sequential strategy to perform their probing, while the Carna Botnet was C&C-less and
its bots used an interleaving permutation method to scan its targets. Further, the work by
Dainotti et al. documented a horizontal scan that targeted world-wide SIP servers, while
the Carna Botnet did not focus on one specific service but rather attempted to retrieve any
available information that was associated with any host and/or service. Readers that are
interested in more details related to the discussed CSCs are kindly referred to [177, 123].
We project that current undetected and unreported CSCs as well as future occurrences
could be ominously leveraged to cause drastic Internet-wide and enterprise impacts as pre-
cursors of various amplified, debilitating and disrupting cyber attacks including, but not
limited to, distributed and reflective denial of service attacks, advanced persistent threats
and spamming campaigns.
5.2 CSC-Detector: A System to Infer Large-Scale Probing
Campaigns
As previously mentioned in this thesis, we have been receiving, for the past three years,
data that amount for a daily total of 12 GB of malicious real darknet traffic from more
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than 12 countries. This section leverages a portion of such large cyber security data to pro-
pose a novel system, CSC-Detector, that aims at identifying Cyber Scanning Campaigns.
Recall that the latter define a new phenomenon of probing events that are distinguished by
their orchestration (i.e., coordination) patterns. To achieve its aim, CSC-Detector adopts
three engines. Its fingerprinting engine exploits a unique observation to extract probing
activities from darknet traffic. The system’s inference engine employs a set of behavioral
analytics to generate numerous significant insights related to the machinery of the probing
sources while its analysis engine fine-grains the previously obtained inferences to automat-
ically infer the campaigns. CSC-Detector is empirically evaluated and validated using 240
GB of real darknet data. The outcome discloses 3 recent, previously obscured and unre-
ported large-scale probing campaigns targeting diverse Internet services. Further, one of
those inferred campaigns revealed that the sipscan campaign that was initially analyzed
by CAIDA is arguably still active, yet operating in a stealthy, very low rate mode. We en-
vision that the proposed system that is tailored towards darknet data, which is frequently,
abundantly and effectively used to generate cyber threat intelligence, could be used by
network security analysts, emergency response teams and/or observers of cyber events to
infer large-scale orchestrated probing campaigns. This would be utilized for early cyber
attack warning and notification as well as for simplified analysis and tracking of such
events.
5.2.1 Proposed System
This section introduces CSC-Detector as significantly simplified in Figure 5.1. In a nut-
shell, the system takes as input darknet traffic and outputs detected well-defined CSCs.
We refer to the inferred CSCs as being “well-defined” since the probing sources of those
CSCs will be identified and correlated through patterns that are automatically generated
by the analysis engine in which each of those patterns is defined by specific, clearly iden-
tifiable, similar probing behavioral characteristics. This section elaborates on the goals,
approaches, and methods that are adopted by each of CSC-Detector’s three engines that
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Figure 5.1: CSC-Detector: System Architecture
The Fingerprinting Engine
In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we have proposed a new approach to fingerprint Internet-scale
probing activities. CSC-Detector leverages this approach to extract probing activities from
darknet data. Hence, the outcome of the fingerprinting engine are probing activities (i.e.,
probing sessions) coupled with their inferred probing techniques.
In addition to the validation of the observation of that approach that was performed
in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we further validate the observation of the approach as follows.
We executed 5 experiments using real and synthetic probing traffic. The Real prob-
ing traffic Data set (RD) was retrieved from the probes of the Carna Botnet [123] while the
remaining four Synthetic Data sets (SD) were respectively generated using four probing
tools, namely, Nmap, Unicornscan, AATools Port Scanner and Superscan, in a lab envi-
ronment. For RD, the various probing technique sessions were automatically extracted
by leveraging Snort’s probing engine [100] and confirmed by manual inspection. For SD,
the tools were invoked 100 times to generate their supported probing techniques in which
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a tcpdump sink was used to collect the traffic. Figure 5.2 illustrates the generated dis-

















































































































































































































































Figure 5.2: Packets’ distribution generated by some of the probing techniques using RD
time series distributions (i.e., time in ms Vs number of packets) for each of the probing
techniques. Subsequently, DFA was applied on each of the distributions by leveraging the
technique in [111] and using 1ms as the bin size. The outcome for RD is shown in Figure
5.3 while the complete set of experiments are summarized in Table 5.1, where the results
of SD represent the average of all the executions. It is worthy to mention that such list of
probing techniques is comprehensive [35]; any probing traffic in any environment should
have been generated by one of the techniques on the list.
From Table 5.1 and the information relating the scaling exponent α to the corre-
lation status, we can produce Table 5.2 that validates the observation that is exploited
by CSC-Detector’s fingerprinting engine; a number of probing techniques indeed demon-








































Figure 5.3: DFA application on the probing techniques using RD
corresponding probing traffic. Using RD, for the TCP Connect() probing technique, the
observation was confirmed with 92% confidence while for the RPC probing technique, in
the same experiment, it was established for 95%. On average, for all the probing tech-
niques, the observation was respectively validated by 97% and 93% for the RD and SD
experiments.
The Inference Engine
CSC-Detector’s inference engine leverages (1) the behavioral analytics that were previously
proposed in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4 to capture the machinery of the probing sources
and (2) the malware correlation approach of Section 4.1 for attribution purposes.
The Analysis Engine
Previous works [179] suggested that coordinated bots within a botnet campaign probe
their targets in a similar fashion. CSC-Detector’s analysis engine exploits this idea by
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Probing Technique RD: α SD: α
TCP SYN 0.57 0.74










Table 5.1: Probing Techniques & DFA output
automatically building patterns that consist of similar probing behavioral characteristics.
The latter aims at identifying and correlating the probing sources into well-defined cam-
paigns. The engine considers the criteria (i.e., features) that are summarized in Table 5.3.
Inferred from the fingerprinting engine, the employed probing technique is a significant
behavior; [177] demonstrated that all the CSC bots used UDP scanning. Further, the anal-
ysis engine consumes all the previously inferred probing machinery that is derived from
the inference engine. It considers the fashion of the generated probing traffic; whether
random or not, and which specific pattern has been adopted if not random; which prob-
ing strategy has been employed; whether the probing source is a probing tool or a bot;
whether the probing is targeted or dispersed; whether or not the probing sources demon-
strate any signs of malware infection and which specific malware type/family/variant if
they do. Additionally, bots/sources in a CSC are postulated to possess similar probing
rates and ratios of destination overlaps; we consider a 90% confidence interval as being
similar. Finally, the analysis engine considers the target port as a significant criterion;
[177] disclosed that all the CSC bots used port 5060.
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Table 5.2: Techniques & Correlation Statuses
To automatically infer orchestrated probing campaigns, the analysis engine leverages all
the previously extracted inferences and insights related to the probing sessions/sources
to build and parse a Frequent Pattern (FP) tree [180]. In such a tree, each node after
the root represents a feature extracted from the probing sessions, which is shared by the
sub-trees beneath. Each path in the tree represents sets of features that co-occur in the
sessions, in non-increasing order of frequency of occurrences. Thus, two sessions that have
several frequent features in common and are different just on infrequent features will share
a common path on the tree. The analysis engine also employs the FP tree based min-
ing method, FP-growth [180], for mining the complete set of generated frequent patterns.
As an outcome, the generated patterns represent frequent and similar probing behavioral
characteristics that correlate the probing sources into well-defined campaigns.
We should emphasize that such an approach that is employed by CSC-Detector’s
analysis engine possess the following advantages. First, the generated patterns are not de-
fined apriori; they are naturally and automatically detected. This permits CSC-Detector
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Employed probing technique
Probing traffic (Random Vs Patterns)
Employed pattern
Adopted probing strategy
Nature of probing source
Type of probing (Targeted Vs Dispersed)
Signs of malware infection
Exact malware type/variant
Probing rate
Ratio of destination overlaps
Target port
Table 5.3: Criteria adopted by the Analysis Engine
to infer novel probing campaigns, without requiring previous knowledge about their spec-
ifications. The latter is a crucial feature, especially with the continuous evolution of
probing campaigns and their employed strategies. Second, the FP-Tree not only provides
the capability for the system to correlate the probing sources into campaigns, but also
semantically describes how the probing sessions have been constructed. Third, by engi-
neering parsing algorithms that traverse the FP-Tree in various ways, the system can infer
horizontal probing campaigns, similar to the CSC in [177], as well as campaigns that do
not focus on one port but rather probe multiple targets on various ports, similar to the
CSC in [123]. Fourth, from a performance perceptive, the employed approach is scalable
since probing sessions are not compared pairwise, which could lead to a quadratic com-
plexity [180]. In fact, the cost of the algorithm is the cost of inserting probing session




We implemented the proposed CSC-Detector as a prototype in Java. We utilized the jNet-
Pcap SDK for packets/sessions processing. For all the statistical distances and tests as
well as entropy and Poisson fitting, we employed their MATLAB implementations and in-
cluded them in Java using the MATLAB Builder JA. We also used ssdeep, a fuzzy hashing
implementation written in C, and wrapped it unto java using SWIG. We as well leveraged
a python implementation of the FP-growth algorithm. We adopted a MongoDB database
to save the instances of the probing sessions coupled with their generated inferences.
Performance Evaluation
We setup CSC-Detector on a lab machine equipped with an Intel Core i7 CPU with eight
cores and 12GB of RAM. We profiled CSC-Detector’s performance in terms of execu-
tion/processing time, CPU utilization and memory consumption using 7 days of logged
darknet data. Using this hardware setup, on average, CSC-Detector was able to process
one day of darknet data (≈ 12 GB) in about 3.5 hours. The latter task is from the time
the system first receives the darknet pcap file to the time all the probing sessions and
their inferences are stored in the database. During these 3.5 hours, throughout the 7 days,
CSC-Detector’s CPU utilization recorded an average of 70.4%, a minimum of 45% and a
maximum of 96%. Further, its memory consumption measured an average of 975 MB, a
minimum of 700 MB and a maximum of 1.15 GB. The fluctuations in both metrics can be
attributed to the varying system’s idle state and the variable size of the processed logged
darknet pcap file. Since the system allows an arbitrary number of worker CPUs, we noticed
that the primary bottleneck was reading and writing to disc. Further, the fingerprinting
and inference engines highly depend on numerous statistical tests and techniques that are
currently implemented in MATLAB; a native fast programming language implementation
of the latter can be expected to boost the processing performance. Concerning the anal-
ysis engine, it required around 12 seconds to automatically build the FP-tree using 240
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Figure 5.4: The outcome of the probing behavioral analytics
is practically viable in a real-world environment.
Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate CSC-Detector using one month of darknet data (240 GB) that was collected
during the recent duration of April 1st to April 30th, 2014. For each day in the dataset,
we extracted 1,000 sessions for a total of 30,000 sessions to experiment with. Note that,
the 30,000 sessions are selected to be generated from unique sources.
Evaluating the inference engine
We proceed by invoking the behavioral analytics that are employed by CSC-Detector’s
inference engine on the 24,300 probing sessions1. The outcome is summarized in Figure
5.4. It is revealed that 62% of the probing sources used certain patterns when gener-
ating their probing traffic. Applying the CLUES clustering algorithm on the generated
patterns resulted in 12 specific non-overlapping Poisson λ intervals. We associate the
probing sources to those intervals. Concerning the employed probing strategy, it is shown
that 57% of the probing sources leveraged a permutation while the remaining adopted a
sequential strategy when probing their targets. Of those that employed a permutation,
76% used a uniform permutation while 24% adopted other types of permutations. The
majority (≈ 98%) of those that employed a sequential strategy were found to adopt a
1As extracted from the fingerprinting engine
162
forward IP-sequential strategy while only 2% adopted a reverse IP-sequential strategy. It
is noteworthy to mention that Dainotti et al. [177] reported that the SIP CSC indeed used
a reverse IP-sequential strategy; the authors deemed that as rare and novel. Other studies
such as [169] dismissed the possible use of this strategy since, as they noted, the strategy is
difficult to be used to extrapolate certain metrics from especially when dealing with partial
probes. Further, the inference engine disclosed that ≈ 75% of the sources were probes from
bots while only 15% were generated from probing tools. Moreover, it was inferred that
90% of the sources were generating probing that is dispersed while only 10% of the sources
were generating probing targeted towards a small set of IPs; the average relative uncer-
tainty of 21,870 probing sources was shown to be > 0.72. Last but not least, the inference
engine employed the approach of Section 11 to investigate any signs of malware infec-
tion in the probing sessions. The output demonstrated that 44% of the probing sessions
exhibited such signs. The top 5 malware contamination that caused the probing were at-
tributed to the following: Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.cwa, Virus-Win32.Sality.s,
Trojan-Win32.Jorik.Shakblades.foc, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.KiayksayRen.b and
Worm-Win32.VBNA.b. It is noteworthy to pinpoint that the latter inference that aims at
coupling probing and malware by only analyzing their generated traffic has never been at-
tempted before. The obtained results also expressed that the average rate of all the probing
sources was around 80 packets/sec, the Domain Name System (DNS) on port 53 and the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) on port 5060 were the most probed UDP services, while
TCP ports 80 and 1433 that respectively represent the HTTP and Microsoft (MS)-SQL
services were the most targeted TCP services. To the best of our knowledge, the above
generated inferences represent the first comprehensive empirical results of probing behav-
iors and characteristics. Although we are unable to validate every single inference due to
the lack of its ground truth, the 3 CSCs that will be uncovered by the analysis engine
(that consumes these generated inferences) will be validated using a publically available
data source, namely, DShield data, advocating the relative accuracy of such insights.
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CSC1 CSC2 CSC3
Employed probing technique: UDP TCP SYN ACK
Probing traffic: Random Random Pattern
Employed pattern: Null Null [19.17-21.23]
Adopted probing strategy: Reverse IP-sequential Uniform Permutation Forward IP-Sequential
Nature of probing source: Bot Bot Tool
Type of probing: Dispersed Dispersed Targeted
Signs of malware infection: Yes Yes No
Exact malware type/variant: Virus.Win32.Sality.bh Trojan.Win32.Jorik Null
Probing rate (in pps): 12 118 77
Target port: 5060 80 1433
Number of Probing Bots/Sources: 846 817 438
Table 5.4: The automatically inferred patterns capturing three large-scale orchestrated
probing campaigns
Evaluating the analysis engine
We proceed by invoking the analysis engine. Recall that this engine consumes the gener-
ated insights from the fingerprinting and inference engines to automatically build patterns
that consist of similar probing sources behavioral characteristics. For the sake of this work,
we have devised a simplistic parsing algorithm which automatically builds patterns from
the FP-tree that aims at capturing orchestrated probing events that probe horizontally;
probe all IPs by focusing on specific ports.
Inferred Campaigns: CSC-Detector automatically inferred the patterns that are
summarized in Table 5.4, which respectively captured three different CSCs. The first
pattern permitted the detection, identification and correlation of 846 unique probing bots
into a well-defined orchestrated probing event that targeted the VoIP (SIP) service. It is
shown that this event, that was initiated on the 17th of April, 2014, adopted UDP scan-
ning, probed around 65% of the monitored dark space (i.e., 300,000 dark IPs) where all its
bots did not follow a certain pattern when generating their probing traffic. Further, the
results demonstrate that the bots employed a reverse IP-sequential probing strategy when
164
probing their targets. Moreover, the malware responsible for this event was shown to be
attributed to the Sality malware. The second pattern successfully captured and correlated
817 unique probing bots to form a campaign that targeted the HTTP (Web) service. This
campaign, that first occurred on April 3rd, leveraged the TCP SYN scanning technique
and did not adopt a pattern when generating its probing traffic. Moreover, all its bots
were found to uniformly permute the dark IP space. Additionally, the malware responsible
for this event was shown to be attributed to the Jorik trojan. The third campaign that
was identified by the third pattern on April 16th was unique by targeting the MS-SQL
service, leveraging ACK scanning, employing a clearly identifiable pattern, focused on a
small set of targeted probing IPs, where its 438 probing sources leveraged a scanning tool
and a forward IP-sequential strategy. Note that we also generate supplementary material
related to the above inferred CSCs including geo-location information per real sources,
organizations, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), cities, regions and countries. However,
we refrain from publishing those due to sensitivity/legal issues.
Validation: Since currently there exist no cyber security capability to discover such
large-scale orchestrated probing campaigns [178], we are unable to directly compare the
inferred CSCs with other systems or approaches. However, in an attempt to validate our
results, we resort to publicly accessible data that is provided by DShield/Internet Storm
Center (ISC). ISC data comprises of millions of intrusion detection log entries gathered
daily from sensors covering more than 500 thousand IP addresses in over 50 countries.
From such data, we extract Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 which respectively depict probe
counts generating probing activities towards UDP port 5060 and TCP ports 80 and 1433
during the month of April, 2014. Figure 5.5 indeed reveals a significant peak on the 17th
of April consisting of an increasing number of probe counts targeting the SIP service;
this is the same day where the first orchestrated probing campaign, that was previously
inferred by CSC-Detector, was detected to be targeting the SIP service. Further, Fig-
ure 5.6, according to DShield’s data, shows a significant number of probes targeting the
Web service on April 3rd; this is as well coherent with the second CSC that was inferred

































































































































































Figure 5.6: Probe counts extracted from DShield/ISC data (April 2014)
demonstrates a peak of probing packets targeting the MS-SQL service on the same day
(i.e., April 16th) when the third CSC was detected to be launching its probing activities
towards the MS-SQL service. Additionally, the target scope of those CSCs, also retrieved
from DShield’s data on those particular days, recorded an unprecedented numbers reach-
ing millions of targets (compared with hundreds on other days). The latter information
strongly advocate that the proposed system was indeed accurately successful in inferring
those unusual large-scale events. Note that, those inferred probing campaigns went unde-
tected and unreported in the cyber security community until now.



















































































Figure 5.7: Probe counts extracted from DShield/ISC data (April 2014)
First experiment: We extracted all the 2101 source IP addresses that were pin-
pointed to be part of the three inferred large-scale probing campaigns. We fed those IP
addresses to third party publically available data sources provided by the online services,
ThreatStop2, MxLookup3, brightcloud4 and ReputationAuthority5. The latter cyber se-
curity data repositories provide information on Internet-scale incidents (i.e., scanning,
malware, spamming, etc.) per IP address. In particular, ThreatStop indexes full, present
and historical dshield data. Since the three probing campaigns were inferred in April 2014,
we verified the existence of the inferred source IP addresses that belong to the campaigns
against those reported in the online services in that specific time frame. The outcome of
such experiment, from all the four sources, demonstrated that (1) 98% of the IP addresses
of the campaigns were indeed found and flagged as malicious in those repositories and (2)
around 91% of those IP addresses were specifically flagged as being involved in scanning
activities.
Second experiment: In an attempt to further validate the phenomenon by cor-





6Adopted from [166], where they have been shown to produce distinguishing characteristics when applied
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addresses for each of those three campaigns. Subsequently, the k-means data clustering
technique was applied on such features. The outcome is illustrated in Figure 5.8. The
figure advocates the creation of three unique clusters, representing the three inferred cam-
paigns.


















Figure 5.8: K-means output
Thus, on one hand, the first experiment validates that the source IP addresses of
the inferred campaigns are indeed malicious where the majority of them were found to be
involved in probing activities in April 2014. On the other hand, the second experiment
demonstrates that the inferred campaigns are indeed well constructed where their IP ad-
dresses coupled with their generated probing traffic are strongly correlated as revealed by
the formed independent clusters.
Discussion: The aforementioned inferred CSC1 is indeed interesting; as elaborated
at the beginning of this section, in [177], CAIDA presented an analysis study of an or-
chestrated probing campaign that targeted VoIP (SIP) servers. According to CAIDA, the
event occurred from January 31st, 2011 till February 12th, 2012. CSC1 that the proposed
system was able to automatically infer possesses the exact characteristics of that CAIDA
on network data
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event. They both were attributed to the Sality malware, generated UDP scanning, tar-
geted SIP servers on port 5060, and used a reverse IP-sequential probing strategy. The
latter behavior is predominantly stimulating because, as previously mentioned, that strat-
egy is known to be extremely under-employed [169]. However, one distinguishing feature
between those two events is that the probing bots of the campaign that the proposed sys-
tem was able to infer has considerably lower probing rate than those of CAIDA’s event;
on average, the bots of the inferred campaign recorded 12 packets per second (pps) while
those of CAIDA measured around 60 pps. Such information (1) arguably proves that
CAIDA’s event is indeed still active, yet operating in a stealthy, very low rate mode in an
attempt to achieve its reconnaissance task without being detected or (2) a new instance
of the same orchestrated event commanded by the same C&C took place in April, 2014
without any cyber security body reporting it. In either cases, we find the latter informa-
tion motivating and to a certain degree bewildering. Thus, we aim in the near future work
to track that event to verify and elaborate on its inner details. It is worthy to mention
that in the month of April 2014, DShield, the media or other sources did not announce a
campaign that CSC-Detector was not able to infer. Moreover, although we did not have
the opportunity to operate and experiment with CSC-Detector for a long period of time,
however, we were able to extract some points that we recently have had the chance to
observe:
• We are often faced with the case in which the probing bot sends two probing packets
to the same destination but with two different destination port numbers. For ex-
ample, if the intention of the scanner/campaign is to probe for the SIP service, the
scanner might send two probing packets towards ports 80 and 5060. This was also
observed and concurred in [177]. CSC-Detector is frequently identifying those bots
as belonging to two different CSCs. One solution to compensate this issue would be
to permit multiple port number assignments in the target IP criteria through the
analysis engine.
• Most of the probing bots that the system is identifying as belonging to the same
CSC are often very geographically dispersed. This suggests that it is very hard if
169
not impossible to mitigate their probes or their possible subsequent cyber attacks by
blocking them based on their location, ISP or Autonomous System Number (ASN).
• Typically, we would expect that probing bots within the same correlated CSC to
possess similar probing rates, as they are coordinated by the same botmaster in a
C&C infrastructure that characteristically adopt a unified probing strategy. For the
three CSCs that the system was able to infer, the latter was found to be false (using
a 90% confidence interval); perhaps this implies that the same botmaster is requiring
different bot groups within the same campaign to adopt different probing strategies
in an attempt to avoid being attributed to the same campaign. In general, we deem
this behavior as stimulating, uncommon and somehow confusing to understand and
interpret.
5.3 Time Series Interpolation and Prediction For Inferring
Orchestrated Probing Campaigns
This section also aims at inferring probing campaigns by investigating traffic destined to-
wards network telescopes. The objective is to provide a more systematic methodology to
infer, in a prompt manner, whether or not the perceived probing packets belong to an
orchestrated campaign. Additionally, the methodology could be easily leveraged to gen-
erate network traffic signatures to facilitate capturing incoming packets as belonging to
the same inferred campaign. Indeed, this would be utilized for early cyber attack warning
and notification as well as for simplified analysis and tracking of such events. To realize
such goals, the proposed approach models such challenging task as a problem of interpo-
lating and predicting time series with missing values. By initially employing trigonometric
interpolation and subsequently executing state space modeling in conjunction with a time-
varying window algorithm, the proposed approach is able to pinpoint orchestrated probing
campaigns by only monitoring few orchestrated flows. After verifying the accuracy of the
individually-employed theoretical based methods using simulated data, we consequently
empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the complete proposed model using 330 GB of real
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telescope data. By comparing the outcome with a previously validated work, the results
indeed demonstrate the promptness and accuracy of the proposed model.
Thus, motivated by the imperative requirement to infer such probing campaigns, we
frame this section’s contribution as follows:
• Proposing an approach that models the complex problem of inferring probing cam-
paigns as the task of interpolating and predicting time series in the presence of
missing values. The model allows the pinpointing of orchestrated campaigns by ob-
serving just few probing packets, rendering it very prompt. Further, by only keeping
a record of the probing time series, the model is efficient and lightweight in terms of
memory and processing requirements, which makes it applicable to be implemented
in real-time on operational data streams. It is also noteworthy to mention that the
model could be easily invoked to capture newly incoming packets that belong to
the same inferred campaign by generating simple yet effective network traffic sig-
natures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic model that is
specifically tailored towards the goal of inferring probing campaigns by observing
network telescopes.
• Employing time series interpolation and prediction approaches based on trigonomet-
ric and state space modeling techniques, namely, the discrete Fourier transform and
kalman filter, and evaluating their accuracy against other approaches using simu-
lated data. The latter aims at authenticating the choice of those techniques as core
components of the proposed model.
• Evaluating the promptness and accuracy of the proposed model using 330 GB of
real telescope data in addition to validating the models’ outcome and advantages by
comparing it with a previous work.
5.3.1 Proposed Model
In this section, we formulate the problem, present the proposed approach and evaluate
the employed theoretical-based techniques.
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Problem Formulation
By observing a set of network telescopes {nt1, nt2, · · · , ntn}, one can infer unidirectional
probing flows {pf1, pf2, · · · , pfn} as previously illustrated in Figure 2.28. A probing flow
refers to a series of scanning packets, generated by employing a specific probing technique
[35], r = {s, d,∆t}, that is originating from a single Internet source s and targeting one
particular darknet IP address d within a duration ∆t. From a telescope perspective, such
flows seem to appear autonomous and totally independent from other probing flows. How-
ever, as stated in Section 5.1, there exists evidence of the emergence of probing campaigns
that aim at executing coordinated scanning activities.
Thus, the problem in-hand could be clarified using the following questions:
1. By solely observing unidirectional probes pfn arriving at the network telescope ntn,
how can we infer orchestrated probing flows ϕ(pfn)?
2. How can we distinguish orchestrated probing flows ϕ(pfn) from other flows that are
also targeting the telescope? More specifically, given a possible set of ϕ(pfn), how
can we achieve ϕ(pfn)− , where  could refer to noise (i.e., independent flows pfn),
to produce confirmed ϕ(pfn).
3. How can we design an approach that achieves the above but at the same time is
efficient (i.e., demands little processing and memory requirements) and prompt.
The latter feature is crucial as we would like to possess the capability to flag an
orchestrated campaign by observing as few coordinated probing flows as possible.
Indeed, this would be utilized for early cyber attack warning, notification and thus
mitigation as well as for simplified analysis and tracking of such events, by monitoring
and capturing signatures of those campaigns in newly incoming flows.
In what follows, we elaborate on the proposed approach, as holistically illustrated
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Figure 5.9: A holistic view of the proposed approach
Proposed Approach
In this work, we uniquely model the task of inferring orchestrated probing campaigns as the
problem of interpolating and predicting time series in the presence of missing values. The
core rationale behind that approach stems from the idea that if the probing flow time series
demonstrates positive predictability features, thus identifying certain probing patterns,
then it might be part of an orchestrated event. To realize such rationale, the proposed
approach (1) fingerprints independent probing flows as perceived by the telescope, (2)
clusters and builds the probing flow time series, (3) interpolates the time series for data
completion purposes, (4) predicts the time series in order to infer orchestrated flows and
eliminate independent (i.e., non-orchestrated) ones and (5) confirms orchestrated flows by
capturing and verifying the logic of the usage of the probing sources. In the sequel, we
elaborate on the latter five steps.
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Fingerprinting Independent Flows
In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we have proposed a new approach to fingerprint Internet-scale
probing activities. In this work, and to successfully extract independent probing flows
as perceived by the network telescope, we adopt and leverage the previously proposed
approach.
Flow Clustering & Time Series Generation
Probing flow packets targeting the telescope have the following 8-tuple form
〈t, srcip, dstip, srcp, dstp, prot, ttl, f lags〉
representing the timestamp, the source and destination IP addresses and ports, the
transport protocol used, the time-to-live (ttl) value and the packet flags. From recent
probing campaign incidents [177, 123], it was observed that orchestrated probes possess
similar values for dst p, prot and flags. Thus, we first amalgamate all the probing flows
into different clusters sharing similar values for those packet features. Additionally, based
on those reported events, it was demonstrated that a particular campaign has been gen-
erated by the same type of operating system; in [177], it was inferred that 97% of the
orchestrated probing flows were originating from windows machines while in [123], it was
revealed that all the flows were generated from Unix environments. Thus, it is desirable
that we further cluster the previous groups by the same originating operating system. To
achieve this, we investigate the ttl value of the probing packets as perceived by the network
telescope. According to [181], most modern operating systems use only a few selected ini-
tial ttl values, particularly, 30, 64, 128, and 255. It is evident that most of these initial ttl
values are far apart. Moreover, since Internet traces have shown that few Internet hosts
are apart by more than 30 hops [182, 183], which is also confirmed by our own recent
observations, one can determine the initial ttl value of a probing packet that is received at
the telescope by selecting the smallest initial value in the set that is larger than its final
ttl. For example, if the observed final ttl value is 112, the initial ttl value would be 128.
Thus, based on this heuristical approach, we further refine the clusters by subdividing the
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probing flows according to similar ttl values. Recall that the latter aims at further clus-
tering the groups based on similar originating operating system. It is important to note
that probing sources/attackers can use, in theory, certain tools that can explicitly modify
the ttl value in an attempt to evade being correctly clustered. For example, traceroute7
is a common application which can set the IP ttl to any random number, independent of
the operating systems’ kernel’s default. However, a probing source who overrides IP ttl to
avoid detection should enforce a stable mapping of IP source to IP ttl, in order to prevent
us from seeing a noisy IP TTL originating from its IP address, and thus subsequently
flagging his IP source as ttl-spoofing. In practice, in our experiments, we did not notice
any ttl-spoofing, where all the inferred ttl values were from those 4 default categories.
Please recall, in a nutshell, that the output of the above are independent probing flows
clustered based on similar dst p, prot, flags and ttl values.
For each of the above independent probing flows within those clusters, we generate
their corresponding time series of the form
〈t, dstip〉
Note that due to the simplicity of such time series, the approach is able to generate
around 200 thousand of those in under 5 seconds. Further, since the time series is com-
posed of just two packet features, namely, the timestamp and the destination telescope
IP address, the storage requirements are minimal; less than 300 MB to save those 200
thousand time series. It is also noteworthy to mention that such storage requirement will
not augment by time, since the approach discards the previously extracted time series
after processing.
Time Series Interpolation
The above time series could be referred to as a time series with missing values in which
some of its rows are not captured. This is because (1) the network telescope only covers
a portion of the Internet space and thus is not able to perceive all the probes at all times
7http://linux.die.net/man/8/traceroute
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and (2) some probing packets arriving at the telescope could be distorted and thus are
filtered out before the generation of the time series. Indeed, without a complete view of
the probing time series, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to devise approaches to infer
orchestration. To deal with this issue, we resort to time series interpolation. This refers to
numerical analysis techniques that aim at constructing new data points from and within
a range of a discrete set of known data points. Although there exists several interpolation
techniques in the literature [184], in this work, we employ and tailor, for accuracy8 and ef-
ficiency reasons, trigonometric interpolation, namely, the discrete Fourier transform (dFt)
[185, 186]. In the sequel, we detail the latter and demonstrate how it is used for effective
interpolation.
Fourier analysis is the theory about representing general functions by means of
trigonometric functions [185]. This decomposition procedure is called Fourier transform
[186].












w ∈ [−pi, pi) since DTFT is 2pi-periodic [187]. Operating on xn defined over all
integers n ∈ Z, the frequency ∼w of the DTFT is always continuous. In other words, DTFT
maps an infinite series of complex numbers into a finite interval. From an engineering














For a sequence xn, n = 0 · · ·N − 1, that is of a finite length, the discrete Fourier
8See Section 5.3.2
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By (5.2) and (5.4), we can see that DTFT provides an approximation for the FT
defined in continuous time.
Furthermore, by Eulers notation [188]















X(k) · w2knN (5.8)
Going back to our interpolation problem, given a set of (n + 1) data points in the
probing time series, dFt provides an interpolating function that is composed of finite
sum of cosines and sine that connects all (n + 1) data points, including any missing
values in between. However, for the previous function to be directly applicable to the
extracted probing time series, we modify the dstip packet feature in the time series from
177
the typical IPv4 CIDR notation [189] (i.e., w.x.y.z/13) to a discrete numeric by using a
simple developed mechanism.
Time Series Prediction
After interpolating the probing time series within the clusters, the next step would be to
verify if such series indicate any signs of predictability. If confirmed, this would provide
evidence that the probing flows indeed possess some orchestration logic. To achieve that
task, we tailor and employ a recursive optimal stochastic estimator, namely, the kalman
filter [190]. Although we have selected to leverage this specific theoretical-based technique
because of various reasons, including, (1) its superior results in practice due to optimal-
ity and structure [191, 192, 193], (2) its convenient form that permits online real-time
processing [194, 195], (3) its ease to formulate and implement and (4) its efficiency when
calculating the measurement equations and the error covariances [196], the main reason,
however, would be due to its significant applicability to the problem in-hand; the kalman
filter infers parameters of interest from indirect, inaccurate and uncertain observations.
This is coherent with our problem since the time series under predictability verification
has been interpolated and thus might contain some uncertain records. The inner workings
of the kalman filter are highlighted next.
The kalman filter could be simplified by
Xk = Kk · Zk + (1−Kk) ·Xk−1 (5.9)
where Xk is the current state, Kk is the kalman gain, Zk is the current measured
value and Xk−1 is the previous estimation. Note that Zk refers to an observed or inter-
polated record in the probing time series. Informally, we can say that the kalman filter
identifies the most optimum averaging factor for each consequent state. Additionally, it
remembers some information related to the past states.
The first step of the kalman filter is rendered by evaluating the probing time series
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signal by using two linear stochastic equations, namely,
xk = xk−1 + wk (5.10)
and
zk = xk + vk (5.11)
where wk and vk are measurement noises.
9
The second step of the kalman filter is composed of establishing and subsequently
iterating through the prediction (i.e., time update) and correction (i.e., measurement








where (5.12) projects the state ahead while (5.13) projects the error covariance











k +Kk(zk − x −k ) (5.15)
and
Pk = (1−Kk) · P −k (5.16)
9For simplicity, these values are extracted from a Gaussian distribution fitted into the received darknet
data. Note that this assumption is not problematic since the kalman filtering algorithm will converge into
correct estimations, even if the Gaussian noise parameters are roughly estimated [192, 197].
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where (5.14) computes the kalman gain, (5.15) updates the estimate via zk and
(5.16) updates the error covariance.
Going back to our probing time series, recall that the aim is to infer whether or
not the probes demonstrate any signs of predictability and thus orchestration. We exploit
the kalman filtering error covariance, Pk, as previously computed, in conjunction with a
time-varying window algorithm to achieve the latter. The pseudocode of the algorithm is
presented next.
Algorithm 6 operates on the basis of two time windows. The first is used to load
the probing time series within each cluster into volatile memory for processing while the
second is used to compare the probing time series. The comparison is based on kalman’s
error covariance; the algorithm flags those flows that increase the error as demonstrating
non-predictability while inferring orchestrated ones by monitoring a decrease in the error
metric. From a complexity perceptive, the algorithm requires O(m) space complexity
where m is the size of the probing time series within each cluster and O(m + n + p)
time complexity where n is the size of the probing time series related to the comparison
window and p is the required time for the kalman filter to process the time series within
q fixed iterations. It is noteworthy to mention that in this work, we have chosen a q
value of 10 iterations for the kalman filter in order to measure and compare the error
covariance. Note that the choice of the value per say is not an issue; rather, its systematic
application for all the probing time series for effective and accurate comparison. Further,
as mentioned in Section 5.3.1, recall that since the probing time series is very simple, there
is no compelling reason (i.e., from a memory or processing requirements) to optimize the
values of the window sizes. In practice, the algorithm can process and decide upon a time
series with 1 thousand records in less than 10 seconds and require, on average, around 10
MB in volatile storage.
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Algorithm 6: A time-varying window algorithm to distinguish between orches-
trated and independent probing flows by leveraging kalman’s error covariance
Data: Probing Clusters, PC,
Probing Time Series, PTS
Result: List of Orchestrated Flows, OF
1 for PTS in PC do
2 ProcessingWindow, PW=5;
3 ComparisonWindow, CW=1;
4 while PTS in PW do




9 if v1 > v2 then
10 flag((CW - -).FirstElement();
11 OF .add(CW - -).OtherElements();
12 end
13 if v1 < v2 then
14 flag(CW ).LastElement());








The previous sections elaborated an approach that aims at inferring orchestrated probing
flows as perceived by the network telescope. Specifically, the outcome of the previous
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Figure 5.10: A simplified illustration of orchestrated probing flows
were inferred to be orchestrated by employing the proposed approach. Recall, that the
approach only analyzed the probing traces which targeted the telescope to conclude that
inference. However, to further assert such orchestration, we extend the approach by ex-
ploiting the logic of distribution or usage of the probing sources as instructed by the
probing master. The latter aims at providing fortified evidence of the coordination of the
probing sources. Note that, we use the generic name ‘probing master’ to either refer to
a probing botmaster where the probing sources are deemed to be infected by a malware
and thus are referred to as bots similar to the analyzed probing event in [177] or to a
more relaxed naming convention which is rendered by any ‘malicious manager’ that is co-
ordinating the probing activities in some matter as was illustrated in [123]. Typically, to
infer the logic of the usage of the probing sources, one need access to the control channels
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(see Figure 5.10). However, recall that we only have access to the network telescope in-
formation. Although we could leverage the observation that coordinated bots in a unified
botnet will relatively generate the same amount of traffic as was noted in [198], we argue
that this approach is not quite accurate and does not apply in our case. First, since our
work exploits network telescopes to infer probes orchestration, it is highly probable that
we might not observe all the probes from the probing sources. Thus, even though the or-
chestrated probing sources might send the same amount of probes, the network telescope
will not perceive such equal amount. Second, the probing master could attempt to hide
the orchestration behavior by purposely instructing the probing sources to probe with very
different number of probes. In either cases, that observation that relies on the generated
load by the coordinated sources will fail to assert orchestration. Therefore, in this work,
we rely on another behavior that is easily and more accurately captured by a network
telescope to achieve that goal. From [177, 123], it was demonstrated that the probing
master instructed its sources to initiate the orchestrated probing activities in a constant
manner. In other words, given a queue of targets, the coordinated probing sources would,
in a constant repetitive manner, select a subset of the destinations and pledge their probes
towards them during a dispersed period of time. We leverage such information and devise
a simple mechanism to capture the activity closeness of the orchestrated sources. This
step could be considered as a post-processing step that is performed on the output of the
previous section. Within a given ProcessingWindow, PW (recall Algorithm 6), we record
all the orchestrated probing sources as inferred by the proposed approach. For each of
such probing sources, we build a simplistic data structure that holds the indices in which
that specific probing source was active within PW . Figure 5.11 illustrates such structure
where K ∈ {0,1}.
 K1  K2  Kn
Probing Sourcen
Figure 5.11: A structure that captures when the orchestrated probing sources are active
Such binary structure indeed captures when the orchestrated probing sources were
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active during PW , where the indices reflect a specific time metric (i.e., ms or sec). Thus,
the problem in-hand is now reformulated as a pattern matching task executed on binary
structures. Indeed, the aim is to utilize the assembled binary structures to infer close-
ness of activity between the orchestrated sources. To achieve the latter, we implement
a highly efficient pattern matching algorithm that is specifically tailored to operate on
binary strings. The code is based on that of [199]. The latter algorithm was found to be
extremely efficient, when compared with other literature techniques, even when the binary
structures are large [199] as it might occur in our case. To determine a suitable percentage
of activity closeness that we can use to assert the orchestration of the probing sources,
we perform the following empirical experiment. We extract 200 unique and orchestrated
probing sources coupled with their real traffic flows from the Carna Botnet [123]. For
all the probing sources, we generate their corresponding structure as previously described
in this section and illustrated in Figure 5.11. For any two of those orchestrated sources,
we execute the binary matching algorithm and record the percentage of similarity. The
outcome is illustrated in Figure 5.12.
The result indicates that between any two orchestrated flows, the average of their
activity closeness, using the proposed approach in this section, is around 57.4%. In this
work, we employ the minimum value derived from this experiment, which is equal to 39%,
as a relaxed lower bound to assert the orchestration of the probing sources. Moreover, only
for labeling purposes, we assert that a cluster of inferred and confirmed orchestrated sources
will indeed define a campaign when the number of such sources reaches a minimum of 100
unique machines; on one hand, the probing campaigns in [177, 123] demonstrated a large
number of involved orchestrated sources reaching thousands and millions, while, on the
other hand, other probing studies [200] revealed a more focused coordinated probing events
involving just few hundreds of orchestrated sources. Thus, we deem the 100 machines
threshold as a suitable parameter to flag a group of orchestrated sources as a campaign.
Note that, this relatively low threshold will permit the model, at very early stages, to
pinpoint orchestrated campaigns by observing just 100 coordinated and confirmed probing


















































































































NUMBER OF ORCHESTRATED PROBING FLOWS
Figure 5.12: An empirical experiment to determine a suitable lower bound for the activity
closeness of the orchestrated probing sources
well as for simplified and prompt analysis and tracking of such events.
5.3.2 Evaluation of Techniques
To interpolate and predict the probing time series, we have initially employed and tailored
trigonometric interpolation based on discrete Fourier transform and subsequently executed
state space modeling related to kalman filtering. This section compares the accuracy of
those two approaches with other common approaches. This aims at verifying the choice
of those two theoretical-based techniques as core components of the proposed model in
solving the specific problem in-hand. To archive that, we resort to a simulation experiment.
The experiment is rendered by a simulation executed using Opnet Modeler10. The
simulation is comprised of a probing source and 100 probing destinations/targets. The
source and the destinations are represented using commodity machines. The probing
source is instructed to generate three types of probing towards the targets, namely, TCP
10http://tinyurl.com/nclm3gp
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SYN, UDP and ACK scanning, for a duration of 10 minutes. The latter ones are typically
common types of probing activities [35].
We generate the probing time series targeting 20 destinations in coherence with Sec-
tion 5.3.1. In case of interpolation, the aim is to verify the accuracy of the discrete Fourier
transform (dFt) in two cases, namely, when the series is missing only one value and in the
case where it is missing multiple values. In both cases, we compare the dFT in relation to
the Least Squares Approximation (LSA) method and the Cubic Spline (CS) method. The
latter are classical and thus significantly used approaches in the field of time series inter-
polation [201, 202, 203]. On one hand, the LSA approach attempts to minimize the sum
of the squares of the errors for a polynomial of a given degree by applying the least-square
principle. Such approach is coherent with the maximum-likelihood principle of statistics
[204]; if the measurement errors are normally distributed and if the standard deviation
is constant for all the data, the line determined by minimizing the sum of squares can
be shown to have values of slope and intercept which have maximum likelihood of occur-
rence. On the other hand, the CS method fits a smooth curve to the known data, using
cross-validation [205] between each pair of adjacent points, to initially set the degree of
smoothing and subsequently estimate the missing observation by the value of the spline.
Note that to implement the LSA and CS techniques, we employed two open source Java
libraries11 while we experimented with a slightly modified version of the FFTW12 library
to implement the dFT approach.
Table 5.5 and Figure 5.13 summarize the interpolated time series in the case of one
missing value where t is in ms and x(t) is the targeted destination. In all the three miss-
ing value cases, we can note that the dFt approach provided the closest estimates to the
actual value while the polynomial LSA approach was the least accurate. In the second
and third missing value cases, the CS approach performed almost as accurate as the dfT




can conclude that the dFT, overall, outperformed the other methods in terms of accuracy,
especially when the number of values preceding the missing interpolated value is limited;


























Actual Value LSA CS dFt
Figure 5.13: Summary of the estimates of the probing time series interpolation in the























Actual Value LSA CS dFt
Figure 5.14: Summary of the estimates of the probing time series interpolation in the
presence of multiple missing values
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Time t x(t) Actual Value x(t) x(t) using LSA x(t) using CS x(t) using dFT
1 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777
2 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796
3 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781
4 3232235779 MISSING 3232235754 3232235762 3232235784
5 3232235783 3232235783 3232235783 3232235783 3232235783
6 3232235792 3232235792 3232235792 3232235792 3232235792
7 3232235788 3232235788 3232235788 3232235788 3232235788
8 3232235789 3232235789 3232235789 3232235789 3232235789
9 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778
10 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785
11 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795
12 3232235782 MISSING 3232235771 3232235778 3232235783
13 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793
14 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786
15 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791
16 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787
17 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784
18 3232235790 MISSING 3232235784 3232235793 3232235788
19 3232235780 3232235780 3232235780 3232235780 3232235780
20 3232235794 3232235794 3232235794 3232235794 3232235794
Table 5.5: Verifying the accuracy of the discrete Fourier transform as applied to probing
time series interpolation in the presence of one missing value
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Time t x(t) Actual Value x(t) x(t) using LSA x(t) using CS x(t) using dFT
1 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777 3232235777
2 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796 3232235796
3 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781 3232235781
4 3232235779 3232235779 3232235779 3232235779 3232235779
5 3232235783 MISSING 3232235761 3232235768 3232235778
6 3232235792 MISSING 3232235763 3232235772 3232235784
7 3232235788 MISSING 3232235754 3232235765 3232235779
8 3232235789 MISSING 3232235752 3232235763 3232235778
9 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778 3232235778
10 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785 3232235785
11 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795 3232235795
12 3232235782 3232235782 3232235782 3232235782 3232235782
13 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793 3232235793
14 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786 3232235786
15 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791 3232235791
16 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787 3232235787
17 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784 3232235784
18 3232235790 MISSING 3232235798 3232235788 3232235792
19 3232235780 MISSING 3232235771 3232235786 3232235777
20 3232235794 MISSING 3232235807 3232235784 3232235797
Table 5.6: Verifying the accuracy of the discrete Fourier transform as applied to probing
time series interpolation in the presence of multiple missing values
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To further assess how the employed dFt approach will perform, we used the same
simulation setup to execute another experiment which is rendered by the presence of mul-
tiple missing values. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.14 summarize the output of such experiment.
The results pinpoint another imperative advantage of the dFt technique; while the accu-
racy of the other approaches very rapidly degrade when faced with multiple subsequent
missing values (i.e., especially at the last position in the missing value series), the dFt
approach still maintains an acceptable accuracy. It can also be noted that, similar to
the previous experiment, the dFt approach outperformed the other techniques in all the
individual missing value cases.
We proceed by investigating the accuracy of the kalman filter as modeled and applied
to the previously interpolated probing time series. Recall, as per Section 5.3.1, we have
leveraged this iterative optimal stochastic estimator coupled with a time-varying window
algorithm to infer and distinguish between orchestrated and independent probing flows
as perceived by the network telescope. To assess its accuracy, we compared it with typi-
cal time series prediction techniques, including the Exponential Smoothing (ES) and the
Moving Average (MA) [206]. We further computed the mean squared error [207], a metric
which is commonly exploited to measure and compare the forecast error when dealing with










Yi is a vector of n predictions and Yi is a vector of n true values.
Figure 5.15 illustrates the output of the experiment. By computing the mean squared
error for the three approaches, it was revealed that, on average, the ES technique suffered
from a 6.8% error rate, the MA technique recorded a 4% error rate while the kalman filter
agonized only 1.52% error rate. The latter indeed demonstrate the accuracy of the kalman
filter. Note that such a low error rate could be further enhanced by permitting the filter























Actual ES MA Kalman
Figure 5.15: Summary of the prediction estimates of the interpolated probing time series
In a nutshell, the above three experiments clearly reveal that the dFt approach
is more accurate than the LSA and CS techniques when interpolating time series with
missing values. Further, the experiments strongly demonstrate that the kalman filter can
generate high accurate prediction estimates in few iterations in comparison with other
common forecasting techniques. This relatively authenticates the choice of both of these
theoretical-based modeling techniques as core components of the proposed model.
5.3.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we leverage 330 GB of darknet data extracted from the month of April
2014 to validate the promptness and accuracy of the proposed model.
Consistent with Section 5.3.1, we infer 30 thousand unique independent probing
flows. Further, coherent with Section 5.3.1, around 35% of the latter were successfully
clustered into 5 groups. The details of those clusters are summarized in Table 5.7.
It can be noted that the majority of the probing flows have been generated by Windows
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Probed Destination Port 5060 23 80 1433 443
Transport Protocol UDP TCP TCP TCP TCP
Probing Flags UDP TCP SYN TCP SYN TCP ACK TCP FIN
TTL 128 128 64 64 128
Number of Probing Flows 2698 3067 913 2983 939



























Figure 5.16: CDF of Destinations in Cluster 1
machines (i.e., TTL = 12813). For each probing flow within each of the 5 clusters, we
generate their probing time series in accordance with Section 5.3.1. Figures 5.16 to 5.20
show the CDF of the probed destinations within each of those clusters.
From the Figures, we can infer that cluster 2 is the most dispersed; 50% of the
sources probed more than 1300 destinations. Further, we can extract that clusters 3 and 5
are more focused in which most of the their sources probed a small number of destinations.
We proceed by executing the discrete-time Fourier transform interpolation approach























































Figure 5.18: CDF of Destinations in Cluster 3
corroborates the fact that the probing flows of cluster 2 are indeed dispersed; not only
they target a significant amount of destinations as was inferred from Figure 5.17, but also
most of them were not captured by our leveraged /13 darkspace, which is indicated by
the large percentage of interpolated multiple missing value time series.
Subsequently, consistent with Section 5.3.1, we invoke the kalman filter coupled with
Algorithm 6 to distinguish between orchestrated and non-orchestrated flows. Table 5.8
summarizes one execution of the filter while Figure 5.22 represents the convergence of the
kalman filter algorithm in that execution. One can pinpoint that with just 10 iterations,






















































Figure 5.20: CDF of Destinations in Cluster 5
for the kalman filter related to Algorithm 6 in order to measure and compare the error
covariance for the purpose of distinguishing between orchestrated and non-orchestrated
probing flows (recall Section 5.3.1).
By initially executing Algorithm 6 and subsequently enforcing the orchestration con-
firmation technique from Section 21, the first four clusters of Table 5.7 demonstrated pos-
itive orchestration behavior and passed the 100 coordinated machines threshold. Cluster
5 was eliminated as it revealed negative coordinated behavior as enforced by the orches-


























Single Value Interpolation Multiple Value Interpolation
Figure 5.21: Distribution of the Types of the Interpolated Values
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
zk 0.390 0.500 0.480 0.290 0.250 0.320 0.340 0.480 0.410 0.450
xk−1 0 0.355 0.424 0.442 0.405 0.375 0.365 0.362 0.377 0.380
P
−
k 1 0.091 0.048 0.032 0.024 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011
xk 0.355 0.424 0.442 0.405 0.375 0.365 0.362 0.377 0.380 0.387
Pk 0.091 0.048 0.032 0.024 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010
Table 5.8: Summary of one execution of the kalman filter
simple tcpdump14 signatures on the data derived from the features (i.e., destination port,
protocol, flags, ttl) of the first four clusters, Table 5.7 could be re-represented as orches-
trated flow clusters as summarized in Table 5.9.
By comparing Tables 5.7 and 5.9, one can note the drop between clustered inde-















Figure 5.22: The Kalman Filter algorithm converging over few iterations
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Probed Destination Port 5060 23 80 1433
Transport Protocol UDP TCP TCP TCP
Probing Flags UDP TCP SYN TCP SYN TCP ACK
TTL 128 128 64 64
Number of Orchestrated Probing Flows 1567 1863 858 587
Table 5.9: Summary of the inferred orchestrated probing campaigns
5.3.4 Comparison with Previous Work
Our first attempt to tackle the problem of inferring large-scale probing campaigns by
observing network telescopes was rendered in [38]. In that work, as was demonstrated in
Section 5.2, we proposed a set of data behavioral analytics to scrutinize probes as received
by the darkspace. Please recall that the analytics were based on statistical, heuristical and
fuzzy hashing approaches that aim at generating feature vectors for each of the perceived
probing flows.
To compare and contrast the advantages of the presently proposed work, in this
section, we compare its outcome with our previous work. To achieve that, we execute the
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C1 C2 C3
Employed probing technique: UDP TCP SYN ACK
Probing traffic: Random Random Pattern
Employed pattern: Null Null [19.17-21.23]
Adopted probing strategy: Reverse IP-sequential Uniform Permutation Forward IP-Sequential
Nature of probing source: Bot Bot Tool
Type of probing: Dispersed Dispersed Targeted
Signs of malware infection: Yes Yes No
Exact malware type/variant: Virus.Win32.Sality.bh Trojan.Win32.Jorik Null
Probing rate (in pps): 12 118 77
Target port: 5060 80 1433
Number of Probing Bots/Sources: 846 817 438
Table 5.10: The automatically inferred patterns capturing three large-scale orchestrated
probing campaigns by employing the approach from Section 5.2
previously proposed approach from Section 5.2 on the same dataset of this work. The out-
come is illustrated in Table 5.10. By comparing Tables 5.9 and 5.10, we can pinpoint that
both approaches were able to infer orchestrated clusters 1, 3 and 4 of Table 5.9. One differ-
ence that is related to those campaigns is concerning the number of identified orchestrated
flows; the number of inferred orchestrated probing sources using the proposed approach
exceeded those inferred using the approach from Section 5.2. We manually investigated
the additional flows as identified using the proposed approach, and we confirmed that they
are indeed part of the campaign. Hence, we assert that the previously proposed approach
missed some flows as belonging to the same campaign. Further, the previously proposed
approach completely missed a fourth campaign, which was pinpointed by the proposed
approach as cluster 2 of Table 5.9. Additionally, the proposed approach is not only more
accurate but is also more prompt than the previous approach; the proposed approach can
flag a campaign by observing only few orchestrated flows while the previous approach
requires the creation of the complete feature pattern (i.e., processing of all the perceived
data) to cluster the sources into well-defined campaigns. Moreover, the proposed approach
is more efficient as it only records and process lightweight time series (recall Section 5.3.1)
while the previous approach needs to maintain, in memory, the entire darknet data flows.
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Last but not least, the presently proposed approach is more systematic and formal com-
pared with the previously proposed approach as it deals with time series, trigonometric
interpolation and state space modeling as apposed to relying on the output of statistical
tests and heuristics. Since the previously proposed approach attributes the campaign to
a certain malware family using correlation techniques between probing and malware sam-
ples (recall Section 5.2), we may port this capability to the presently proposed approach,
which currently lacks that feature.
5.3.5 Model Limitations
It is realistic to pinpoint two limitations of the proposed approach. First, as previously
described in this section, the model flags a campaign when the number of orchestrated
flows within the campaign reach a hard threshold of 100 coordinated sources. Although the
latter is not problematic, we would like to avoid hard thresholds, possibly by assigning a
probability function to the campaign. In this matter, the model would be able to pinpoint
a campaign when the probability reaches a certain confidence level. This interesting
aim is left for future work. Second, it is evident that the model leverages the telescope
space to infer orchestrated probing campaigns. Although the monitored space is relatively
large (i.e., /13), the model is unable to monitor events that do not target such space.
Subsequently, the approach will be unable to correlate those “unseen” activities and thus
will fail to detect and identify all coordinating probing flows. However, we deem the
latter as a generic limitation with any work the leverages the dark space and not a model
limitation per say.
5.4 Behavioral Service Graphs: Inferring the niche of a
Probing Campaign
In this section, we present an approach, by leveraging graph theoretic notions, that aim at
inferring the niche of the detected probing campaigns. It is worthy to note that the niche
of the campaign are rendered by the infected bots (i.e., machines) that are causing the
probing botnet to expand by infecting other nodes. Such capability is highly imperative,
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as it will allows the prompt containment of such nodes to subsequently force the campaign
to diminish.
5.4.1 Proposed Approach
We model the probing machines that show signs of infection coupled with their feature
vectors using what we refer to as Behavioral Service Graphs. Please note that the probing
machines are inferred as such by leveraging the approach from Section 3.2 of Chapter 3.
Further, the feature vectors of each of such machines are generated by using the behav-
ioral analytics from Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4. Behavioral Service graphs are of the form
G = (N,E) where N represents the set of infected probing sources/machines (i.e., nodes)
and E characterizes the edges between such nodes. It is worthy to mention that G is an
undirected complete graph [208], with weights on the edges representing the probability
of behavioral similarity (Pbs) computed by piecewise comparisons between the previously
inferred feature vectors of each of the nodes. Examples of G corresponding to 8 and 20
nodes is shown in Figure 5.23. Another feature of such graphs is that they are designed to
(a) K8 Complete Graph (b) K20 Complete Graph
Figure 5.23: Illustration of Undirected Complete Behavioral Service Graphs
provide additional forensic evidence related to what service is being probed. The service
is rendered by the destination port number inferred from the detected probing packets.
Hence, the word ‘Service’ in Behavioral Service Graphs. Therefore, in essence, each con-
structed graph is actually modeling infected machines, their behavioral similarity and what
specific network service is being probed.
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The proposed approach further executes two steps to retrieve the niche number of
infected machines for a given probing campaign.
First, given a complete Behavioral Service Graph G = (N,E), the approach extracts
a subgraph G′ = (N ′, E′) where N ′ = N and E′ ⊆ E. This aims at reducing the number
of edges while maximizing the behavior probability between the infected machines (i.e.,
nodes). To achieve this task, we employ the graph theoretical concept of a maximum
spanning tree [209] by implementing a slightly modified version of Kruskal’s algorithm
[210]. Although there exists a plethora of approaches for the creation of maximum span-
ning trees, the latter algorithm was the basis of many and is abundantly available in
numerous tool sets. For illustration purposes, if we apply the algorithm on the K8 and
K20 complete graphs of Figure 5.23, the outcome could be represented as in Figure 5.24.
Second, to understand the structure of the subgraph formed by members of a campaign
(a) K8 SubGraph (b) K20 SubGraph
Figure 5.24: The application of Maximum Spanning Trees on Complete Behavioral Service
Graphs
on a Behavioral Service Graph, suppose that there are m bots (i.e., infected machines)
in the network, and therefore there are m corresponding nodes on the graph. Let the set
X = {X1, X2, · · · , Xm} denote these nodes and Pe denote the probability of having an
edge between any given Xi and Xj , for i 6= j where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m . Since
Pe would exist with an equal and a random probability given any pair of Xi and Xj , the
subgraph formed by the nodes X1, X2, · · ·, Xm on a Behavioral Service Graph is indeed
an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph [211, 212], where each possible edge in the graph possesses
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an equal probability of being created.
One interesting property shown by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi is that, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs
have a sharp threshold of edge probability for graph connectivity [212]. Simplified, if the
edge-probability is greater than such threshold, then all of the nodes produced by such a
model will be strongly connected. Erdo˝s and Re´nyi have shown that the sharp connec-
tivity threshold is ths =
lnθ
θ , where θ is the number of nodes in the graph. The proposed
approach exploits this neat graph theoretic property; given the previously extracted max-
imum spanning tree subgraph, the approach eliminates all nodes/edges whose bot-edge
probability (i.e., behavioral similarity Pbs) is less than ths, deeming the rest of the nodes,
given such formal forensic evidence, as the minimum number of infected machines (i.e.,
the niche) forming a campaign.
In conclusion, according to the random peer selection model, the niche members
of the same infected campaign are expected to be closely connected to each other on a
subgraph extracted from Behavioral Service Graphs.
5.4.2 Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed approach in two different deployment scenarios using two real
datasets. This aims at validating the accuracy, effectiveness and simplicity of the generated
network-based evidence as well as demonstrating the portability of the proposed approach.
Scenario 1: Enterprise Capability
In this first scenario, Behavioral Service Graphs are employed to infer infected machines
within an enterprise network. Although the notion of an enterprise network could extend
to an Internet service provider or even a backbone network, in this scenario, for simplicity
purposes, we depict a small department within an organization having a deployment set-
ting similar to what is illustrated in Figure 5.25. Such department includes 26 machines
that are connected to the Internet via an enterprise commodity edge server. The proposed




Figure 5.25: The proposed approach deployed as an enterprise edge engine
Building the ground truth
In order to systematically assess the accuracy of the proposed scheme, one needs to know
the IP addresses/hosts of the members of the malicious campaign in a given network.
Otherwise, nothing can be said about the true positive or false alarm rate.
In order to establish the ground truth for our experiment, we obtained 10 GB of real
probing traffic dataset retrieved from the Carna botnet15. The latter orchestrated cam-
paign is rendered as one of the largest and most comprehensive IPv4 probing census ever.
Subsequently, we presumed, as shown in Figure 5.25, that 10 out of the 24 machines are
infected and thus are generating their malicious probing traffic towards the Web service
using TCP as the transport protocol and 80 as the destination port number. We success-
fully achieved this by substituting the IP addresses of the assumed infected departmental
machines with 10 IP addresses belonging to 10 unique sources of the Carna botnet that
are probing that service. To provide a realistic evaluation scenario, we now assume that
15http://internetcensus2012.bitbucket.org/download.html
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we have no knowledge about the infected departmental machines. Subsequently, we gen-
erated a legitimate background traffic dataset by leveraging the Security Experimentation
EnviRonment (SEER) tool set16 and randomly merged it17 with the malicious probing
traffic dataset. The newly created merged dataset could be thought of as the network
data generated by the departmental machines and received by the edge server, where the
proposed approach has been deployed for inference and analysis.
Evaluation
By invoking the proposed approach on the merged dataset, the Behavioral Service Graph
and its corresponding maximum spanning tree were inferred as depicted in Figure 5.26.
(a) Enterprise Complete Graph (b) Enterprise SubGraph
Figure 5.26: The creation of the Enterprise Complete and Sub Graphs
A number of observations could be extracted from the complete graph. First, the
number of assembled Behavioral Service Graphs is accurate; the approach generated one
complete graph which is correct as the infected machines in the illustrated scenario are
probing only one service, namely, the Web service. Second, the number of nodes in this
Behavioral Service Graph is also precise; the approach inferred and correlated 10 infected
machines which is consistent with the number of infected departmental machines. Third,
after a semi-automated analysis and comparison that was based on the logged probing
IP traffic flows, we identified that all the 10 machines that the proposed approach has
identified are indeed the same IP addresses of the infected departmental machines (i.e.,
16http://seer.deterlab.net/trac
17using tcpslice available at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpslice/
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the IP addresses of the Carna botnet). Therefore, based on the latter three observations,
we can claim that the proposed approach yielded no false negative or false positive.
However, to further fortify the latter claim in an attempt to generalize it as it ap-
plies to various network scenarios, we performed several other experiments. Specifically,
we were interested in evaluating the accuracy of the proposed approach as (1) the number
of probed services increase in diversity and (2) as the number of infected machines scale
up in the given network. Thus, we first augmented the number of probed services, one
at a time, up to 10 various probed TCP and UDP services. The results disclosed that
the number of generated Behavioral Service Graphs remained accurately reflecting the
number of probed services. Moreover, to verify the scalability of the proposed approach,
we increased the number of ground truth infected machines, by slots of 100, up to 1000
machines. The outcome disclosed around 82% accuracy in terms of constructed number of
nodes and 100% accuracy in terms of the positive infection state of such nodes. Such ex-
periments validate the accuracy of the proposed scheme, yet revealing that such approach
might not be very scalable.
We were further concerned about the quality of the formed cluster provided by the
complete Behavioral Service Graph. Since such graph is supposed to correlate the nodes
based on their infection state as well as their behaviors, we thought it would be signif-
icantly beneficial to assert such grouping of nodes by employing another approach. To
achieve this, we relied on an unsupervised, machine learning data clustering technique,
namely, the k-means algorithm [213]. Typically, the standard k-means algorithm requires,
as apriori knowledge, the number of clusters k. However, since our aim is to provide a
robust evaluation methodology, we relied on an approach to automatically determine the
optimal number of clusters. In particular, we leveraged the Calinski-Harabasz criterion
[214] that operates by systematically verifying various number of clusters and subsequently
recording the variances between and within the formed clusters. To determine the optimal
number of clusters, the metric should be maximized with respect to k; the optimal number
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of clusters is the solution with the highest Calinski-Harabasz index value. To apply the k-
means on the infected 10 nodes as previously inferred by the complete Behavioral Service
Graph, we (1) retrieved their probing traffic from the merged dataset using a simplistic
tcpdump18 filter, (2) extracted their packet features [215] using the open source jNetPcap
API19 and (3) compiled the extracted features into a unified data file and then applied
the k-means algorithm in conjunction with the Calinsk-Harabasz metric on such file. The
outcome of the k-means execution is illustrated in Figure 5.27.
Motivated by [216] that asserted 1) that the relaxed solution of the k-means cluster-
ing, specified by the cluster indicators, could be given by the principal components from
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique [217] and 2) that the PCA subspace
spanned by the principal directions is identical to the cluster centroid subspace, Figure
5.27 reveals the formed cluster on the first two principal axes of the PCA. One can no-
tice the formation of one, and only one, relatively strongly correlated cluster. This result
strongly advocates that the nodes possess strong similarity characteristics. In summary,
such outcome that was generated by approaching the clustering problem from another
perceptive, indeed validates the grouping capability of the infected machines (i.e., nodes)
that is provided by the constructed complete Behavioral Service Graph.
Thus, up to this stage, an enterprise forensic investigator can leverage such precise
and actionable evidence for prompt detection, containment and mitigation of such infected
machines from the concerned network. Intuitively, an investigator can as well isolate such
machines to collect additional evidence by monitoring their network and system activities
for auxiliary data analysis or extraction of digital artifacts. The latter evidence could be
exploited to generate signatures of attacks or for thoroughly analyzing a specific security
phenomenon of interest.
Extracted from the Behavioral Service Graph, the enterprise subgraph that is de-





















Probing Packets of Infected Machines in the
            Behavioral Service Graph
Figure 5.27: Validating the clustering capability of the complete Behavioral Service Graph
formal forensic evidence that clustered the machines into a well-defined orchestrated in-
fected campaign. Recall, that the formality arises from the fusion of the bots behavioral
similarly as previously extracted by the behavioral analytics of Section 4.2.3 coupled with
the graph theoretical notion of a maximum spanning tree. Second, and more importantly
in our opinion, the approach was able, by leveraging Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, to infer
the niche members of that infected campaign. From Figure 5.26, one can notice that 2
out of the 10 nodes are colored differently than red (i.e., in blue and green). In fact, the
proposed approach revealed that these two nodes render the creation of the campaign.
Thus, in theory, these nodes should have caused the creation of the campaign in the first
place. To validate this, we manually investigated those IP addresses by going back to the
Carna botnet dataset. Our investigation showed that these two IP addresses are used as
root nodes in the botnet to infect other machines for propagation purposes. The latter fact
was further validated as these two nodes were among the top 3 nodes to generate most of
the probing traffic in the dataset. The latter formal forensic evidence could be promptly
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exploited by investigators to prioritize the eradication of those two nodes in order to seize
the expansion of the campaign on their networks. This would indeed significantly limit
any present or future possible sustained collateral damage and any symptoms of infection
that could be caused by the infected bots.
Scenario 2: Global Capability
In the previous scenario, we have demonstrated how the proposed scheme can be ex-
ploited to operate within the context of an enterprise network. In this section, we port
the approach to a global scale and elaborate on how it can be employed to monitor, infer
and distribute Internet-scale forensic intelligence. Thus, in this scenario, the approach is
envisioned to operate in a model similar to what is dubbed as a global Security Opera-
tion Center (SOC). Typically, such operational centers have access to significant various
real-time and raw data streams from around the globe. They often exploit such data for
analysis, correlation and generation of intelligence that would be distributed to concerned
parties for alert and mitigation purposes. Such centers were initially formed as global
independent entities to combat an increasing trend of external (in contrary to internal)
threats and attacks.
Thus, in this second scenario, Behavioral Service Graphs are postulated to be de-
ployed as an additional forensic capability in one of those SOC centers. In this context,
we operate the scheme by investigating darknet data.
Evaluation
From our darknet data repository, we extract one week of data (≈ 80 GB) retaining to
the period of October 4th to October 11th, 2012. The aim is to employ the proposed
approach on such data to evaluate the scheme’s capability and effectiveness in disclosing
insights related to that reported campaign.
By executing the proposed approach on the extracted probing traffic from our dark-
net dataset, the outcome demonstrated that one of the Behavioral Service Graphs was
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Figure 5.28: The proposed approach revealing the bots of the SQL probing campaign
indeed able to infer and correlate around 800 unique sources20 targeting the SQL service.
Further, the behavioral analytics (1) showed strong behavioral similarity between those
sources and (2) inferred that those sources were indeed bots, thus providing strong evi-
dence that such campaign was triggered from Internet-wide infected machines. The latter
inferred bots could be visualized as in Figure 5.28. Additionally, it might be interesting
to mention that the proposed approach deemed 84 bots as the niche of the campaign.
Thus, provided with such forensic evidence, SOC analysts can demand an immediate
take-down of those 84 bots to limit the expansion of such campaign on the global Inter-
net. Supplementary, they can promptly notify concerned parties to employ mitigation
approaches against the abuse of SQL servers.




In this section, we review the related work on various concerned topics.
Extracting Probing Events: Li et al. [129] considered large spikes of unique
source counts as probing events. The authors extracted those events from darknet traf-
fic using time series analysis; they first automatically identified and extracted the rough
boundaries of events and then manually refined the event starting and ending times. At
this point, they used manual analysis and visualization techniques to extract the event.
In an alternate work, Jin et al. [218] considered any incoming flow that touches any
temporary dark (grey) IP address as potentially suspicious. The authors narrowed down
the flows with sustained suspicious activities and investigated whether certain source or
destination ports are repeatedly used in those activities. Using these ports, the authors
separated the probing activities of an external host from other traffic that is generated
from the same host. In contrast, in this work, we propose a method that exploits a unique
observation related to the signal correlation status of probing events. By leveraging this,
CSC-Detector’s fingerprinting engine is able to differentiate between probing and other
events and subsequently extract the former from incoming darknet traffic.
Analyzing Probing Events: The authors of [218, 219] studied probing activities
towards a large campus network using netflow data. Their goal was to infer the probing
strategies of scanners and thereby assess the harmfulness of their actions. They introduced
the notion of gray IP space, developed techniques to identify potential scanners, and sub-
sequently studied their scanning behaviors. In another work, the authors of [129, 220, 221]
presented an analysis that drew upon extensive honeynet data to explore the prevalence of
different types of scanning. Additionally, they designed mathematical and observational
schemes to extrapolate the global properties of scanning events including total population
and target scope. In contrary, we aim at inferring large-scale probing campaigns rather
than focusing on analyzing probing events. To achieve that, CSC-Detector’s inference and
analysis engines collaborate to scrutinize the behavior of probing events as perceived by a
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darknet and subsequently automatically build patterns that aim at correlating the probing
sources into well-defined campaigns.
Probing Measurement Studies: In addition to [177, 123], Benoit et al. [222]
presented the world’s first Web census while Heidemann et al. [223] were among the first
to survey edge hosts in the visible Internet. Further, Pryadkin et al. [224] offered an em-
pirical evaluation of IP address space occupancy whereas Cui and Stolfo [225] presented
a quantitative analysis of the insecurity of embedded network devices obtained from a
wide-area scan. In a slightly different work, Leonary and Loguinov [169] demonstrated
IRLscanner, a tool which aimed at maximizing politeness yet provided scanning rates that
achieved coverage of the Internet in minutes. In this work, as previously mentioned, we
strive to infer large-scale probing campaigns rather than solely providing measurements
of particular probing events.
Botnet Detection Frameworks: A number of botnet detection systems have been
proposed in the literature [226, 227, 228, 229]. Some investigates specific channels, others
might require deep packet inspection or training periods, while the majority depends on
malware infections and/or attack life-cycles. To the best of our knowledge, none of the
proposals is dedicated to tackle the problem of inferring large-scale probing campaigns.
Further, in this work, we aim to achieve that task by analyzing the dark IP space and by
focusing on the machinery of the probing sources, without requiring content analysis or
training periods.
Indeed, as stated by CAIDA in [178], the capability to infer large-scale orchestrated




First, this chapter presented CSC-Detector, a systematic effort towards the challenging
goal of detecting and identifying large-scale orchestrated probing campaigns specifically
tailored towards the dark IP space. The system was primarily motivated by the prompt
need for such a cyber security capability as stated by CAIDA [177, 178]. The system’s fin-
gerprinting engine exploits a unique observation to extract probing activities from darknet
traffic. Consequently, CSC-Detector’s inference engine employs a set of behavioral ana-
lytics to generate insights that capture numerous characteristics of the probing sources.
Last but not least, the system’s analysis engine leverages several criteria, methods and
approaches to automatically identify and correlate the probing sources into well-defined
campaigns. CSC-Detector was empirically evaluated using significant amount of real dark-
net data. The recently inferred CSCs, which were validated using DShield data, indeed
demonstrates that the system exhibits promising accuracy and can generate substantial
evidence to infer diverse large-scale probing campaigns.
Second, this chapter also approached the problem of inferring orchestrated probing
campaigns but from a time series perspective. The motivation behind that was two-
folds. First, from an efficiency perspective, we thought it would be desirable to work
with the artifact of the data rather than the data itself. Second, scientifically, it is typi-
cally more sound to generate inferences and insights using formal methods and approaches
rather than depending on statistical inferences or heuristics. Thus, also in this section,
we uniquely modeled the challenging task of inferring probing campaigns as a problem of
interpolating and predicting time series in the presence of missing values. Initially, the
model extracts independent probing flows as perceived by the telescope. Subsequently,
the model builds numerous time series clusters sharing similar traffic features. For data
completion purposes, the model employs trigonometric interpolation on such probing time
series. To infer possible orchestration behavior, the model executes state space modeling
in conjunction with a time-varying window algorithm. Finally, to assert orchestration, the
model exploits the usage of the coordinated sources by leveraging a similarity of closeness
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technique. Simulation analysis have authenticated the choice of the employed theoretical-
based techniques as core components of the proposed model, while empirical evaluations
indeed demonstrated the promptness and accuracy of the proposed model in comparison
with a previous work.
Third, this chapter had devised Behavioral Service Graphs, an approach that is able
to effectively process, analyze and correlate large volumes of network traffic to generate, in
a very prompt manner, formal, highly-accurate and actionable network forensic evidence
that could be leveraged by investigators to infer the niche of the the probing botnets.
Rigorous empirical evaluations with real data under two different deployment scenarios




The ever increasing population and adoption of cyberspace has been a great asset both
socially and economically. The complete embracing of cyberspace technologies allowed
the creation and implementation of new ideas that tremendously facilitate everyday tasks.
Critical infrastructure heavily depend on information and communication technologies to
operate successfully. However, recent events demonstrated that cyberspace could be sub-
jected to amplified, debilitating and disrupting attacks that might lead to severe security
issues with drastic consequences.
This thesis was dedicated to tackle the ever increasing cyber security concern ren-
dered by probing activities, which are a core facilitator of numerous cyber security inci-
dents. We successfully achieved the latter by employing passive monitoring of the Internet
IP space, also known as network telescopes.
In particular, in this thesis, we primarily reviewed the literature in terms of probing
approaches, probing techniques as well as distributed probing detection methods. Conse-
quently, we concentrated our research work towards the problem of inferring enterprise and
Internet-scale probing activities. After inferring such malicious activities, we attempted
to correlate the latter with malware samples for attribution and containment purposes.
The last problem that we tackled in this thesis was rendered by inferring and attributing
large-scale probing campaigns, which define a new era of of such malevolent events.
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From the conducted research, we can extract the following points/research gaps:
• Inferring and attributing botnets or malicious campaigns by solely monitoring the
dark IP space is very challenging due to the passive nature of such IP space. There-
fore, other interactive techniques such as honeypots could be used in conjunction
with darknet analysis to enhance botnet investigation.
• Differentiating between scan-based amplification attacks and probing activities is
still partially in the gray area. More robust and practical approaches are required
to investigate the latter.
• Packet analysis is the only technique employed on darknet data to investigate spoof-
ing activities. This method is rendered by inspecting ICMP packets and TTL values.
Minimal research has been executed to study spoofing events through darknet anal-
ysis. Therefore, spoofing is still a noteworthy malicious activity that needs more
attention from the security research community.
• Filtering darknet misconfiguration is still not thoroughly investigated in the litera-
ture and hence requires more attention from the research community.
• Mobile darknet is a new research trend that has a promising future in the area of
passive monitoring. Future deployment could include mobile-based VoIP darknets.
• Despite the existence of few collaborative darknet projects, more darknet resources
and information sharing efforts should emerge to infer and attribute large-scale cy-
ber activities. Indeed, establishing a worldwide darknet information exchange is a
capability that requires collaboration and trust; however, this collaboration necessi-
tates the implementation of numerous global policies and undoubtedly would raise
serious privacy concerns.
As for future work, we aim at tackling the following research and development topics:
• The design and implementation of cyber threat intelligence approaches for critical
infrastructure protection by leveraging big data analytics.
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• The analysis of the implications of IPv6 assignment on Internet passive monitoring.
• The design and implementation of robust non-heuristical correlation mechanisms
between various cyber security data feeds.
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